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Paper Abstracts
Taxes and Regional Transfers in an Economic Geography Setting
The paper analyses the effects of introducing taxes and regional transfers on the equilibrium
properties in a standard Core-Periphery model. A central government levies taxes on produc-
tion factors and redistributes the revenue to all agents regardless of their location. In the case
of Core-Periphery economy this is in effect a re-allocation of agglomeration rents. Simulations
show that taxes and transfers alter the Core-Periphery model’s properties by moving the Break
and Sustain points. The range of freeness of trade with Core-Periphery outcomes is reduced
for transfers to the periphery, and increased for transfers to the core. The width of the overlap
where the models exhibit hysteresis effects remains the same regardless of the transfers. The
analysis reveals that in the Core-Periphery outcome the agglomeration rents can be taxed with-
out exhausting the core’s scale effects. The tax revenues can then be redistributed such that
periphery regions and the central government have incentives in promoting core regions, which
function as industrial locomotives for the whole economy.
iii
Congestion, Fiscal Equalisation and Local Public Goods Provision
The paper extends the canonical two region Core-Periphery model of Krugman (1991) with
congestion costs to capture negative effects of urbanisation. The congestion costs act as an
extra dispersion force in the model, and this reduces the range of freeness of trade for which
the economy exhibits agglomeration. In addition, a new symmetric stable equilibrium replaces
the Core-Periphery state for high levels of integration. Then the model is extended by consid-
ering local governments supplying public goods. The production of public goods binds local
factors and raises factor costs in the regions, thus enhancing the dispersing force even more.
At the same time, however, supply of local public goods and services will attract mobile labour,
concentrating economic activity. These extra effects change dramatically the properties of the
standard Core-Periphery model. In particular, the range of freeness of trade for which the
economy exhibits agglomeration is reduced.
Danish Regional Models
After the recent reform of the Danish municipal structure, the equalisation grant scheme in place
also needed a reform. This paper constructs a regional computable general equilibrium model
of Denmark to analyse the effects on regional income and the locational production structure
from the reform. The equalisation grant reform transfers 900 million kroner from the regional
public sector in East Denmark to West Denmark. Simulations show that the contraction of the
regional public sector i Copenhagen creates room for the knowledge intensive clusters to ex-
pand. But the corresponding growth in the Western public sector squeezes the private industries
in those regions. However, the scale effects inherent in the clusters in Copenhagen leads to pro-
duction increase so that the national welfare increases as a result of the equalisation reform.
The theoretical foundation used to build the CGE model is economic geography as described in
Fujita, Krugman and Venables (1999), characterised by monopolistic competition assumptions
and agglomeration characteristics. The paper introduces a methodology to regionalise national
data using available information on regional supply of labour and capital. This is also used to
calculate an interregional trade matrix.
iv
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Each year when the Danish government presents the yearly state budget, the proposal is attached
a forecast and an impact assessment of the policies in the proposal. These calculations are based
on complex economic models, such as the ADAM model and the DREAM model.1 The former
being a model based on econometric estimations and the latter being a computable general
equilibrium model. The models’ contributions lie in their ability to calculate the economic
effects of policy changes or initiatives and, to some extent, forecast economic performance.
And with these tools enable politicians to evaluate and decide what policies to follow. Thus,
when the state budget is passed, the decision is well-informed.
The Danish economic production structure has a regional dimension, with almost half the pro-
duction taking place in the Copenhagen region, and the rest being more evenly distributed.
Also, there is a large part of Danish firms that engage in strong international trade and compete
on the global markets. In addition, we can observe that these globally oriented industries has a
1Economic Modelling, Statistics Denmark (2008) and DREAM-group (2008).
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tendency to cluster in small geographic areas. Since firms in these industries could have located
themselves anywhere, there must be some kind of benefit of concentrating, see for example
Porter (2003). The focus on clusters and agglomeration effects are an integral part of regional
policies in other countries. Norway, Sweden, Finland and Austria all have Centres of Expertise
that invest in promoting growth through active cluster policies. There is strong belief in scale
effects from agglomeration of economic activity.
But the regional perspective and the agglomeration patterns of clusters cannot be accounted for
in models built on national scale which the ADAM and DREAM models are. They are simply
not built for the purpose of analysing regional effects, and cannot, therefore, give the level of
information needed to evaluate policies with regional implications. For instance cluster policy
initiatives.
To give such a foundation for policy evaluation, the present dissertation offers regional com-
putable general equilibrium models built with agglomeration characteristics based on the eco-
nomic geography literature. This topic is treated over the next three chapters. First, by analysing
conceptual models of economic geography extended with features needed for the final policy
analysis. These features include interregional transfers between local governments and supply
of local public produced goods. The insights from the conceptual analyses are carried further
when an applied regional model is constructed. The regional model is built around the Danish
administrative regions and Danish production structure in order to be a tool for regional policy
analysis. The presented model is then used to give a regional evaluation of the recent reform of
the municipal and regional equalisation scheme in Denmark. In effect, the reform transfers extra
money from the richer Eastern part of Denmark to the Western part, but the change in interre-
gional transfers is relatively small compared to the local governments’ budgets. In spite of this,
the reform of the equalisation scheme does have significant effects on the regional production
structure, especially the clustering sectors across the Danish landscape.
2
The next two chapters add extensions stepwise to the models in order to get a better under-
standing of how the textbook versions of agglomeration models change when introducing extra
features. In chapter 2, the first set of extensions of taxes and regional transfers are introduced,
and this is followed by an analysis of how the agglomeration pattern in the economy changes
as a consequence of this introduction. In chapter 3, a further set of extensions are built into the
modelling setup. These further extensions are costs associated with congestion in large urban
areas, and the supply of local public goods from the local governments. Again, it is shown how
these further features in the model change by reinforcing of diminish the concentration or dis-
persion forces of economic activity in the economy. With the results from these two chapters,
a better understanding is established on how the economic forces work in an economy with
regions and agglomeration characteristics such as the Danish economy. This leads to chapter 4,
where as mentioned above, an applied model is presented and used. Finally, a few concluding
remarks are given in chapter 5.
3
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Taxes and Regional Transfers in an
Economic Geography Setting
The paper analyses the effects of introducing taxes and regional transfers on the equilibrium
properties in a standard Core-Periphery model. A central government levies taxes on produc-
tion factors and redistributes the revenue to all agents regardless of their location. In the case
of Core-Periphery economy this is in effect a re-allocation of agglomeration rents. Simulations
show that taxes and transfers alter the Core-Periphery model’s properties by moving the Break
and Sustain points. The range of freeness of trade with Core-Periphery outcomes is reduced
for transfers to the periphery, and increased for transfers to the core. The width of the overlap
where the models exhibit hysteresis effects remains the same regardless of the transfers. The
analysis reveals that in the Core-Periphery outcome the agglomeration rents can be taxed with-
out exhausting the core’s scale effects. The tax revenues can then be redistributed such that
periphery regions and the central government have incentives in promoting core regions, which
function as industrial locomotives for the whole economy.
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2.1 Introduction
In most nations there are some regions that are better off than other regions. The common ex-
ample being that urban areas are wealthier than rural areas on a per capita basis. From an egal-
itarian point of view, these differences in income represent undesirable differences in welfare
for agents in the regions, and policy makers have implemented various instruments to address
this. This policy of equalisation is in place almost regardless of the regional scale; even small
countries have transfers at the level of local governments – the municipalities – and in some
cases transfers exist between nations in economic unions. Denmark, Sweden and Norway are
examples of the former and The European Union of the latter.
The exact design of these transfers varies from grant programs to directly equalising tax revenue,
but at the core they all serve the purpose of equalising welfare or income across regions. The
issue is also to ensure that the less well-off regions have the ability to supply a minimum of
public goods, whether it is health care services or basic infrastructure. The political desire
to make citizens equally well-off is widespread across countries in the world and the most
used instrument is directly transferring income from the rich to the poor regions. For instance
in Denmark, the richer municipalities pay a fraction of their local tax revenue to the poorer
municipalities, and the central government issues grants to the municipalities depending on
what public services the local governments are required to supply.1
Returning to the underlying driver of equalisation policies: economic activity is typically con-
centrated in centres. Thus, the premise of equalisation is the observation of economic space
being uneven. The focus of economic geography has been to understand concentration patterns
of production across space. Much activity is placed at obvious locations, such as mining and oil
production where the resources are extracted. Natural geography also determines locations for
1See Boadway (2003) for a survey on where transfers are used and the issues of equalisation, including consid-
erations of efficiency and fiscal equity for agents.
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harbours or transportation hubs, agricultural land or fishing banks. But economic activity con-
centrates much more than the natural geography warrants, and the study of economic geography
relates to what else drives this concentration. So, whether concentration happens for obvious
reasons through natural geography or there are other intrinsic drivers for the phenomena, space
should be taken into account when analysing the effects of policy based on exactly the premise
of equalising income.
The current paper addresses this issue as both space and regional transfers are integral parts.
The theoretical framework is the Economic Geography (EG) literature, especially the work by
Krugman (1991) and Fujita et al. (1999). It is a contribution to the research agenda requested
in Fujita and Krugman (2003) (p. 158), namely constructing applied agglomeration models to
better understand the agglomeration patterns across the world. Ottaviano (2002) (p. 15) also
motivates this research agenda in addressing the need for using economic geography for policy
analysis, and in the end be able to draw applied policy from what agglomeration models show,
and on that note work with the models even if they have built in agglomeration forces. As
they put it: “...for policy analysis to proceed, the first step is precisely to take the models liter-
ally.” There is a comprehensive coverage of various policy aspects in agglomeration models in
Baldwin, Forslid, Martin, Ottaviano and Robert-Nicoud (2003), and they are also proponents
of entering into the arena of policy analysis. Here I present a new extension to the economic
geography models that accounts for regional transfer of tax revenue. Furthermore, I analyse
what this does to our understanding of patterns of economic concentration when, for exam-
ple, equalisation policies are implemented. Policies that, in a sense, try to counter the effects
agglomeration of economic activity entails.
The analysis shows that equalisation schemes will alter concentration patterns of economic ac-
tivity. In particular, regional equalisation policies reduce agglomeration forces in the economy.
Concentrated regions become more vulnerable to losing the concentration altogether. In eco-
7
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nomic geography models it is the freeness of trade, manifested by transport costs, that is the
decisive factor in determining the sustainability of an agglomeration. If freeness of trade is
below a certain level, or equivalently if transport costs are above a certain level, the dispersing
forces dominate, economic activity will move away from centres, and agglomeration breaks
down. And with equalisation policies imposed, the point where agglomeration breaks down is
moved to a higher level of freeness of trade. In other words, policy makers risk the viability of
economic centres when imposing equalisation schemes, even though their goal is just to tax the
economic centre – not dismantle it. The risk stems from the alteration of the economic forces,
thus destabilising the prevalent equilibrium. The benefit of concentrated economic activity sim-
ply disappears. However, it is shown that it is possible to design the taxes and equalisation
scheme so that the risk of a collapse of economic centres is removed.
I will refrain from recommending any optimal policy in the paper. Such a recommendation
would require an assumption of an optimality criterion, e.g. a social welfare function that a
government can maximise using the tax and transfer instruments. The purpose of this paper,
then, is to analyse only the positive (and not normative) effects of different government initia-
tives.
The results reported here support the basic hypothesis that it is vital to take changes in ag-
glomeration forces into account when designing regional transfers. For regional equalisation
schemes, the results imply that a concentration of economic activity can be taxed and some of
the revenue be transferred to a periphery, but only to a certain extent. And possibly, equalisa-
tion policy needs to be combined with other initiatives that increase freeness of trade as to avoid
centres from breaking down.
In section 2.2, the paper continues by giving a brief overview of related literature. The following
section 2.3 gives an outline of the basic model. In section 2.4, I describe the extension in
8
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the form of transfers and define several scenarios for analysis. This is followed by section
2.5, where I present the results of the simulations. Finally, section 2.6 offers conclusions and
implications of the reported results.
2.2 Related Literature
There have been several investigations related to regional government actors in a spatial frame-
work of economic geography. These have been mainly focused on tax competition and regional
investments. Several authorities, each setting taxes, give rise to problems of tax competition
to attract economic activity. Also as the regional expenditure can influence the agglomeration
patterns of the economy, investment decisions of regional governments come into play.
Andersson and Forslid (2003) observe that agglomeration gives rise to rents and they show
that a redistributive tax between mobile and immobile workers can be imposed, and such a tax
reduces the incentive for tax competition. Baldwin and Krugman (2004) analyse a tax setting
game of two regions where one region is already in an agglomerated state, and find that the
concentrated region can set taxes higher than the other region without losing the concentration
altogether. However, this positive tax gap is only present for a specific range of transport costs
and is hump-shaped within that range. This ’hump’ represents an agglomeration rent that can
be taxed without the agglomeration breaking down. However, as the results in section 2.5
show, the tax instrument is a much stronger instrument than these papers suggest. Taxing the
agglomeration rent actually reduces the range of transport costs where there is a hump to tax.
Higher taxes not only drain the scale effects of agglomeration, but also weaken the forces of
agglomeration.
Ludema and Wooton (2000) also analyse redistributive taxes and they find that agglomeration
reduces tax competition between regions, so that the stronger the agglomeration forces are, the
9
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higher is the level of equilibrium taxes. Gaigné and Riou (2007) introduces fiscal equalisa-
tion schemes between regional governments. They show that when the regional tax revenue is
equalised, tax competition is significantly reduced, thus promoting a rise in overall tax revenue.
Gaigné and Riou (2004) find that revenue sharing between different levels of government may
lead to efficient tax setting without coordination, but only for high levels of transport costs. For
lower levels of transport costs the revenue sharing leads to a race to the bottom of the local
taxes. The evidence on redistributive taxes thus seems inconclusive.
Welfare effects of public policy are studied in Charlot and Gaigné (2001). They show that
policy toward the periphery region could be both equalising but also efficient in welfare terms,
but only when transport costs are in the Core-Periphery range. If transport costs are outside
that range, the authors cannot show justification of public policy using any welfare criterion.
Contrary to the findings in the present paper, regional transfers do not improve overall welfare
in the case of a dispersed economy, unless an agglomeration can be induced by the transfer, i.e.
if the transfers are strong enough to strengthen the agglomeration forces such that a symmetric
equilibrium becomes unstable – and an agglomeration ensures.
Charlot, Caigné, Robert-Nicoud and Thisse (2004) compare the two outcomes of the Core-
Periphery model using the Pareto, utilitarian and Rawlsian welfare criteria. That is, if the Core-
Periphery outcome is better or more efficient than the dispersed equilibrium. When there are
compensation schemes they fail to determine which outcome is best, and the evaluation of the
best outcome is too heavily dependent on social perceptions and values of equality. They do
suggest, however, that there could be an over-concentration, i.e. governments should pursue a
more even distribution of activity. In effect, they are proponents for equalisation schemes in the
Core-Periphery outcome.
By considering regional transfers in an economic geography setting, the present paper extends
10
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the research papers related above. As the foundation, I use the standard Core-Periphery model
from Krugman (1991). This choice is founded on the fact that the model describes the theo-
retical constructs in the most general form, whereas other versions of geography models add
more complex structures, e.g. mixed factor inputs or international capital flows as in Forslid
and Ottaviano (2003) and Martin and Rogers (1995), respectively. In fact, most of the papers
mentioned above use the models of these two papers. In the standard version, used here, the
underlying assumptions are less restrictive, but at the cost of not having closed form solutions,
thus only being solvable using numerical methods. But since computational power is readily
available this is not a problem, and the Krugman (1991) model is preferred. The next section
describes the setup of the Core-Periphery model in more detail.
2.3 Benchmark Model
The analysis is that of Krugman (1991), i.e. a closed economy with two regions. There are
two production sectors, one that produces a homogeneous good and one that produces het-
erogeneous, differentiated goods. There are two factors of production; skilled and unskilled
labour. The consumers have identical homothetic preferences, and have a two-tier utility func-
tion where the top tier is a Cobb-Douglas function over the homogeneous and heterogeneous
goods, and the bottom tier is a CES composite over all the varieties of the heterogeneous goods.
In the following subsections only a single location is considered in order to keep the algebra
manageable.
2.3.1 Consumers
The consumers’ utility function is:
U = A1−µMµ , M =
(
n
∑
i=1
m
σ−1
σ
i
) σ
σ−1
, σ > 1, (2.1)
11
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where A is the homogeneous good and M is the heterogeneous composite of the n varieties.
A single variety is denoted as mi. The cost share of the heterogeneous composite is µ , while
σ is the elasticity of substitution between varieties. The consumers’ problem is solved in the
usual two step approach, first minimising expenditure of the composite and then maximising the
utility of the top-tier function. This reveals the following uncompensated demand for a single
variety:
mi = µEp−σi P
σ−1, P=
(
n
∑
i=1
p1−σi
) 1
1−σ
, (2.2)
where E is the total expenditure, pi is the price of the variety and P is the CES price index of
the composite. Assuming that the number of varieties is large, the price index is perceived by
the agents to be unaffected by changes in the price of a single variety. Thus, the elasticity of
demand is perceived to be σ . If the prices for each variety are the same, pm, the CES price
index reduces to
P=
(
n
∑
i=1
p1−σi
) 1
1−σ
= pmn
1
1−σ . (2.3)
It can be easily seen that if σ > 1, the index falls as the number of varieties increases. The size
of this effect depends on the perceived elasticity of substitution between varieties. Turning to
the homogeneous good, the uncompensated demand is derived from the usual cost share of the
Cobb-Douglas function:
A= (1−µ)E 1
pa
, (2.4)
where A is the demand and pa is the price.
2.3.2 Producers
The sector that supplies the homogeneous good, produces under constant returns to scale using
only unskilled labour as input. The other sector exhibits increasing returns to scale in producing
varieties using only skilled labour. Firms maximise profits, and for the homogeneous sector,
this means output price is equal to the unskilled wage level. With respect to the heterogeneous
12
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sector, the first order condition depends on the specific formalisation of the increasing returns
technology. This is represented in the cost functions of firms. For firm i the cost function is
defined as
ci = (α+βqi)ws, (2.5)
where ci is the total cost of producing qi of variety i, and ws is the skilled wage. α and β are the
fixed and variable cost coefficients respectively. The firm acts as a monopoly in the market for
the specific variety, so profit maximisation reveals the monopoly pricing rule
pi
(
1− 1
σ
)
= βws ⇐⇒
pi = βws
1
ρ
, (2.6)
where σ is the perceived elasticity of demand and pi is the output price of variety i. Furthermore,
it is assumed that there are no barriers to entry. As long as there are opportunities for profits,
new firms will establish themselves and produce new varieties. The free entry condition entails
zero profits and this determines the output of each firm. The number of firms is derived from
the input requirement in (2.5) and the available skilled labour force. The output q∗ of an active
firm in the sector is given by:
q∗ =
α
β
(σ −1). (2.7)
By symmetry of the cost functions and demand for varieties, all firms set the same price and
level of output. The total number of firms is then the total skilled labour force divided by the
input requirement of each firm. The input needed to produce is l∗ = α+βq∗ and inserting (2.7)
gives l∗ = ασ . Dividing this into the available resources yields the following number of firms
n=
Ls
ασ
, (2.8)
where Ls is the endowment of skilled labour.
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2.3.3 Many Locations, Transport Costs and Factor Mobility
Considering many locations, where a geography with physical distance is defined, it assumed
that there are costs associated with transporting the heterogeneous goods between locations.
Specifically, the costs are modelled as iceberg transport costs where a fraction of the good melts
in transit from location c to d. The price in location d of a variety shipped from location c is
pd = tc,d pc. Then the price index from (2.3) becomes
Pd =
(
∑
c
nc
[
pctc,d
]1−σ) 11−σ
. (2.9)
Inserting the transport costs into the derivations of consumer demand for varieties, the uncom-
pensated demand from (2.2) is rewritten. By symmetry, the demand is the same for each variety:
mc = µEd
(
pctc,d
)−σ Pσ−1d . (2.10)
Notice that this does not change the perceived elasticity of demand. The price setting and output
profile of the firms is, therefore, unchanged.
It is assumed that skilled labour is not tied to a specific location, skilled labour is ’footloose.’
However, unskilled labour remains fixed to a location. The mobility of skilled workers is driven
by the desire for the highest real wages, and they are willing to relocate to achieve this. However,
the relocation of skilled labour is not assumed to be instantaneous – only a fraction of the labour
force moves at a time, otherwise the model will become highly unstable. Denoting the share of
skilled labour in location c as λc, the change in the share is given by:
λ˙c = γ (ωc− ω¯)λc, ω¯ =∑
c
ωcλc, (2.11)
where ωc is the real wage in location c and ω¯ is the average real wage of the whole economy.
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The equation is multiplied by the share to ensure that changes in all shares sum to zero. The
speed of adjustment is given by the coefficient γ . If the real wage in a location is lower than
the average, a fraction of the skilled workers will emigrate and – vice versa – if the real wage
in a location is higher, then skilled workers will immigrate to that location. As the heteroge-
neous sector depends on the skilled labour force for producing, the location of the labour also
determines where the firms will locate. Each firm uses the same amount of skilled labour and
has the same level of output, so the share of the heterogeneous industry in a location is equal to
the share of skilled labour, i.e. the concentration of skilled workers and the agglomeration of
industry are equivalent results, and I will use the terms interchangeably in the rest of the paper.
The model contains three main forces that either concentrate or disperse activity. Following the
naming in Krugman (1991), these are:
The first is the backward linkage effect, and it concentrates activity. Firms want to locate close
to the consumers of their products, i.e. the biggest market. This increases the demand for the
skilled factor and increases the real wage in that region. This induces more migration into the
region and makes the market bigger.
Second is the forward linkage effect, and it also concentrates activity. skilled workers want to
locate close to where their consumer goods are produced in order not to pay the transport cost
mark-up. This increases the amount of skilled labour in a particular location and the number
of firms increases. More varieties will be produced and the price index in the region falls,
increasing the real wage. This again induces more migration.
Third, immobile unskilled workers’ demand is spread evenly across regions and works as a
dispersion force. At the same time the regional competition for consumers coupled with high
real wages will drive companies away to the less concentrated region.
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The final equilibrium of the model depends on the balance of these factors. If the concentrating
forces dominate, the economy ends up in a Core-Periphery state, while a symmetric outcome
will emerge if the dispersing forces dominate.
2.3.4 Implementation
The complexity of the algebra in the Core-Periphery model makes it impossible to solve ana-
lytically, therefore numerical methods have been applied to identify the model’s properties. As
mentioned in the introduction, other versions of EG models have been shown to be solvable,
e.g. Forslid and Ottaviano (2003) and Martin and Rogers (1995), albeit only by adding further
assumptions and restrictions to the framework. The availability of simulation software makes
it possible to solve the original model quite easily, while giving the researcher room for adding
extensions. This is the approach I have chosen in this paper and in general in this dissertation.
Numerical simulations require specific assumptions regarding the model’s parameters, i.e. con-
sumer preferences, production technology, level of transport costs, and factor endowments. The
analysis presented in this paper uses the following values for the parameters. In the utility
function the cost share of the heterogeneous good is µ = 0.4 and the elasticity of substitution
between varieties is σ = 5. The cost share is chosen for homogeneous goods at 60% to comply
with the no-black-hole condition as mentioned in Fujita et al. (1999) p. 58, to avoid the scale
and variety effects spinning out of control. The elasticity of substitution is chosen as a conser-
vative level, which also is in line with Fujita et al. (1999). However in a Danish context, the
chosen cost share of homogeneous goods in the present model here is not high, as the Danish
share is approximately 80%, cf. chapter 4.
For the production technology, the parameters are normalised using σ such to simplify the
expressions in (2.7) and (2.8), i.e. α = 1σ ,β =
σ−1
σ . Finally, for the economy as a whole, there
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are two locations and there is more unskilled labour relative to skilled.
The model is solved for different levels of transport costs and distributions of the skilled labour.
The resulting real wages in the two locations are calculated to determine any immigration pres-
sure. For simplicity only three runs are shown in figure 2.2(a). The diagram is an implicit
representation of the phase diagram belonging to (2.11) and displays the three major types of
dynamic relationships the model exhibits.
Equilibria are identified where the schedules cross the horizontal axis and where they cross the
diagram’s boundaries. On the edges, the economy is completely agglomerated in one location.
Above the horizontal axis the migration is toward location 1, λ1 is increasing, moving to the
right in the diagram. Equivalently, when the wage gap is below the axis, the migration is towards
location 2, moving to the left. For low levels of transport costs, the economy has an unstable
symmetric equilibrium and two stable agglomerated equilibria. In the case of intermediate
transport costs there are three stable equilibria, the symmetric and the two agglomerated. In
addition, there are two unstable with various distribution of labour. Finally, for high transport
costs, there is one stable and two unstable equilibria, the stable is the symmetric while the
unstable are agglomerated.
These patterns of equilibria are condensed into the next diagram, figure 2.2(b). Here the hor-
izontal axis represents the Freeness of Trade, φ = t1−σ . At the leftmost point, φ = 0, there
are prohibitive transport costs (t → ∞) while there is free trade at φ = 1 (t = 1). The fully
drawn lines show the stable equilibria while the dashed lines represent the unstable ones. This
is the Tomahawk Bifurcation known from the literature and it gives a complete description of
all equilibria present in the model, as shown by Robert-Nicoud (2005).
It can be seen that the model exhibits strong path dependency. If the economy is at a low level of
17
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Figure 2.1: Dynamics of the General Core-PeripheryModel
0
0.50
Real Wage Gapω1 − ω2
λ1
Low T
Intermediate T
High T
        
        
         
(a) The Wiggle Diagram
0.0
0.5
1.0
0
Model Equilibria
φs = 0.112
φb = 0.180
λ1
φ
(b) The Tomahawk
trade freeness, industry will be dispersed evenly in the two regions, the symmetric equilibrium.
If a group of workers is relocated, they will experience a drop in the real wage and move back
to regain the higher wage and the symmetric equilibrium is re-established. Raising the freeness
of trade will not change the symmetric distribution of labour unless the initial relocation is of
a significant size, i.e. enough to pass the unstable equilibrium. However, when the freeness of
trade reaches a certain point, the symmetric equilibrium becomes unstable. This is denoted as
the break point, φb. From this point onwards, the economy will always agglomerate toward the
region where the first group of workers moved.
Starting from the other end with completely free trade, the industry will be concentrated in one
region. Lowering the freeness, e.g. erecting trade barriers, the agglomerated equilibrium is
stable until the freeness is reduced to the sustain point, φs. Here the dispersion forces dominate,
i.e. the competition effect is the strongest, and the real wage of the skilled labour is the highest
where it is most scarce. Migration will continue until the labour is evenly distributed and the
symmetric outcome is again the stable equilibrium. Importantly, the break and sustain points
overlap, such that either the agglomeration or dispersion of industry show a significant path
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dependency. If the trade freeness is in the intermediate zone, the exact distribution of industry
crucially depends upon the previous state of the economy, i.e. history matters (Krugman, 1991).
So far, this is a replication of the literature on the Core-Periphery model. The rigidity of the
labour force in the range of intermediate freeness of trade represents an agglomeration rent. A
rent which can be extracted without causing the agglomeration to break down, but this extraction
will influence the agglomeration forces at play. The next section extends the model with taxes
and interregional transfers, as these will function as means of extracting the rent.
2.4 Extensions: Taxes and Transfers
The envisioned economy analysed in this paper, is an area with distinct regions, governed by
a central authority. This could either be municipalities subject to a national government, or on
a higher level, the member states in a union with some kind of supranational authority. The
central authority levies and collects taxes on factor income, and all tax revenue is pooled into
the treasury. Then the government re-distributes the revenue to the consumers in the regions.
Depending on the profile of re-distribution, this will in effect be an interregional transfer system
or even a full fiscal equalisation scheme. By keeping the transfer system in this simple form, the
analysis actually encompasses a wide range of observed transfer regimes. From the case of the
Canadian central authority that collects taxes and distributes to regions, to the case of Danish
municipalities that collect local taxes and pay a fraction of their revenue to the central authority
who then re-distributes the money.
As taxes are set and collected by a single government agent, there is no need for specifying
a tax setting game as in Baldwin and Krugman (2004) and Gaigné and Riou (2007). In those
papers, the regional governments play a game of maximising their local tax revenue subject to
the tax setting of their opponent in a non-cooperative game. However in this paper, the central
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authority sets a national income tax rate, collects the taxes and then distributes the revenue to
the regions according to a predefined rule. In fact, in the exact specification here there are no
local authorities at all. The whole game theoretic aspect is left out of the analysis, because only
the effects of policy initiatives are observed and that there are no policy recommendations. The
consideration is purely on the effects from exogenous decisions by the government agent.
The taxes in question are levied directly on factor income of all agents in the economy using the
same tax rate. The redistribution of tax revenue to consumers is treated as a lump sum transfer to
the agents’ income. Giving the consumers a direct income transfer instead of supplying a public
good eliminates the specification of a public production sector, and especially its technology.
The aspect of public goods is considered in chapter 3, where the model is extended further.
2.4.1 A Central Government
The central government levies taxes on factor income in both regions with the tax rate τ . The
tax revenue, G, is
G=∑
d
τ (wLud+w
s
dL
s
d) , 0≤ τ < 1, (2.12)
where the first element in parenthesis is the region’s total unskilled wage bill and the second
element is the region’s total wage bill for the skilled labour. All tax revenue is transferred back
to consumers using a distribution coefficient: region d’s consumers receive a fraction ξd of
the total revenue. The consumer income less taxes and including transfers is the region’s total
expenditure
Ed = (1− τ)(wLud+wsdLsd)+ξdG, ∀ξd ≥ 0, ∑
d
ξd = 1. (2.13)
Four types of transfer schemes are analysed to give an overview of the full spectrum of possible
regimes. These four transfer regimes range from subsidising the concentrating region, denoted
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All to the Core rule, to compensating the periphery region, denoted as the All to the Periphery
rule. The first two represent end-points of possible transfer rules. The two other rules analysed
can be considered as convex combinations of the end-point transfer rules. The spectrum of pos-
sible transfer rules is then covered by analysing these four rules, and the results will reveal a
range of possible effects. Again, as there are no specific policy recommendations in the paper,
the results will serve the purpose of understanding the workings of the economy subject to var-
ious policy initiatives, i.e. mixes of transfers and taxes. In the following sections I will go into
more detail on each of the four transfer rules, starting with transfers towards the concentrated
region, and ending with the full compensation to the periphery region.
All to the Core
First, when transfers are subsidising the concentrated region, the transfer of tax revenue follows
the skilled work force migration pattern. Thus, when a concentration develops in a region, it
is reinforced by transfers from the other regions. The transfers in this regime are not intended
to compensate or offer any kind of equalisation to a region where firms leave. On the contrary,
they are designed for boosting any tendency of agglomeration. If the economy is on the verge
of agglomerating in one region, but cannot quite achieve the sustained concentration, the central
government can induce and solidify such a concentration through a transfer subsidy. The rule
is considered an end-point since there is no a priori selection of the concentrated region. The
more simple rule of just transferring all tax revenue to one region, regardless of the migration
pattern, requires a further assumption of which region the transfers initially should go to. The
present rule of following migration eliminates the need for this. Formally,
ξd = λd, d = 1,2. (2.14)
In addition, this rule is neutralised in the case of the symmetric equilibrium, because in that case
skilled labour is divided evenly between the two regions and so is the transfer.
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No Transfers
Taxes are collected as if the local governments are completely autonomous. This is to get a
benchmark as if there is no government at all. However, the regime is implemented as a rule
in the model with a central government for easier comparison to the other cases with one tax
collector and re-distributor. To allow for this, the amount to be transferred needs to be equal
to the tax revenue from each region. The local government receives all tax revenue without
any interregional transfer system. With migration, the tax revenue (and transfer) will follow the
movement of the skilled labour. Formally the rule is:
ξd =
τ
(
wLud+w
s
dL
s
d
)
G
, d = 1,2. (2.15)
Inserted to (2.13) reduces to the standard model without a government sector. As the tax is
imposed and given to the consumers as a lump sum transfer, it is as if there is no tax collection
at all.
Equal Shares
This rule is the no-frills fiscal equalisation scheme in its simplest form. There is no consid-
eration as to the size, endowments or tax base in the regions. The total tax revenue is simply
divided into two equal chunks, and given to the regions’ consumers. In effect, the rule will
function as a moderate transfer from a concentrated region to a periphery region, since the tax
revenue in the concentrated region is higher. Formally,
ξd =
1
2
, d = 1,2. (2.16)
Thus, the rule takes no account of any migration pattern or location of production. In the case
of a symmetric equilibrium, the rule reverts to the no transfers between regions.
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All to the Periphery
Finally, I consider the case of full transfer to the poorest region. The rule is the reverse of the
first rule as the transfers follow the opposite direction of migration. Technically, the tax revenue
is distributed according to the “inverse” share of labour in each region. The fractions are:
ξd = 1−λd, d = 1,2 (2.17)
Using this rule, a region that loses skilled workers from migration is compensated by receiving
more of the tax revenue continuing up to receiving all tax revenue. The Core will contribute all
to the Periphery – this is the full compensation to the Periphery of the agglomeration of activity
in the other region. For the symmetric outcome, there are no transfers since each region receives
what is collected in taxes.
These four rules for the regional transfers represent the full range of possible transfers, from the
all to the core rule, that is an agglomeration subsidy, to the all to the periphery rule, that is a
full compensation to the periphery. Thus, by analysing these rules a complete representation of
the changes in concentration patterns in the model is mapped and identified. In the next section,
the results of simulations using these transfer rules are presented.
2.5 Simulation Results
For each of the interregional transfer rules, the model is solved numerically, and the wage
differentials are found such that the migration forces, and ultimately the concentration patterns,
can be deduced. The tax rate on factor income is set to 20%; about the average municipal tax
rate in Denmark.
The analysis focuses especially on the impacts of transfer regimes on the break and sustain
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Figure 2.2: Using Different Transfer Rules
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points, which are crucial for the agglomeration properties of the model. This will highlight the
issue of whether transfers of tax revenue are possibly forcing an agglomeration to break down.
The result of the simulations are compiled in figure 2.2, where the horizontal axis is the freeness
of trade as in the tomahawk bifurcation. The vertical axis depicts the transfer rule ordered after
the direction and level of transfers to the periphery region. Trade freeness increases when
moving to the right in the diagram, while the amount transferred to the poor region increases
when moving upwards. The no transfer rule is situated between the all to the core and equal
shares and represents the zero transfer or baseline case.
The break and sustain points move considerably depending on the specific transfer rule in
place.2 As in the tomahawk diagram in figure 2.2(b), the economy has a symmetric equilib-
2The connecting lines are just drawn to emphasise the pattern as the vertical axis is not continuous and the
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Table 2.1: Using Different Transfer Rules
Trade Freeness, φ Transport Costs, t
Sustain Break Sustain Break
All to the Periphery 0.233 0.268 1.45 1.39
Equal Shares 0.142 0.178 1.63 1.54
No Transfers 0.112 0.149 1.73 1.60
All to the Core 0.077 0.109 1.90 1.74
rium left of the sustain points and an agglomerated equilibrium to the right of the break points.
Between the two points either type of equilibrium is possible. I will denote the area left of the
sustain points as the symmetric zone and the area right of the break points as the concentrated
zone. The area in the middle will be called the hysteresis zone, where both symmetric and
agglomerated outcomes are stable and the realised equilibrium depends on the previous state of
the economy.
It can be seen that the break and sustain points move right as the transfers to the poor region is
increased. Conversely, the points move to the left when the direction of transfers is reversed.
Thereby, the divisions of the zones are slanted from the upper right corner down towards the
lower left. In addition, the width of the hysteresis zone is the same for every rule, i.e. the width
measured in freeness of trade which is an inverse exponential function of the transport costs.
For reference, the numerical values of the break and sustain points in both trade freeness and
transport costs are shown in table 2.1.
By introducing interregional transfers into the standard Core-Periphery model, the basic proper-
ties change while the path-dependency remains. It is clear that the economy’s state can change
dramatically by re-distributing wealth between regions, since the movement of break and sus-
tain points can place the economy in a completely different zone of equilibria.
distance between the rules has not been scaled.
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Regardless of whether the policy is to subsidise the concentrated region or to compensate the de-
industrialised region, possible dramatic changes need to be taken into account when designing
policies that alter the concentration and dispersion forces of the economy.
As mentioned in the introduction, Baldwin and Krugman (2004) show that the core region can
set taxes to just extract an agglomeration rent, without the periphery stealing the agglomerating
industry. In that paper they analyse different tax rates in the two regions, which can be achieved
in the present paper by designing an appropriate transfer rule. In contrast, in this model the
core’s strategy is to have a transfer rule that does not move the economy into the symmetric
zone. However, an important implication of the results from figure 2.2 is that such a tax will
distort the agglomeration forces in the economy; in effect, it is possible that an extraction of
the agglomeration rent will move the economy up in the diagram passing the sustain points line
into the symmetric zone – thus the concentration collapses. In the framework of Baldwin and
Krugman (2004) the strategy of the core economy has to be amended to not move the economy
into the symmetric zone, thereby decreasing how much of the rent that can be extracted.
2.5.1 Policy
In figure 2.2 the two axes represent the two policy instruments available for the government.
First, on the horizontal axis there is the trade freeness. In the usual interpretation in the in-
ternational trade literature this represents transport costs, tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade.
Here the regions in the economy are not considered to be subject to tariffs since they are part
of the same country, so the trade freeness is a consequence of the costs associated with the
costs of hauling goods between regions. These costs can either stem directly from the ge-
ographic distance impacting on fuel costs and transport time, or stem from a more complex
array of factors. I will jointly denote these obstacles as the lack of integration between regions.
Examples of the latter could be differences in the practice of the regional governments when
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giving authorisations for transporting dangerous goods, or if specific requirements are imposed
on the transportation of goods, such as maximum lorry loads. The policy instruments that im-
prove regional integration, e.g. investments in infrastructure, streamlining transportation rules,
or reducing the authorisation bureaucracy, will move the economy along the horizontal axis in
the figure, and show the government’s possibilities to induce an agglomeration or move into
symmetry by increasing or decreasing the regional integration, respectively. If the considered
regions are in a union of nation states the aspect of tariff and non-tariff barriers are, of course,
an issue with respect to the trade freeness in addition to regional integration.
Second, on the vertical axis is the degree of regional transfers. The position on the vertical axis
is directly proportional to the level of transfers to the poorer region, thus it is a depiction of
the actual policy instrument in use. By altering the transfer rule, the government can move the
economy upwards and downwards in the diagram, and for specific intervals of trade freeness
also use this instrument to either induce agglomeration or force a symmetric outcome. That is,
the fact that there is a positive slope of the sustain line shows that large transfers from the core
to the periphery can undermine the agglomeration if the sustain line is crossed.
Depending on the political agenda of the government, i.e. whether it is to induce agglomeration
and compensate the periphery or to equalise regions by moving towards the symmetric zone, the
government can choose an appropriate policy mix of regional transfers and regional integration
to achieve the desired goal. Especially if the economy is in the hysteresis zone, there are a lot
of possibilities for the government to influence the final outcome. The designed policy mix of
the two instruments will enable the central government to move in all directions in the diagram.
An example could be if the economy is in an agglomerated outcome in the hysteresis zone; the
central government could compensate the periphery using transfers thus moving up in the dia-
gram, but to avoid passing the sustain point, the transfer policy can be combined with enhanced
regional integration to move right in the diagram and away from the sustain points line, thereby
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maintaining the Core-Periphery pattern. Equivalently, if the economy is in a dispersed state
the introduction of transfers as a subsidy can induce a concentration of industry in one region
(moving downwards in the diagram). Then, by utilising the inertia of the agglomerating forces
the government can reverse the transfer policies and extract the agglomeration rents from the
core to the periphery by designing the policy mix as not to cross the sustain boundary.
Thus, the introduction of regional transfers opens up a range of opportunities for a central
government to influence the industrial concentration in the economy.
2.6 Conclusion
This paper extends the standard (canonical) model of Economic Geography with inter-regional
transfers of tax revenues. Taxes are levied on factor income and pooled into the central govern-
ment, who in turn re-distributes the revenue to the agents in the regions. The paper focuses on
the impacts on the concentration patterns when using different rules of transfers.
The extension introduces an extra instrument for the central government to influence the con-
centration pattern in the economy. The unique part of this is the ability to construct a policy
mix to fulfil the ambitions of the government. This is important because many governments
strive to make their citizens equally well-off, whether it is to supply the same amount of public
goods to all regions or to equalise the consumers’ welfare. The paper shows that the equali-
sation schemes will alter the concentration patterns in the model; in particular the equalisation
schemes reduce the range of Core-Periphery outcomes as this outcome requires still greater in-
tegration (freeness of trade) to be sustained. Thus, a core can be taxed and some of the revenue
can be transferred to a periphery, but only to a certain extent, namely where the transfer moves
the economy up to the sustain line. The transfers must be restricted as not to cross the line and
initiate an effect that bleeds the core region dry.
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However, if the ambition of the government is to maintain the Core-Periphery outcome, it can
be achieved by combining the policy of transfers with policies that increase the integration
between regions and thereby increase the trade freeness. More integration will fortify the ag-
glomeration, and the transfer scheme policies can thus be utilised because the economy is far
into the concentrated zone. This way, the core region functions as an industrial locomotive for
the benefit of the whole economy as the periphery also experiences a gain in in income from
agglomeration through the transfers.
With another perspective, starting from a symmetric pattern, the government can combine poli-
cies to induce an agglomeration of activity in a specific region. If increased integration is not
enough to pass the break point, a policy of agglomeration subsidies – as in the All to the Core
rule – moves the economy further, and possibly into the desired concentration outcome. In turn,
when the concentration is established, the inertia of the hysteresis zone can be utilised through a
reversal of the transfer rule to subsidise the poor region. As long as the economy remains in the
hysteresis zone, the concentration is sustained – as such, the periphery region will have negative
net transfers to start off. But, the periphery region will benefit from positive net transfers after
the policy reversal. The problem, then, is to identify which region this type of policy should
focus on first.
The extension of the spatial models of economic geography with interregional transfers, whether
being equalisation grants or agglomeration grants, sheds some important light on the behavioural
characteristics of the concentration patterns. The economic geography models’ property of a
sudden shift in economic concentration is not only given by the level of integration, but is highly
influenced by governmental redistributive policies between regions.
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It is not without consequences to take money from the economic centre in an economy and
give it to peripheral regions. As this may not be surprising in itself, the results shown here
are significant in the finding that the concentration pattern through break and sustain points
both shift, and the overlap between them, given by the hysteresis zone, remains approximately
constant measured in level of integration.
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Congestion, Fiscal Equalisation and Local
Public Goods Provision
The paper extends the canonical two region Core-Periphery model of Krugman (1991) with
congestion costs to capture negative effects of urbanisation. The congestion costs act as an
extra dispersion force in the model, and this reduces the range of freeness of trade for which
the economy exhibits agglomeration. In addition, a new symmetric stable equilibrium replaces
the Core-Periphery state for high levels of integration. Then the model is extended by consid-
ering local governments supplying public goods. The production of public goods binds local
factors and raises factor costs in the regions, thus enhancing the dispersing force even more.
At the same time, however, supply of local public goods and services will attract mobile labour,
concentrating economic activity. These extra effects change dramatically the properties of the
standard Core-Periphery model. In particular, the range of freeness of trade for which the
economy exhibits agglomeration is reduced.
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3.1 Introduction
Locally produced public goods and services are by their very nature not traded across regions
or nations, but are bound to the location of the public sector. When local governments supply
goods and services, the supply is directed at the local population. Services offered by municipal
child care centres are for the benefit of local families. When municipal sewage treatment plants
take care of waste water, the service’s geographic coverage is the municipality itself. And when
public schools teach, it is the local children who are educated. These are typical examples of
public services that are offered by a local or regional government, and they are services that are
offered only to the citizens of that specific location.
To finance this public production, local governments levy taxes on the recipients of the public
services. But as some regions are more well-off than others, the differences in tax base give
rise to different levels of public good provision. Local governments in richer urban areas re-
ceive a higher tax revenue and can, therefore, supply more than governments in poorer rural
regions. From an egalitarian point of view, these differences in public provision represent un-
desirable differences in welfare, and policy makers have implemented various instruments to
address this. The issue is also to make sure that the not so well-off regions have the ability to
supply a minimum of public goods to their citizens, whether it is health care services or basic
infrastructure. The desire to make citizens equally well-off is widespread across the world, and
the most used instrument is to transfer income directly from the local governments in the rich
to the governments in the poor regions.1
Equalisation through transfers of government revenue is in place almost regardless of the re-
gional scale; countries have transfers on the level of local governments – the municipalities –
and in some cases transfers exist between nations in economic unions. Denmark, Sweden and
1See Boadway (2003) for a survey on transfers used for equalisation, including considerations of efficiency and
fiscal equity for agents.
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Norway are examples of the former and The European Union of the latter. The exact design of
these transfers schemes varies from central government grant programs to transfers that directly
equalise tax revenue across regions. But in essence, all schemes serve the purpose of equalising
welfare or income for agents across regions - to eliminate regional inequality. For instance, in
Denmark the schemes combine transfers from the richer municipalities to the poorer munici-
palities with grants from the central government, grants that depend on what public services the
local governments are required to supply.2
Richer regions are characterised by a concentration of economic activity that generates wealth
for the region, where peripheral regions have less economic activity, and therefore do not gener-
ate as much wealth. In spite of the larger wealth creation, there are disadvantages of concentra-
tion in large urban centres. This is the issue of congestion costs. This is for example manifested
through crowded infrastructure, inadequate housing and pollution. When workers need to live
several hours drive from their workplace, it represents a cost of congestion. When pollution
significantly shortens life expectancy, it is also a cost of congestion. The time spent commuting
and the shorter lives both represent wasted resources. Wasted resources that should be taken
into account when considering the effects of a concentration of economic activity.
The aspects of local public sectors, fiscal equalisation and congestion are all issues concerning
spatial distribution of economic activity. And as these aspects are very much present in many
western economies, it is of interest to analyse models that can take these issues into account. The
point of departure in this paper is the agglomeration models used in the Economic Geography
(EG) literature, where the theoretical framework is the work by Krugman (1991) and Fujita
et al. (1999). The present paper presents a computational approach with extensions that account
for the mentioned observations of local public goods, interregional transfers of tax revenue and
costs of congestion. At the same time, this work is a contribution to the research agenda of
2In Denmark these instruments are termed Kommunal udligning and Bloktilskud.
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constructing computable general equilibrium (CGE) versions of the EG models. As such, the
paper is a step in the development of new tools for policy analysis using spatial models. Policy
analysis that has been lacking the proper tools to take the equalisation and congestion issues
into account. A comprehensive coverage of various policy aspects is presented in Baldwin et al.
(2003). They are also proponents of entering into the arena of more direct policy analysis.
To understand the implications for public production, interregional transfers and congestion,
this paper provides insights to the possibilities available for decision makers, but not least to
shed light on possible pitfalls when designing policy. Policy that is to be effective in a economy
characterised by geography, local governments, congestion and agglomeration. But in as much,
the paper is also a contribution in understanding the effects of these characteristics in the spa-
tial models before implementing computable versions calibrated to data – the task of the next
chapter.
The research reveals that the costs of congestion creates an extra dispersion force in the model,
which reduces the range of integration (freeness of trade) for which the economy exhibits ag-
glomeration. In addition, a new symmetric stable equilibrium emerges and the Core-Periphery
state disappears for high levels of integration, thus further reducing the range of agglomeration
outcomes. The introduction of local public goods, financed partly by transfers from rich regions
to poor regions, also create extra dispersion forces. These extra effects change dramatically the
properties of the standard Core-Periphery model, at the same time giving the model more facets
and characteristics in correspondence to the positive and negative effects of urbanisation we
observe.
The paper treats the mentioned issues in reverse order. After a brief review of related literature
in section 3.2, a recapitulation of the the workhorse Core-Periphery model is presented. This is
followed by a section where the model is extended to take costs of congestion into account and
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the effects on the concentration pattern in the model is described. Then interregional transfers
are introduced in section 3.5 and again how this affects the the model. The section is followed by
section 3.6, where local public goods are introduced. Finally, the last section brings everything
together, by summing up the implications for public policy if congestion costs, local public
goods, and regional transfers all are present in an economy with agglomeration characteristics.
3.2 Related Literature
Murata and Thisse (2005) introduce congestion costs in a simplified version of an economic ge-
ography model. Workers are allowed to alleviate the disadvantages of urbanisation by dispers-
ing to other regions, but the forces concentrating economic activity is left unchanged through
transport costs and monopolistic competition. They show that high costs associated with con-
centrated economic activity leads to dispersion of economic activity, i.e. agglomeration be-
comes unsustainable even in a fully integrated economy. On the other hand, they show that
low costs of congestion increase concentration of economic activity. The methodology of in-
corporating congestion costs used in Murata and Thisse (2005) is adapted in section 3.4 to the
standard Core-Periphery model of Krugman (1991). When applying congestion costs in this
manner, the similar result of dispersion under full integration emerges, and as shown later, the
dispersion outcome remains for the non-integrated economy.
Concerning the aspect of public goods provision and regional investments, Forslid (2004) anal-
yses two countries, where one country has two regions, and finds that improvements in national
infrastructure speeds up concentration of manufacturing. Public goods, thus, enter and im-
prove firms’ efficiency. This effect comes from the lower interregional transport costs as the
international trade costs are held constant. In addition, he observes that regional subsidies only
tend to be effective when the concentration forces are weak. This suggests that regional policies
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that increase regional integration strengthens concentration forces, but will lose their effective-
ness when integration is at a high level. A similar setup of countries and regions is treated in
Behrens, Gaigné, Ottaviano and Thisse (2005), where the authors show that a fall in interre-
gional transport costs, e.g. by means of investments in national infrastructure, increases the
possibility of agglomeration. An opposite effect is observed when international trade costs fall
and interregional transport costs are constant. That is, lowering of tariff barriers will lead to re-
gional dispersion. However, as the complexity of forces and interactions increase exponentially
with the number of regions in such analyses, the present paper refrains from moving beyond the
two region setup.
Turning to taxes and regional transfers, Andersson and Forslid (2003) observe that agglomer-
ation gives rise to rents, and they show that a redistributive tax between mobile and immobile
workers can be imposed, and such a tax reduces the incentive for tax competition between re-
gional governments. Baldwin and Krugman (2004) analyse a tax setting game of two regions
where one region is already in an agglomerated state, and find that the concentrated region can
set taxes higher than the other region without losing the concentration altogether. However, this
positive tax gap is only present for a specific range of transport costs. Gaigné and Riou (2007)
introduces fiscal equalisation schemes between regional governments. They show that when
the regional tax revenue is equalised, tax competition is significantly reduced promoting a rise
in overall tax revenue. In an earlier paper, Gaigné and Riou (2004) find that revenue sharing
between different levels of government may lead to efficient tax setting without coordination,
but only for high levels of transport costs. For lower levels of transport costs the revenue sharing
leads to a race to the bottom of the local taxes.
The present paper extends this research. As the basis, I use the standard Core-Periphery model
from Krugman (1991), as it describes the theoretical constructs of agglomeration and geography
in the most general form, whereas the versions of geography models mentioned by the authors
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above add more complex structures, e.g. mixed factor inputs or international capital flows as in
Forslid and Ottaviano (2003) and Martin and Rogers (1995), respectively. However, opposed
to these models, the standard version used here can only be solved numerically. But more im-
portantly, extensions in the form of regional transfers, public goods production and congestion
costs are easier to incorporate, a numerical implementation for this analysis is more appropriate.
3.3 Benchmark Model
The model of Krugman (1991) is quickly recapitulated here for reference, a more comprehen-
sive description is given in the previous chapter. There are two regions in an economy otherwise
closed with respect to international trade. There are two production sectors. One producing ho-
mogeneous goods under constant returns to scale and one producing heterogeneous varieties of
another good. There are two factors of production; skilled and unskilled labour. The consumers
in both regions have identical homothetic preferences represented by a two-tier utility function.
The upper tier is a Cobb-Douglas function over the homogeneous and a composite of the het-
erogeneous goods. The lower tier aggregates the heterogeneous varieties in a composite, where
there is constant elasticity of substitution between the varieties. The consumers’ utility function
in a region is:
U = A1−µMµ , M =
(
n
∑
i=1
m
σ−1
σ
i
) σ
σ−1
, (3.1)
where A is the homogeneous good and M is the heterogeneous composite of the n varieties. A
single variety is denoted as mi. The cost share of the heterogeneous composite is µ , while σ is
the elasticity of substitution between varieties. The consumers maximise their utility subject to
their budget, that consist of the sum of factor payments.
The sector supplying the homogeneous good produces under constant returns to scale using
only unskilled labour, thus profit maximisation equates the unskilled wage with the price of
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the homogeneous good. The heterogeneous sector exhibits increasing returns to scale in pro-
ducing varieties, but only uses skilled labour. The first order condition for these firms de-
pends on the specific formalisation of the increasing returns technology, which is represented
in their cost functions. In the Core-Periphery model the cost function for firm i is defined as
ci = (α+βqi)ws, where ci is the total cost of producing amount qi of variety i, and ws is the
skilled wage. The parameters α and β are the fixed and variable costs respectively. The firm
acts as a monopolist in the market for the specific variety, thus the pricing rule is
pi = βws
1
ρ
, ρ =
σ −1
σ
, (3.2)
where σ is the perceived elasticity of demand3 derived from (3.1) and pi is the output price
of variety i. It is assumed that there are no barriers to entry, so as long as there are profit
opportunities, new firms will establish themselves and produce new varieties. The free entry
condition entails zero profits. By symmetry of the cost functions and demand for varieties, all
firms in the heterogeneous sector set the same price and level of output. The number of firms
is derived from the available supply of skilled labour and each firm’s input requirement. The
total number of firms in a region is then the total available skilled labour in a region divided by
the input requirement of a firm, and each firm produces a single variety, so the number of firms
gives the number of varieties.
When there are several locations where goods are produced, there are costs associated with
importing and exporting the heterogeneous goods to satisfy supply and demand across space.
Specifically, the costs are modelled as iceberg transport costs where a fraction of the good
melts in transit from location c to d. The price in location d of a variety shipped from location
c becomes pd = tc,d pc, where tc,d is the iceberg cost. Inserting the transport costs into the
derivations of consumer demand for varieties, the uncompensated demand function changes,
3The consumer’s price reaction is perceived, as consumers do not consider price changes in a single variety to
affect the overall price index for the heterogeneous composite.
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but the perceived elasticity of demand remains σ . And the price setting and output profile of
the firms are, therefore, unchanged. For clarification, the transport costs are inverted into an
index of regional integration, φ , where a value of one is completely integrated regions, i.e. no
transport costs, while φ tends to zero as transport costs go to infinity.4 For the remainder of this
paper, the level of φ is termed the level of integration between regions.
As opposed to the unskilled labour, the skilled labour is assumed to be ’footloose’. Skilled
workers are not tied to a specific location. They seek the highest possible welfare and relocate
to get it.5 However, this mobility of workers are assumed to be somewhat sticky, that is, the
relocation of labour does not happen instantaneously. Only a fraction of the skilled labour force
moves at a time. This assumption is required to put a damper on the agglomeration forces, as full
mobility will render the model completely unstable and not useful for any analysis. Denoting
the share of skilled labour in location c as λc, the change in the share is given by
λ˙c = γ (ωc−ωd) , (3.3)
where ωc is the utility per capita in region c. The speed of adjustment is given by the coefficient
γ . If the utility in one location is lower than in another location, a fraction of the skilled workers
will emigrate – and vice versa – if the utility in one location is higher, then skilled workers will
immigrate to that location.
As the heterogeneous sector depends on the skilled labour in order to produce, the location of
the labour force also determines where the firms will, and can, locate in that region. As each
firm uses the same amount of skilled labour and has the same level of output, the share of the
heterogeneous industry in a location is equal to the share of skilled labour in that location. Thus,
4The level of integration is defined as φ = t1−σ .
5In the classic Core-Periphery model it is the desire for the highest real wage that motivates immigration. In
the benchmark case in this section this mobility assumption is equivalent, but when public goods provision are
introduced the welfare, measured in utility, is more important.
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the concentration of skilled workers and the agglomeration of industry are equivalent results,
and I will use the terms interchangeably in the remainder of the paper.
In Krugman (1991) there are three main forces that either determine the concentration or dis-
persion patterns of economic activity.
First, firms want to locate close to the consumers of their products. This force is the backward
linkage effect, and it concentrates activity.
Second, skilled workers want to locate close to where their consumer goods are produced. This
force is the forward linkage effect, and it also concentrates activity.
Third, competition between firms for skilled labour drives up wages and will drive companies
away to the less concentrated region. This force is the competition effect.
The final equilibrium of the model depends on the balance of these factors. If the concentrat-
ing forces dominate, the economy ends up in a agglomerated Core-Periphery state, while the
economy will end in a symmetric outcome if the dispersing force dominates.
3.3.1 Implementation
The complexity of the algebra in the Core-Periphery model makes it impossible to solve analyti-
cally, so numerical methods is applied to identify the model’s properties. Numerical simulations
require specific assumptions regarding the model’s parameters, i.e. consumer preferences, pro-
duction technology, level of transport costs, and factor endowments.
As mentioned by Fujita et al. (1999), the output from the heterogeneous sector, i.e. the number
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of varieties, can go toward infinity if there is not imposed a bound on the cost-share of hetero-
geneous to homogeneous goods – a no-black-hole condition. The cost share of heterogeneous
goods is, therefore, chosen to be µ = 0.4. The elasticity of substitution between varieties is
also tied to the same issue and is chosen at a relative conservative level of σ = 5. For the pro-
duction technology the parameters are normalised using σ such to simplify the expressions, i.e.
α = 1σ ,β =
σ−1
σ , which implies that firms produce one unit of output. Finally, for the economy
as a whole, there are two locations and overall there is more unskilled labour relative to skilled
labour.
The equilibria characteristics of the standard Core-Periphery model is usually best summarised
in the Tomahawk diagram, cf. figure 3.1. The figure represents stable equilibria by the full
drawn lines, and unstable equilibria by the dotted lines. For high levels of integration, the
economy has an two stable agglomerated equilibria. In the case of intermediate integration
there are three stable equilibria, one symmetric and two agglomerated. In addition, there are
two unstable equilibria with various distribution of labour. Finally, for low integration, there is
one stable symmetric equilibrium.
The model exhibits strong path dependency. This is the case both when the the starting point
is at a low level of integration, in the symmetric state, and when the starting point is at a high
level of integration, the agglomerated state.
If the economy is at a low level of integration, the heterogeneous industry will be dispersed
evenly across the two regions, that is the symmetric equilibrium. In this case, if a group of
workers are relocated, they will experience a drop in the welfare and move back to regain the
higher welfare and the symmetric equilibrium is re-established. A small increase in integration
will not change the outcome of a symmetric distribution of labour. However, when the level
of integration reaches a certain level, the symmetric equilibrium becomes unstable. This is
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Figure 3.1: Tomahawk Bifurcation in the Core-Periphery Model
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Note: Full drawn lines are stable equilibria while dashed lines are unstable equilibria.
denoted as the break point – the point when the symmetry breaks into a core and a periphery.
From this point onwards, the symmetric equilibrium is always unstable and the economy will
always agglomerate toward the region where the first group of workers moved, the core region.
Starting from the other end with completely integrated regions, the industry will be concentrated
in one region. Decreasing integration, for instance by introducing road tolls, the agglomerated
equilibrium is stable until the integration is reduced certain level. This is denoted the sustain
point – the lowest level of integration where an agglomeration can be sustained. The welfare
of the skilled labour is the highest where it is most scarce. Migration to the periphery will
continue until the labour is evenly distributed, and the two regions are symmetric. From there
on, any further reductions in integration has no other effect than increasing the dominance of
the dispersion force, solidifying the symmetric distribution of activity.
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Importantly, the break and sustain points overlap, such that either the agglomeration or dis-
persion of industry show a significant path dependency. If the level of integration is in the
intermediate zone, the exact distribution of industry crucially depends upon the previous state
of the economy – a hysteresis effect. Whether agglomeration or dispersion is a stable outcome,
depends crucially on the the concentration pattern in an earlier period. As Krugman (1991) puts
it: history matters.
The rigidity of the labour force in the range of intermediate integration, the overlap between the
sustain and break points, represents an agglomeration rent. A rent which can be extracted with-
out causing the agglomeration to break down. But as mentioned in the introduction, there are
also costs associated with concentration, namely the congestion costs. In the next section, the
model is extended with these costs and how this affects the agglomeration pattern is analysed.
3.4 Congestion Costs
The costs of congestion are in essence costs associated with crowding. If it is health problems
from polluting industries or wasted time in traffic, they stem from the concentration of economic
activity and the concentration of people. In most spatial models of economic geography, these
negative effects are not taken into account. The purpose of this section is to extend the Core-
Periphery models to account for congestion problems.
Costs of congestion are introduced as iceberg costs on the supply of skilled labour. There is
a negative externality on the effective supply of skilled labour the more concentrated workers
are. A straightforward interpretation is that a worker needs to spend time in his car commuting
to work. Because of crowded streets the worker spends more time waiting, and thus, the hours
at work are effectively reduced, cf. Murata and Thisse (2005). Skilled workers cannot live on
top of each other, and have to settle next to each other away from the workplace. They need to
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commute to work and the cost is linear in distance, x. Furthermore, all workplaces are assumed
to be situated in a central business district (CBD). If every worker can supply one unit of labour
and they locate in one dimension from the CBD, the effective labour supply is,
s(x) = 1−2θ |x|, x ∈
[
−L
2
;
L
2
]
, (3.4)
where s(x) is the supply of one worker living at distance x. The parameter θ is the congestion
costs parameter and lies in the range, 0≤ θ < 1. The total amount of skilled labour living in a
region, L, locates around the CBD, then the total effective supply of skilled labour becomes,
S=
L/2∫
−L/2
s(x)dx= L
(
1−θ L
2
)
. (3.5)
A visual representation of the labour supply is given i figure 3.2. The shaded areas represent
the congestion costs in region r. The share of skilled labour is Lr, which can be either equal to
one, the agglomerated state, or equal to 0.5, the symmetric state.
Figure 3.2: Effective Supply of Skilled Labour, Different Outcomes
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The two left panels are for the agglomerated Core-Periphery outcomes, and the two right panels
are the situation of the dispersed outcomes. The top panels show the effective labour supply for
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medium congestion costs, while the lower panels are for the cases of high congestion costs.
In the concentrated outcome and highest congestion costs, θ = 1, the bottom left panel, the
worker living just on the city boundary is the marginal worker with zero labour supply, and the
worker living in the middle can supply the full amount of labour.
When the economy is dispersed, the city boundary lies halfway out compared to the concen-
trated case, since only half the skilled workers live there. The worker on the boundary will
always have a positive supply of labour. From this, it is apparent that the least cost to the labour
supply happens when the skilled labour is fully dispersed across regions. Thus, total congestion
costs across the whole economy are lowest when there is no agglomeration and highest when
the economy is concentrated.
Since the number of firms producing heterogeneous products depend on the supply of skilled
labour, iceberg congestion costs, that reduce labour supply, imply that the overall number of
firms in the economy is reduced, cf. Murata and Thisse (2005). And as consumers have
love-of-variety preferences, a reduction in the number of varieties means lower welfare for all
consumers. Congestion costs also shift the labour supply curve downwards, thereby lowering
wages. Both the reduction in welfare and the lower wage are dispersion forces, in addition to
the competition effect already present in the model.
3.4.1 Concentration Patterns with Congestion Costs
Murata and Thisse (2005) show in a cut’down version of the Core-Periphery model that these
congestion costs flip the Tomahawk diagram around. This means that in the case of high inte-
gration, the benefits of locating close to the market is outweighed by the costs from congestion,
thus the economy is dispersed – where the standard Core-Periphery model is agglomerated for
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high integration. The model presented in this paper has similar properties as Murata and Thisse
(2005), however there are significant differences.
The results shown here are obtained by numerical simulations for different combinations of
transport costs (levels of integration) and congestion costs. From the simulations the migration
patterns are calculated and the concentration patterns are identified for the congestion costs and
transport costs combinations. Analysing the range of congestion costs from zero and upward,
the agglomeration properties change as follows:
At zero congestion costs the model reverts to the standard Core-Periphery model. There is
agglomeration at full integration, there is dispersion at low integration, and there is path depen-
dency in the outcome. Exactly the properties as in the Krugman Core-Periphery model in the
previous section.
For positive congestion costs the agglomeration pattern changes. Both the break and sustain
points are shifted to higher levels of integration. The dispersed outcomes for low levels of
integration last longer, so integration needs to be increased more in order to spur a concentrated
outcome. Furthermore, the concentrated outcomes are more vulnerable. It will now take a
smaller reduction in integration before an agglomeration becomes unsustainable. Thus, the
range of agglomeration equilibria is reduced, and they are only possible at higher levels of
integration.
However, another stable dispersed outcome emerges for very high levels of integration and the
agglomerated outcomes disappear from that range. When the regions are fully integrated and
there are costs of congestion, the disadvantages in relocating to a rural area is outweighed by the
reduction in costs associated with urban crowding. The extra dispersion force from congestion
costs is directly identified in the new dispersion outcomes at high levels of integration. This
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effect is in line with Murata and Thisse (2005), where they identify a symmetric equilibrium
for the full integration (free trade) case. Although Murata and Thisse (2005) do not identify the
dispersion outcomes for low levels of integration.
Figure 3.3: Tomahawk with Congestion Costs
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The agglomeration pattern and the properties of the break and sustain points are shown in figure
3.3 for an arbitrary intermediate level of congestion costs.6 There are now two break points
and two sustain points in the economy. Examining the diagram, different equilibrium zones are
identified. These are shown by the bar in the lower part of the diagram.
For high levels and low levels of integration the economy has only stable outcomes when activ-
ity is dispersed. These two zones, at the ends of the integration scale, are denoted the Symmetric
zones, labelled a and e in the diagram.
6The next section will deal with the characteristics when the congestion costs θ varies. For this illustration the
exact level of congestion costs is not relevant.
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The stable outcome of agglomeration in one region, the Core-Periphery outcome, is the sole
equilibrium for an intermediate range of integration. For this range of integration is the Con-
centrated zone, label c in the diagram.
There are two ranges of integration where the economy has more than one stable equilibrium,
both the dispersed and the agglomeration outcomes are possible. The realised outcome is de-
termined by the history of the economy. That is, there is path dependency of the locational
pattern. These are the Hysteresis zones, labelled b and d in the diagram. If the economy is
concentrated before moving into the hysteresis zone, it will stay concentrated - and vice versa -
if the economy is in a symmetric equilibrium it will stay dispersed if moved into the hysteresis
zone. It’s only when the economy passes the break and sustain points that the outcome of the
economy changes. The naming convention of the different zones of outcome is in line with the
naming in the previous chapter.
Walking through the diagram yields insights to the effects at play, from left to right. For very
low levels of integration, the regions are far apart in terms of costs. In order to supply the other
region, goods incur large transport costs. It is expensive to supply goods to other regions. At
the same time, congestion costs reduce the effective labour supply increasing the competition
for labour. These dispersion forces dominate the forward and backward linkages, so a region is
unable to sustain an agglomerated outcome. Labour and firms relocate to even out the distribu-
tion of economic activity. The only stable equilibrium is the dispersed outcomes – the economy
is in the symmetric zone a.
When the level of integration moves the economy into the (first) hysteresis zone b, the forward
and backward linkages begin to increase in strength, making it possible for on agglomeration
to be sustainable. But the dispersion forces are still strong enough to keep the economy in the
dispersed outcome.
52
3.4. Congestion Costs
In the intermediate range of integration, the positive linkages dominate. The economy is in
the concentrated zone c. Skilled labour migrates to the agglomerated region to get access to
cheaper goods without having to pay transport costs mark-up, and firms want to locate close to
their consumers and where there is abundant labour. This happens in spite of the fact that there
are transport costs associated with supplying unskilled labour in the other region, and than the
effective labour supply is reduced because of the congestion costs.
Moving further along the integration axis, the economy lies in the second hysteresis zone d.
Here the dispersed outcome again becomes a stable equilibrium. Now the higher level of inte-
gration makes it possible for firms to locate in both regions, since the transport costs needed to
supply goods to the other region are low. Equivalently for the skilled labour, the higher integra-
tion reduces the costs of buying goods from the other region. At the same time the congestion
costs reduce their effective labour supply, so there is a benefit in dispersing to increase their
labour income.
Finally, in the second symmetric zone e, the benefit of market access for firms and skilled labour
disappear because the transport costs become insignificant. In this case the congestion costs of
concentration completely dominate, dispersing the labour and economic activity.
3.4.2 Dynamics with Changing Congestion Costs
The above example was shown for an intermediate level of congestion costs. However changing
the level of congestion costs, reveals new dynamics in the concentration patterns in the model.
Increasing the congestion costs adds to the dispersion forces. This has an effect at both ends
of the integration scale, that is, it moves the leftmost break and sustain points to higher levels
of regional integration, but also moves the rightmost break and sustain points to lower levels of
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integration. This narrows the band of agglomeration outcomes.
In order to visualise this, the dynamics of the break and sustain points for the economy are
condensed in a single diagram. This is the central illustration of the properties of the model.
Drawing the integration on the vertical axis and the congestion parameter along the horizontal
axis, the full properties of the model are revealed for all combinations of congestion costs and
levels of integration, cf. figure 3.4. In the diagram, the three zones are replicated with the same
Figure 3.4: Dynamics with Congestion Costs
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Note: The small hysteresis zone in the top left corner is due to rounding.
colours. The concentrated zone is shown in complete white, the symmetric zone in blue/light
grey and the hysteresis zone in burgundy/dark grey. At the leftmost part of this diagram there
are no congestion costs and the model is the standard Core-Periphery model. Moving right
along the primary axis increases the congestion costs, θ , and the leftmost break point in the
tomahawk, now the lower part of the concentrated zone, moves to higher levels of integration.
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At the same time the rightmost break points in the tomahawk, now the upper points, move to
lower levels of integration. It is the break points that sets the boundary of the dispersed outcome,
so in the concentrated zone only the Core-Periphery outcomes are stable, and the dispersed are
unstable. The shifting of the two break points closer together when increasing congestion costs,
narrows the concentrated zone forming a cone shape of agglomeration outcomes. At the tip
of the cone both break points meet, and agglomeration as the sole outcome in the economy
disappear.
As the sustain points from the Tomahawk closely follows the break points, these also shift
toward each other. The sustain points are the outer boundary of the hysteresis zone, and this
zone also forms a zone where both agglomerated and dispersed outcomes are possible in the
economy. The hysteresis cone is a bit larger than the concentrated cone.
As the congestion costs increase, the symmetric zone takes over where the other zones withdraw.
In the symmetric zone, only dispersed outcomes are stable in the economy. The symmetric zone
takes over completely, when the congestion costs reach a level beyond the tip of the hysteresis
cone. From that point onward, agglomeration can not be sustained, regardless of the level of
regional integration.
The shape of these cones gives clear evidence that increasing the dispersion forces, the conges-
tion costs, reduce range of outcomes where the economy has stable agglomerated equilibria.
This happens at both ends of the spectrum of integration. Concentrated economic activity has
difficulty to sustain itself both for very high levels of integration and for very low levels of in-
tegration. In the case of the fully integrated economy, it does not matter for firms where they
produce in order to supply their customers. They can ship their goods anywhere, but the costs
associated with concentration are that a lot of the labour supply is wasted. A waste that hurts
the income of the affected workers, and the overall welfare of the economy from the lower pro-
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duction of varieties. This is the reason for the symmetric zone beginning to dominate the top
part of the diagram.
These income and welfare effects associated with the congestion costs are something that should
be considered if policies of agglomeration are put forward. The results also show that an ef-
fort invested into reducing congestion costs would help policies promoting agglomeration. By
combining increased integration with lower congestion problems, one can move the economy
far into the concentrated zone.
With the characteristics of the Core-Periphery model extended with congestion costs estab-
lished, the next section turns to implementing interregional transfers of income.
3.5 Taxes and Transfers
The model represents an economy with two distinct regions, governed by one central authority.
This could either be municipalities subject to a national government, or on a higher level, the
member states in a union with some kind of supranational authority. The central authority levies
and collects taxes on factor income, and all tax revenue is pooled into the central treasury. Then
the central government redistributes the revenue to the local governments. Depending on the
profile of redistribution, this will in effect be an interregional transfer system or even, as a
special case, a full fiscal equalisation scheme. By keeping the transfer system in this simple
form, the analysis encompasses a wide range of observed transfer regimes; from the case of the
Canadian central authority that collects taxes and distributes to regions, to the case of Danish
municipalities that collect local taxes and pay a fraction of their revenue to the central authority
who then redistributes the money. In this paper the central authority sets a national income tax
rate, collects the taxes and then distributes the revenue to the regions according to a predefined
rule. Therefore, the game theoretic aspect in e.g. Baldwin and Krugman (2004) and Gaigné
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and Riou (2007) is left out of the analysis and only the effects of the single central government
agent’s decisions are considered.
The analysis follows the previous chapter. The focus is on the impacts of different policy rules,
but will refrain from recommending any specific policy. Such recommendation would require
assumptions of optimality criteria, e.g. a social welfare function, and this is not the purpose of
this paper. Here the purpose is to analyse the direct effects of different government initiatives
using instruments of transfers and instruments that increase integration.
The taxes are levied directly on factor income of all agents in the economy using the same tax
rate. The redistribution of tax revenue to local authorities is treated as a lump sum transfer to
the local consumers’ income.
3.5.1 A Central Government
The central government levies taxes on factor income in both regions with the tax rate τ . All
tax revenue is transferred back to consumers using a distribution coefficient: region d’s govern-
ments receive a fraction ξd of the total revenue. The tax revenue, G, is
G=∑
d
τ (wLud+w
s
dL
s
d) , 0≤ τ < 1, (3.6)
where the first element in parenthesis is the region’s total unskilled wage bill and the second
element is the region’s total wage bill for the skilled labour. The consumer income less taxes
and including transfers is the region’s total expenditure
Ed = (1− τ)(wLud+wsdLsd)+ξdG, ∀ξd ≥ 0, ∑
d
ξd = 1. (3.7)
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One type of transfer scheme is analysed to give an overview of the effects of the transfer system.
As there are no specific policy recommendations in the paper, the results will serve the purpose
of understanding the workings of the economy subject to various policy initiatives, i.e. mixes
of transfers and taxes. The scheme considered is the equal shares regime where the total tax
revenue is divided equally between the regions. The details of the rule is as follows:
Equal Shares
The equal shares regime is the no frills fiscal equalisation scheme in its simplest form. There is
no consideration as to the wealth or income of the consumers. The total tax revenue is simply
divided equally and given to the regions’ consumers. The lump sum transfer to each consumer is
exactly the same. In effect, the regime will function as a moderate transfer from a concentrated
region to a periphery region since the tax revenue in the concentrated region is higher. Formally,
the share to each consumer is given by:
ξd =
1
Ls+Lu
, d = 1,2. (3.8)
Thus, the rule takes no account of any migration pattern or location of production. In the case
of a symmetric equilibrium the rule reverts to the no transfers between regions.
Effects of Transfers
When the model is extended further with these transfers, the following results are revealed.
When the transfer moves income from the rich to the poor region, i.e. from the core to the
periphery, the lower part of the cones in the diagrams shift upwards. The relatively mild redis-
tribution of income imposed by the transfer rule means that the shift is relatively small. This
means that the width of the concentrated zone is further reduced, however, the transfers do not
change significantly the properties of the upper part of the cones.
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Figure 3.5: Dynamics with Transfers
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As shown in the previous chapter, a transfer of income from the core to the periphery shifts
the break and sustain points to higher levels of integration, leaving less room for a sustainable
agglomeration to happen. This result emerges here as well, with the lower parts of the cones
shifting upwards, the lower parts of the cone being the original break and sustain points from
the standard Core-Periphery model. The results reported here with congestion costs added are,
therefore, as expected in line with the effects shown previously.
Thus, the introduction of interregional transfers to satisfy an equalisation agenda has the effect
that it narrows the concentrated zone further, risking a concentration to break down. A policy
of equalisation, therefore, warrants an evaluation of how much money can be extracted from
the concentrated economic centre, and if such a policy should be combined with initiatives for
increased integration. And with the congestion issue incorporated, as shown here, the con-
centration force is even more ’vulnerable’. But the results also show that policies that reduce
congestion costs can reinforce the agglomeration forces such that economy is shifted into the
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concentrated zone.
This section dealt with passive government agents that issue lump sum transfers to consumers
in the regions. However, local and national governments engage in direct production of public
goods, whether they are of the scale of national defence or smaller scale as local schooling. The
following section takes the issue of government involvement through public production further
by introducing local public goods.
3.6 Supply of Local Public Goods
Local public provision supplies some form of public goods to the citizens of the region in
question. It is not just a transfer of income to and from consumers in different regions. The
interregional transfers are in fact targeted at local governments to help them supply public pro-
duction. And public production ties resources to the production. In addition, the level of public
production or the amount of resources going into the public sector is a politically decided issue,
and therefore fixes the public use of resources, and the private producers have to adapt to the
level of residual level of available resources. In essence, the resources available to the private
sector is the total available resource of factors less the factors used for public production. This
also has the consequence that public production influences the factor payments.
Local governments are introduced to the model as an extra sector. The local governments
produce locally consumed public goods and receive a grant from the central authority. The
public good enters the utility function in an additive separable way, as it is standard in assumed
in the literature. The utility function of the representative consumer then becomes,
U = A1−µMµ +H, M =
(
n
∑
i=1
m
σ−1
σ
i
) σ
σ−1
, (3.9)
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whereH is the public provided good received by the consumer, measured in utility. For simplic-
ity, the public good enters the utility function additively so the public good just raises the level
of utility without changing the consumer’s maximisation problem. The first order conditions
and the consumption bundle of the consumers are left unchanged.
It is assumed the public sector produces the public good using a constant returns to scale tech-
nology. The government uses both skilled and unskilled labour in equal proportions.
H = Lδs L
δ
u , δ = 0.5. (3.10)
The exact formulation of the public sector’s technology is, of course, arbitrary and the formula-
tion here is chosen for its simplicity. The skilled labour is assumed to be used in the production
in order to tie down some of the skilled labour in the regions. This implies that a region will al-
ways have some skilled labour employed in the public sector, even if the region is the periphery
measured in the share of heterogeneous firms present.
Simulations with this setup reveals exactly this: a fraction of skilled labour is employed in the
public sector in the periphery region. In the case of no congestion costs and no transfers between
regions - the standard Core-Periphery model - the agglomeration outcomes have less than 100%
of the skilled labour concentrated in the core. The government production, financed by taxes
revenue, draws some skilled labour by offering high wages. But at the same time, the wages
are too high for the heterogeneous firms to locate there. The break points of dispersion and the
sustain points of the agglomeration remain in the place as in the standard model. This means
that the tomahawk diagram is similar, but with the edges, signifying the core and periphery
outcomes, are closer to the middle line, cf. figure 3.6.
As the local government need financing to provide public goods, the model is based on the
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Figure 3.6: The Tomahawk With Public Production - No Transfers, No Congestion Costs
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version presented earlier, however with no congestion costs. Thus, factors of production are
levied taxes and the tax revenue is used by the local governments for local public production.
Now the analysis is focused on two different transfer regimes. The first being the rule of no
interregional transfers and in the second the same amount per citizen is given to each region.
Recall that the overall tax rate for both regions is the same. The local governments are not
allowed to levy different taxes, either as subsidies or otherwise.
The rule of no interregional transfer entails that the budget of the local government is equal to
the total collected tax revenue from the respective region. But note that the level of utility added
to the consumer’s welfare, Hd , may differ between regions - even for the same budget. This is
because local government production uses both factors, and since the skilled wage can differ
between the regions, the cost of producing is not necessarily at the same level.
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In the second regime, tax revenue is transferred according to the population sizes in the region.
Hence, each local government receives the same amount of revenue per citizen and gear public
production after this. In a concentrated state, the equal grant to each citizen represents a small
transfer from the centre to the periphery since the unskilled immobile labour, as well as the
skilled labour used in public production, pay a smaller amount in taxes than that given to the
local government’s budget. The budget in the periphery’s local government is larger than what
they could have had if they only received revenue from the local tax base.
The provision of public goods in periphery regions financed partly by the core regions intro-
duces an extra dispersion force in addition to the competition effect and the costs of congestion.
Therefore the balance of power between these effects shifts the economy towards the dispersed
equilibria. The agglomeration characteristics of the models are diluted when these extra disper-
sion forces come into play. These effects are shown in figure 3.7 and 3.8.
The regime with no transfers almost replicates the earlier results shown in figure 3.4, where the
tip was at θ = 0.2 in the case of the model with only congestion costs and no taxes or transfers.
Equivalently, the intercepts of the cones, in this regime with public production and no transfers,
are at the same levels of integration as in the case in section 3.4, i.e. the standard Core-Periphery
model.
It is apparent that the binding of skilled labour in a periphery region by the public production,
does not in itself change the agglomeration pattern in the economy as long as there are no
transfers between the regions. The only thing that changes is the level of concentration, that is
there is less than 100% concentration of skilled labour in one region.
Allowing for small transfers between regions changes the concentration patterns significantly,
cf. figure 3.8. When concentration exists there will be a small transfer of money from the core
to the periphery.
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Figure 3.7: Dynamics with Public Goods Production, No Transfers
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Note: The scale of the x-axis has changed from the previous figures. This eases the comparison
with the next figure.
In this case, the hysteresis zone is expanded horizontally. The tip of the cone now spans to the
level of congestion costs at about θ = 0.41. At the same time the tip of the concentrated zone
is a bit further out at θ = 0.22. In the hysteresis zone the economy stays in the concentration
pattern, whatever changes happen to the level of integration between the regions. If the economy
is in a Core-Periphery state in this zone, the transfer of money to the periphery does not make
the concentration unsustainable. The skilled labour that is bound to the public production in the
periphery region ensures that the tax base, and thus the revenue collected, is sufficiently large so
the transfers required by the regime are minor. But the transfer of money away from the core,
reduces the size of the core government’s budget and reduces the level of public production.
This frees resources to the private sector in the core and the scale effects in the heterogeneous
sector is strengthened. The concentration forces, therefore, still dominate and they are more
robust towards increasing congestion costs.
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Figure 3.8: Dynamics with Public Goods Production, Equal Grants
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30 0.35 0.40
Congestion Costs, q
In
te
gr
at
io
n,
 f
Symmetric Zone
Concentrated Zone
Hysteresis Zone
0.222 0.413
On the other hand, the symmetric outcome is also fortified by the expanding hysteresis zone.
Again, this is a consequence of the bound skilled labour. The presence of at least some skilled
labour in a region in addition to the immobile unskilled labour, increases the minimum demand
for varieties. In the models without bound skilled labour it is only unskilled labour’s demand
for varieties that are left in a periphery region. Now the larger minimum demand for varieties
will attract firms and increase the dispersion forces.
By introducing local public production in the model, some skilled labour is bound to both
regions. However, the concentration pattern only changes when transfers are introduced.
3.7 Concluding Remarks
The analysis presented in this paper shows that adding extra features to the standard Core-
Periphery model has profound implications for the concentration patterns in the model. These
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features introduce the following extra forces.
First, concentration of skilled workers will reduce the labour supply wasting resources. This will
in fact reduce the available varieties for the whole economy and will be overall welfare reducing.
Thus, via the overall welfare reduction, workers may want to relocate to offset this loss in
welfare. This is an indirect dispersion force. The congestion costs of concentration thus reduces
the concentration zone of the model from both sides of the integration spectrum, as the costs also
have the effect that symmetric outcomes emerge for high levels of integration. The domination
of the concentrating forces when there is full integration between regions, which is the case in
the standard Core-Periphery model, disappears and the dispersion forces take over. Increasing
congestion costs squeezes the concentration zone from both sides, while the hysteresis zone still
remains around the concentrated zone retaining the property of path dependency in the model.
Second, transfers between regions taps resources from economic centres for the benefit of con-
sumers in poorer regions. This increases the dispersion forces in the model. This further reduces
the area of the concentration zone as the dominance of the concentration forces are weakened.
The shape of the different zones, however, remain.
Third, the provision of public goods increase the utility of agents in a region. More immigra-
tion will increase the tax base and help finance more public provision. This will work as an
concentrating force. But the production of public goods will draw factors away from the private
sectors and drive up wages, working toward dispersion. Besides reducing the full agglomera-
tion to partial agglomeration, the concentration patterns of the economy is only changed when
introducing transfers in addition to public production. And this changes the concentration pat-
terns dramatically, creating much more path dependency expressed through the increased area
of the hysteresis zone.
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In the model used here, more observed facts are introduced to the benchmark Core-Periphery
model. Facts that are present, for example, in the European economy. Many urban centres suffer
from costs of congestion, most countries have transfers schemes or policies of subsidising poor
regions, and local governments supply goods for the benefit of the local populace only. When
all these factors are taken into account, the analysis shows that the design of public policy does
impact the production patterns of the economy.
Most importantly, a concentration of economic activity could become unsustainable if inter-
regional transfers are applied and if the congestion cost of the concentrated region are high.
Provision of public goods can attract more labour, but public investments could reduce the costs
of congestion by for example improving infrastructure. This emphasises the fact that policies
concerning public provision, interregional transfers, congestion and regional integration all in-
fluence the concentration and dispersion forces in the economy, and in the right combination
the policies can reinforce or counter each other.
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Chapter 4
Danish Regional Models
After the recent reform of the Danish municipal structure, the equalisation grant scheme in
place also needed a reform. This paper constructs a regional computable general equilibrium
model of Denmark to analyse the effects on regional income and the locational production
structure from the reform. The equalisation grant reform transfers 900 million kroner from the
regional public sector in East Denmark to West Denmark. Simulations show that the contraction
of the regional public sector i Copenhagen creates room for the knowledge intensive clusters
to expand. But the corresponding growth in the Western public sector squeezes the private
industries in those regions. However, the scale effects inherent in the clusters in Copenhagen
leads to production increase so that the national welfare increases as a result of the equalisation
reform. The theoretical foundation used to build the CGE model is economic geography as
described in Fujita et al. (1999), characterised by monopolistic competition assumptions and
agglomeration characteristics. The paper introduces a methodology to regionalise national
data using available information on regional supply of labour and capital. This is also used to
calculate an interregional trade matrix.
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4.1 Introduction
A critique of agglomeration models is that they predict what is termed catastrophic agglom-
eration. The results from the theoretic models are, that either there is complete symmetry of
production or there is only production in one region, and the change is not gradual. However,
Ottaviano (2002) dismiss the concerns and states: “...for policy analysis to proceed, the first step
is precisely to take the models literally.’ In other words, accept the drawbacks of modelling ag-
glomeration through monopolistic competition and transport costs, and understand what policy
conclusions can be drawn. And as I show on the following pages, expanding the model with
more regions and more sectors, each with different agglomeration patterns, the agglomeration
models can indeed be used for policy analysis. Baldwin et al. (2003) have a comprehensive
coverage of various policy aspects and are also proponents of entering into the arena of policy
analysis, but none offer any applied models for the analysis. The present paper remedies this.
The previous two chapters analysed regional agglomeration models in simple two by two setups.
Those models gradually introduced key aspects of a real local economy: space, taxes, conges-
tion costs and local public production, and the analyses gave insight to how these aspects change
the agglomeration patterns in economic geography models. Turning to an application of these
concepts to the Danish economy, the present paper offers a methodology and an implementation
of a regional computable general equilibrium model with agglomeration effects. Although, the
element of congestion costs is left out of the modelling setup, and left for future analysis.
The presented model is applied to give a regional evaluation of the recent reform of the munic-
ipal and regional equalisation scheme in Denmark. The reform transfers extra money from the
richer Eastern part of Denmark to the Western part, but the change in interregional transfers is
relatively small compared to the budgets of local governments. In spite of this, the reform of
the equalisation scheme does have significant effects on the regional production structure and
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especially on the clustering sectors across the Danish landscape.
The results from the simulations show benefits of implemented policies that have not been
shown earlier. In Denmark the regional differences in income and the resulting differences
in welfare, however, can be somewhat off-set by the provision of local public sectors and the
interregional transfers of public revenue. Some regions are blessed with rich cities while other
more remote regions are devout of economic activity. At the risk of stating the obvious, rich
regions can afford more than poor regions. Although, countries strive to overcome this using
policies of transferring income between regions, thus opening the possibilities for poorer local
governments to supply more services than they otherwise could have supplied. As a result,
the higher public provision in poor regions raise the welfare for local citizens and, in fact, the
simulation show that aggregated welfare for the whole economy is also increased.
In the following section, 4.2, a description of the Danish economy is given, with emphasis on
the public sector. Section 4.3 goes in to more detail on the specifics concerning the modelling
of the economy. This is followed by section 4.4 that cover the empirical foundation used for
the calibration of the model. The section also deals with the methodology taken in order to
disaggregate into the regional setup of the model. Section 4.5 sets up the counterfactual experi-
ment of reforming the equalisation grant scheme which was implemented recently in Denmark.
Finally, the chapter is summed up in section 4.6.
4.2 Economic Backdrop of Denmark
Getting an overview of the Danish economy, and the division of government between local
and central authorities, is vital in the process of constructing a CGE model of the economy.
This section briefly describes the workings of the Danish economy with special focus on the
public sectors, as these sectors in Denmark account for almost 40% of the national income,
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and employ approximately 30% of the work force. The description lays the foundation for the
formal mathematical specification of the equations in the model.
4.2.1 Overall Economy
The Danish economy is a small open economy, participating in the European Union. Thus, the
Danish government has little or no influence on the world markets, their development, prices or
interest rates. Danish firms compete as price takers and the international markets are insatiable
to Danish exports, i.e. there are no upper constraints on export volume from the viewpoint of the
buyers. The Danish exchange rate is technically free floating, but the central bank is committed
to keeping a fixed exchange rate vis-a-vis the Euro, and cooperates with other European central
banks in this respect, although not in the common currency area. Simultaneously, the fiscal
policy of the Danish government is also strictly committed to the goals put forth in the European
Union’s Growth and Stability Pact, a commitment that supports and facilitates the goal of a de
facto fixed exchange rate.
As the Danish economy has next to no influence on the world economy, that part of the model is
treated exogenously. The computable model is closed by assuming an unchanged trade balance
using a common effective foreign exchange as nominator. This means that, in order to increase
imports, exports have to be sold to buy the extra imports. In the short run this is too restrictive,
but even in the medium run a significant trade imbalance will be inconsistent with a fixed ex-
change rate. In addition, since the rest of the world is treated exogenously, the foreign exchange
rate is chosen as the model’s overall numeraire. All changes in the model’s prices are reported
relative to the price of foreign exchange.
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4.2.2 Public Sector
Denmark has a relatively large public sector compared to other countries. The government is
split into three layers of authority each with a different set of obligations and autonomy. The
lowest level is the municipality followed by administrative regions, and finally, the national
government. The recent structural reform of the regional governmental system, with the effect
from 2007, has reduced the number of municipalities from 275 to 98, and reduced the 14 re-
gions1 to 5 regions. The municipalities supply publicly available goods to their citizens. These
goods encompass day care centres, schools, retirement homes, renovation services, emergency
services, local roads planning, unemployment centres, business service centres, etc. The regions
are solely in charge of the public health care system and regional business development. The
top level government supplies schooling at high school level and upwards, national defence,
sets overall guidelines and so forth.
The municipality and the administrative regions are free to choose the level of public provision
they want to supply their citizens. Despite certain minimum requirements being set by the cen-
tral government, the main philosophy is that the local authority knows best, e.g. being elected,
the local governments are most aware of local preferences and circumstances. In addition, the
lower levels of government have been entrusted to implement the social benefits schemes.
All the public provision supplied by the three levels of government is financed by taxes and du-
ties. The municipalities’ source of income comes primarily from imposing tax on their citizens’
income and housing and from property tax on businesses. And to cover the imposed minimal
level of public provision and supplied social benefits, the central government issues general
grants to the municipalities budgets. Turning to the regions, they do not have the authority to
raise income through taxes or duties, so they are completely dependent on government grants
to finance the supply of their public provision. Finally, the central government charges taxes on
1The previous name for these entities were Counties. The post-reform naming is Region.
77
Chapter 4
labour income, collects corporate taxes, earns consumption taxes (VAT) and excise duties, and
extracts import duties.
The system of local taxes combined with general grants does not necessarily enable municipal-
ities to supply the same levels of public provision. Clearly, a municipality with citizens that
are well off is able to collect more taxes than a municipality with citizens that are not so well
off. Thus, the differences in municipalities’ tax bases do not give them equal opportunities to
supply amenities and public goods to their citizens. The area harbouring the richer tax base
can set tax rates lower in order to supply a similar level of public provision compared to poorer
areas. In order to alleviate this problem and to adhere to the principle of similar citizens have to
be treated equally, regardless of residence, Denmark has imposed an equalisation scheme.
The municipal equalisation scheme is, briefly stated, a large transfer system that moves funds
from rich regions to poor regions, and this in order to fulfil the principle of equals should
be treated equally. The bare inter-municipal transfer system is built as a zero sum relocation
of money, but due to the complexity and introduction of certain exemptions it is in effect a
negative sum system, where the central government makes up for the difference.2 The principle
of equals being treated equally is formulated as keeping the ratio of tax revenues to the level of
public provision the same for all. If a municipality chooses a high level of public provision, it
also has to choose a high tax rate to reclaim the cost, and vice versa, if they choose a low level
of provision they should be allowed to lower taxes. This is based on the assumption of the tax
base being unchanged, in the short run, by changes in public provision. Thus, the equalisation
system needs to transfer funds such that the ratio is the same across all municipalities. This
eliminates the case of a municipality with a poor tax base needing to tax their citizens hard in
order to collect a minimum of revenue.
2The exact calculation is based on a combination of a cost burden and a tax-provision ratio. The formulation
leaves the sum of required money to the receiving municipalities larger than the sum of money from the paying
regions, see Pedersen (1995).
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The exact calculation of the nominator and, not least, the denominator for the tax to service
ratio is a hugely complex matter, see Pedersen (1995) and Indenrigs- og Sundhedsministeriet
(2005). It is based on a wide range of factors including a calculation of an area expenditure
requirement. The modelling setup put forth in this paper refrains from endogenously calculating
the equalisation scheme in itself, but will treat it exogenously given. In this respect, the proposed
CGE model in the next sections will not take endogenous changes to equalisation into account.
This choice is also based on the fact that the scheme itself is not a result of rational behaviour
on behalf of any agent, but purely is a politically decided chosen instrument. Although, the
scheme could create incentives that do change the behaviour of e.g. local government agents,
however these are disregarded.
To sum up, the public sector in Denmark is split in three administrative levels of government
each responsible for a part of the public provision to their citizens. The financing of the local
provision is a mix of the individual municipality’s own tax collection, a centralised grant and an
equalisation scheme between all the municipalities. For the purpose of the modelling exercise,
the public sector is modelled two tier: central and regional public production. The regional
public production thus encompasses both the municipal and the regional level.
4.2.3 Clusters in the Private Sectors
The non-public part of the Danish economy remains to be described. For the purpose of this
paper, the private sector is characterised into three main types of activities, these are resource
based, locally oriented and globally oriented activities. The work by Porter (2003) and others
have shown that the globally oriented activities tend to cluster together in order to take advan-
tage of scale effects on the industry level.
The most apparent evidence that space is important for firms’ decision of where to locate is the
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existence of industrial clusters. Several studies have shown that many industries show signs of
firms placing their production in close proximity to each other, see Porter (2003), Copenhagen
Economics (2006), and Combes and Duranton (2001). These researchers have also found evi-
dence of non-pecuniary externalities between groups of industries when these are located close
to each other.
Since these positive effects are prevalent within localised clusters, they can be described as
monopolistic competitive sectors in a new economic geography model. Sectors in these models
are exactly formulated to catch positive externalities from closeness. Copenhagen Economics
(2006) shows that clusters of globalised industries are present in the Danish economy, and that
they contribute significantly to the economy. Furthermore, they create a regional income base
for the locally oriented activities. The cluster sectors’ output amount to almost 25% of Danish
Gross Value Added (GVA). The globalised sectors are also spread unevenly across the Danish
geography, with most production, about 40%, taking place in the Copenhagen region. Using
the information gathered in the above mentioned studies, the cluster sectors are constructed for
the model. Section 4.4 will return to the empirical observations on the industrial make up and
spatial distribution of these clusters.
The present paper uses the sector classification that have been identified in the Danish regional
economy in Copenhagen Economics (2006). This yields both a grouping of which industries
form into the various clusters and a cluster map of where the clusters are located Denmark. The
details of the method applied is treated in section 4.4.
Table 4.1 shows the 11 identified clusters. These are grouped into two meta-clusters, Knowledge
Intensive Production and Manufacturing Production.
The first columns in the table report the absolute values of output, rents to factors and foreign
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trade, while the next columns give the national distribution of sectors in percentages and the
individual sectors’ split of between capital and labour as well as the importance of foreign trade
for each sector.
The clusters account for about 24.5% of the total output of the Danish economy, with 11.6%
coming from the knowledge intensive clusters, where the largest is the IT and Telecommu-
nications sector accounting for 4.4% of gross value added, followed by Business Services and
Financial Serviceswith 2.8% and 2.0% respectively. In addition, the sectors in this meta-cluster
are relatively labour intensive compared to the non-clustering private sectors.
The manufacturing clusters account for 12.9% of total value added and are in general more
labour intensive in production than the knowledge intensive clusters. The most important man-
ufacturing clusters are the Foodstuff sector and Chemical and Pharmaceutical production, with
3.4% and 3.3% of total Danish value added respectively. The manufacturing clusters exhibit
the most labour-intensive production of all private sectors with a capital-labour ratio of 23 to
77 (measured in value added) in the Machinery and Engineering cluster as the most extreme
case. The manufacturing clusters also have high export ratios in terms of their value added, with
export volumes well above total value added of the clusters. These sectors show a high depen-
dency on international trade. This element of a high degree of export dependence is rooted in
the fact that it is one of the defining characteristics of a cluster – that they are globally oriented
industries, cf. Porter’s (2003) methodology of identifying clusters.
The rest of the economy’s total value added is produced in non-clustering sectors, with 45.8%
being locally produced goods and services and 23.2% being public service goods from either
central or local and regional governments. The remaining value added is split between Trans-
port Services and resource extraction3, which produce 3.5% and 3.0% of national output of
3Resource extraction are for example farming and fisheries
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value added, respectively.
The Danish public sector is relatively large in an international comparison, and more than half
of the public service is supplied at the regional or local level. The public production sectors
have wage shares about 90%, and they are by far the most labour intensive of all the sectors
in the Danish economy . The international trade shares for the public sectors are practically
non-existing by the nature of the public provision being non-traded internationally.
After a short examination of the trade volume in the sectors, it is apparent that clusters account
for far the largest part of international trade. The manufacturing clusters have total trade vol-
umes that are more than double their value added. In total the manufacturing clusters account
for 44% of total exports from Denmark and for 52% of all imports to Denmark, despite their
relatively modest share of the overall value added. The knowledge intensive clusters account
for 11% of total exports and 18% of total imports. With the exception of the Tourism sector,
the knowledge intensive clusters thus have trade shares which correspond more closely with
their shares of total value added. However, these trade volumes are still high compared to the
non-clustering sectors of the economy. It is the globally oriented firms, in both the knowledge
intensive clusters and the manufacturing clusters, that are assumed to have scale effects in the
modelling setup.
The transport sector represents 3.5% of national value added, but it has importance in facilitating
the physical connection between producer and consumer in the economy. The sector supplies
all the interregional trade services used for the interregional trade flows. The sector also stands
out because of the very large international export volume of 262% relative to value added. This
characteristic is partially inherited from the Danish sea transport industry which is embedded in
the sector.
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4.2.4 Regional Make-up of Production in Denmark
The recent reform of the Danish municipal structure in 2007 gave birth to five administrative re-
gions in Denmark. These regions are used to define the regional structure in the modelling setup
and they are Copenhagen, Zealand, Southern Denmark, Mid-Jutland and Northern Jutland. The
spatial make-up of Danish production is not readily available from statistical resources, and as
a consequence is an imputed distribution of industry. The methodology of this regionalisation
is described in detail in section 4.4. The imputed split of the production structure by region is
presented in table 4.2.
With close to 40% of the country’s value added, the Copenhagen region accounts for the largest
share of the economic activity in Denmark. Two other fairly active regions are the Mid-Jutland
and Southern Denmark accounting for 23% and 18% of total value added respectively. The
regions with the lowest shares of value added are Zealand and Northern Jutland, with 12% and
less than 10%, respectively.
Some of the differences in the distribution of value added across regions are connected naturally
to the distribution of the population. Northern Jutland also has the smallest population of the
five Danish regions, and Copenhagen has the largest, so it is hardly surprising that Copenhagen
has a larger share of value added than Northern Jutland.
The regional distribution of the clustering sectors varies. The knowledge intensive sectors are
primarily centred in the Copenhagen region, where they account for 16 % of value added in all.
In no other region do these clusters exceed 10% of the economic activity. The manufacturing
clusters are slightly more evenly distributed cross the country, albeit the main parts are in the
regions Mid-Jutland and Southern Denmark. Together the five manufacturing clusters account
for between 15% and 18% of the value added in all regions, except Copenhagen, where just 7%
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of the activity stems from the manufacturing clusters.
The knowledge intensive Financial Service cluster, in particular, is heavily concentrated in
the Copenhagen region. More than 70% of the sector’s value added is generated in Copen-
hagen. Also the IT and Telecommunication sector has a disproportionately high concentration
in Copenhagen, as close to 60% of the sector’s value added is in this region. The distribution
of the Entertainment cluster reflects some of the larger urban areas in Denmark, i.e. the highest
concentrations are in Copenhagen, Odense, Esbjerg and ‘the triangle area’ (Southern Denmark)
and Århus (Mid-Jutland).
The manufacturing clusters of Building Materials, Machinery and Engineering and Textiles,
Wood and Furniture are concentrated in Southern Denmark and Mid-Jutland. Together, the
two regions generate 60 to 70% of the value added in these clusters. Almost half (47%) of
the national value added in Textiles, Wood and Furniture is generated in Mid-Jutland, which
is more than double of the region’s share of total value added. Machinery and Engineering is
also concentrated in Mid-Jutland, as close to a third of the cluster’s value added stems from this
region. The concentration for this sector is not as deep, though, as Southern Denmark follows
closely, accounting for 29% of activity. In turn, Southern Denmark has the majority share of
the Building Materials cluster with 37% of the value added, and Mid-Jutland accounts for an
additional 30%. The Copenhagen area generates only a substantial share of the value added
in one manufacturing cluster, the Chemical and Pharmaceutical sector. Thus 45% of activity
in this sector is located in the Copenhagen region. In addition, the Zealand region, accounting
for 19% of the value added, also has a fairly large share of Chemicals and Pharmaceuticals.
The only other cluster – knowledge or manufacturing – with a fair concentration in Zealand is
Foodstuffs, which is also the most evenly distributed of all the clusters.
The non-clustering sectors are all spread among the five regions along the same lines as the
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distribution of total value added. Although, Southern Denmark and Mid-Jutland have a slightly
larger share of Transport and Logistics, than their share of total value added. Recall that the
non-clusterings sectors are aggregated into the local and resource based sectors, so these sectors
represent a wide range of firms, e.g. hair dressers, restaurants and supermarkets for the local
type; and mining, forestry and agriculture in resource based sectors.
Public production has a small bias towards the Copenhagen region, a reflection of the Capital’s
administrative institutions. Zealand and Northern Jutland have a larger share of both public
production and regional public production than of their overall share of value added.
4.3 Modelling Framework
With the Danish economic backdrop outlined in the previous section, the following section
goes into detail with respect to the mathematical representation of the economy. The pur-
pose is to give a formal representation of the mathematics behind the computable model that is
reader friendly compared to the CGE modelling language. This entails definitions of the agents’
problems, a description of the geographic space, and derivations of the necessary equilibrium
conditions. However, to give an overview of the framework, the following sets out a brief reca-
pitulation of the theory before diving into the exact mathematical formulation. The topics are
dealt with in the following order: First, a presentation of the consumers’ preferences and their
optimal behaviour. Second, an outline of the different types of producers and their optimal pro-
duction plans. Third, a description of the setup of the public sector. And finally, a presentation
of how the Danish geography is dealt within the model.
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4.3.1 Modelling Background
The model in this paper is based on a version of the New Economic Geography model presented
by Krugman (1980) and extended by Venables (1996) to cover a real geography.4 The original
model from Krugman deals with two countries engaged in trade in two types of goods, produced
under perfect and monopolistic competition respectively. Goods from the perfect competitive
industry are traded free of cost, while there are transport costs on the goods from the monopo-
listic competition industry. Together with labour mobility across countries this creates a general
equilibrium model with agglomeration characteristics. The strengths of the model are, as he
puts it in Krugman (1980): "to shed some light on causes of trade between economies with
similar factor endowments, and the role of a large domestic market in encouraging exports."
Especially, the first strength is exactly the characteristic of the interactions between regions in
the Danish economy.
The transport costs used throughout the literature of New Economic Geography are of the
Samuelson Iceberg type, cf. Samuelson (1952). The assumption is that only a fraction of a good
that is exported reaches the destination, i.e. some of it melts during transportation. However as
this paper calibrates a CGE model to the Danish economy, iceberg costs are an unsatisfactory
assumption for describing costs of transportation for the specific reason that disappearance of
goods, when they are traded, is not compatible with CGEmodels’ need for closure. Thus, in this
paper the assumption is that transport services enter into a Leontief aggregate with the traded
good. In order for the trade flow to occur, it requires a specific amount of transport services.
And the cost accrues the transport sector supplying the service. The importing agent still pays
for the goods shipped, while the exporting agent does not ’receive’ all the money. Formulating
the transport costs in this manner retains the property of unchanged perceived elasticities of
demand of the final consumers, and eliminates the disappearing of goods from the model. The
implementation of the transport sector is similar to the methodology used on a national basis by
4A real geography in the sense that there are well defined distances between many regions in the model.
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Hertel and Tsigas (1999).
The two primary factors, capital and labour, are assumed not to be mobile. Since firms use
intermediate goods as inputs in production, factors are implicitly traded through factor content
of the intermediates. The factor content substitutes for the mobility of the primary factors (to a
certain degree). However, as complete regional specialisation of sectors, an Armington assump-
tion is imposed on goods from different regions, which also constrains the equalisation of factor
prices from the theorem of the factor price equalisation. The analysis performed by Venables
(1996) show that models of economic geography retain the properties of agglomeration when
factor mobility is replaced by use of intermediate inputs.
At least one good is produced under perfect competition and is allowed to be traded without
incurring transport costs. These goods are the homogeneous goods in the model. The other
main types of goods are produced in separate industries exhibiting monopolistic competition,
such that each type is produced in a range of similar varieties. They are the heterogeneous
goods.
4.3.2 Consumers
In each region there is a representative consumer, and all agents have homothetic preferences.
Their preferences are the love-of-variety kind, as introduced by Spence (1976) and Dixit and
Stiglitz (1977). The utility is represented by two-tier function: The top tier is a Cobb-Douglas
function across the main types of goods, i.e. the homogeneous goods and the heterogeneous
goods. The bottom tier is for each of the main types of heterogeneous goods constructed as a
composite of varieties of that good. The composite is a CES function across the varieties for that
specific type of heterogeneous goods. By this, it is assumed that consumers value equally each
variety within the main types, but with a substitution effect imposed from the CES function.
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Figure 4.1: The Representative Agent’s Consumption Bundle
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Local public goods
When using a CES function for the composite utility function the consumers will always receive
higher utility when more varieties are available, and as a result, will always demand some
amount of all the types of varieties. In addition, the consumer is assigned an amount of local
public goods from which he derives utility, but is unable to decide how much to consume.
The local public goods enter as an additive term in the utility function. National public goods
from the central government are treated exogenously and are left out. The composition of the
consumers’ utility bundle is visualised in figure 4.1. Formally, the consumer gets utility, U ,
from the a types of homogeneous goods, Aa, and s types of heterogeneous goods, Bs:
U =
(
∏
a
Aµaa
)(
∏
s
Bµss
)
+LPG, ∑
a
µa+∑
s
µs = 1, 0< µa < 1, 0< µs < 1, (4.1)
where µa are the shares of income spent each type of homogeneous goods, and µs are the
shares of income spent on each composite of heterogeneous goods. The local public provision
is denoted LPG. Each Bs is a composite good constructed as a CES aggregate over the ns
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varieties. The CES function takes the form:
Bs =
(
∑
ns
bρsns
) 1
ρs
, ∀s, 0< ρs < 1, (4.2)
where bns is the consumption of variety n from sector s. Defining ρs ≡ 1− 1σs =
σs−1
σs ,σs > 1,
then σs is the elasticity of substitution between varieties of type s heterogeneous goods, and low
sigma entails low substitution and greater differentiation.
The consumer maximises utility subject to prices and his budget, and as this decision is unaf-
fected by what level of public provision he receives, local public goods are eliminated in the
derivation of the demand functions. The consumer’s problem is solved in two stages, first by
minimising the expenditure on the heterogeneous composites, then by maximising utility over
homogeneous goods and the heterogeneous composites. The demand functions are
As = µa
I
pa
, bns = µs
I
Gs
(
pns
Gs
)σs
, Gs =
(
∑
ns
p1−σsns
) 1
1−σs
(4.3)
Where, pa is the price for the homogeneous good a, pns is the price of a single variety and Gs
is the price of a composite from the heterogeneous sector s. These prices are the prices facing
the consumer. The price for the same good or variety are allowed to vary at different markets,
i.e. the same good has different prices depending on the region where it is sold. Finally, I is
the consumer’s total income from ownership of labour and capital I = wL+ rK. It is assumed
that the heterogeneous sectors have large number of varieties, such that the overall price index
of the varieties is perceived to be unaffected by changes in prices for a single variety. Thus, the
variety’s elasticity of demand with respect to its own price is simply σ .
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4.3.3 Private Sectors
Turning to the private sector the production technology is specified in the following paragraphs.
First, with an outline of the general production function used, then with a description of the
main types of sectors, i.e. the homogeneous and heterogeneous sectors.
General Input Composite
All sectors use a similar type of composite inputs for their production technology. The input
composite is formulated as a two-tier function. The bottom tier aggregates the primary factors in
an expression of the value added, and the top tier aggregates the value added from the primary
factors with the use of intermediates. The bottom tier is a Cobb-Douglas constant returns to
scale aggregation over capital and labour, giving the value added aggregate, VAi, in sector i the
functional form of
VAi =ΨiKαii L
1−αi
i , 0< αi < 1, (4.4)
where Ψi is the scaling factor for the technology, Ki and Li is capital and labour employed,
while αi is the cost share of capital in the production for sector i. The top tier is a Leontief fixed
proportions production function for output, Yi, and is given by
Yi =min
(
1
βVAi
VAi,
1
β 1i
X1i , . . . ,
1
β ji
X ji , . . . ,
1
βNi
XNi
)
, βVAi +∑β ji = 1, (4.5)
where the β ’s are the proportions of the value added aggregate and intermediate inputs, X ji .
Intermediates are supplied from all other sectors, j, to the producing sector i. The functional
form of the production functions, thus, allows for substitution between the primary factors, but
not between the intermediate inputs. The input composite is visualised in figure 4.2. Minimising
expenditure for the composites yields the corresponding unit-demand functions for the value
92
4.3. Modelling Framework
Figure 4.2: Generalised Input Composite for all Firms
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, (4.6)
and the top level unit demand functions for the inputs are
VAi = βVAi Yi, X
j
i = β
j
i Yi. (4.7)
For each unit of general input i requires β ji units of input from sector j and β
VAi times the
demand functions of primary inputs given by (4.6).
Perfect competition prevails in the homogeneous sectors, and the firms produce with constant
returns to scale. The production function for the firms is equal to the general input function. One
unit of composite input yields one unit of output. Maximising profits yields prices equalling the
marginal cost of producing, and no profits for the firms. The homogeneous goods composition
in the economy is given in figure 4.3.
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Figure 4.3: The Homogeneous Goods ’composite’ in a Region 1
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Heterogeneous sectors
To specify the production functions for the model, it now remains to quantify the exact scale
effects of the identified clusters. There are no studies of scale effects based on the industry clas-
sification as used in this paper, so for the purpose here, the clustering industries are assumed to
exhibit increasing returns to scale, while the resource based and local industries are assumed to
produce under constant returns to scale. Thus clustering industries are heterogeneous sectors,
and local and resource based industries are assumed to be homogeneous sectors. The produc-
tion structure is the monopolistic competition structure of Spence (1976) and Dixit and Stiglitz
(1977).
The firms in the heterogeneous sectors are assumed to exhibit increasing returns to scale in
producing a single variety. It follows from this property, that a firm already producing a variety
will always have a cost advantage over any new and existing firms trying to produce the same
variety. Each variety is then produced by one firm only and in effect a monopoly exists for each
variety.
In addition, the individual firm does not consider the production of other varieties to influence
their market decision, so their pricing as a monopolist is determined by the perceived elasticity
of demand for the variety, which is given by the consumer’s demand function as σ . On top
of this, it is assumed there is free entry allowing new firms to introduce new varieties. Firms
will enter an industry if there are profit opportunities, thereby forcing profits down to zero.
Thus the number of varieties is endogenously determined. The usual monopoly market power
is transferred from determining the level of output to how many varieties are produced. The
composite of heterogeneous goods is depicted in figure 4.4.
The increasing returns technology is implemented through assuming the production function is
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Figure 4.4: The Heterogeneous Goods ’composite’ in a Region 1
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decreasing in average cost by setting a fixed input requirement for production to take place.
The heterogeneous firms maximise profits given the demand structure and the factor markets,
and they choose output to satisfy the Lerner index5 of prices set at marginal cost times the
inverse of the elasticity of demand for the varieties, that is:
p=
σ
σ −1MC (4.8)
All firms, both homogeneous and heterogeneous firms, compete on factor markets for labour
and capital.6 In addition, they demand intermediate inputs from the goods markets in each
region.
This paper assumes that firms that exhibit this increasing returns technology are firms in glob-
alised sectors. They are faced with international competition and are able survive through ex-
ploiting the scale advantages inherent in each variety for which they act as monopolists. The
sectors previously identified as clustering sectors are exactly this kind of types and they are
classified as the heterogeneous industries in the model implementation.
4.3.4 Public Production
As mentioned in the section dealing with the consumer, only the regional public provision is
modelled. The national supply of public provision is fixed exogenously. For technical reasons,
the regional government is split into producing and a consuming part. The regional public
production is modelled as a cost minimising homogeneous sector. Technically, the primary
final customer of the production is the regions’ local government agent. The local government
agent then supply the goods as local public goods, but some of the output is also used in the
5See for example ch. 1 in Tirole (1994) for derivation of the Lerner Index.
6The Core-Periphery model used by Krugman (1980) uses only labour as a production factor.
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local sectors as intermediate inputs. As the local government is the main buyer of the goods
from the regional public producing sector, the local government agent’s budget determines the
size of the sector. In addition, it is assumed that the those goods are non-traded across regional
borders. Thus, any change in the local government’s consumption directly affects the regions’
production of regional public goods.
The regional public production technology is the same as for the private homogeneous sectors,
i.e. a Cobb-Douglas aggregation of the primary factors, labour and capital, and a Leontief ag-
gregation of the value added composite of factors and intermediate goods. Intermediates can
be both from the homogeneous sectors, the heterogeneous sectors, as well as own supply of
regional public production. The production exhibits constant returns to scale, so profit maximi-
sation entails zero profits.
The regional government agent’s budget consists of an initial endowment of income, given
by the benchmark data. But a central redistributive authority is constructed to allow for extra
transfers of money between the regional governments – thus mimicking the equalisation grant
reform.
4.3.5 Regions
The model consists several regional economies, and these economies engage in interregional
trade. This ensures that all regions have access to all types of goods, regardless of place of
production, except for the regional public production. The setup of the regional trade of goods
is as follows. International imports and regional production is pooled into a regional supply.
This supply delivers goods to the region’s available goods as well as interregional exports to
other regions’ available goods. From the region’s available goods delivery goes to the region’s
representative consumer as final demand, to the region’s firms as intermediate inputs, and to
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Figure 4.5: Flow of Goods, Two Regions
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international exports. The international imports and the regional production is aggregated using
the Armington assumption, i.e. there is substitution between foreign and local goods. Further-
more, there is an Armington assumption when compiling the interregional trade into a region’s
available goods. The flow of goods, in the case of two regions, is illustrated in the figure 4.5:
The Armington assumption entails some substitution between goods from different regions,
ensuring that there will not be specialisation of production in specific regions. This is a standard
technical solution in order to get a working model, and to account for import and export of the
same type of goods in the trade data and avoid complete specialisation, cf. The Global Trade
Analysis Project (2000).
Goods from the homogeneous sectors do not incur transport costs, but for the varieties from
the heterogeneous sectors a markup is applied using a transport service Leontief function on
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the varieties crossing regional borders.7 For technical reasons the transport services sector, thus
applied to the interregional trade flows, is difficult to label with regards to place of production.
So, the transport sector is treated as a national homogeneous sector. The sector can locate
anywhere and the service is completely homogeneous since there is no Armington aggregation
at all. This is equivalent to the method used in the GTAP model (Hertel and Tsigas, 1999),
however they use five different types of transport services, which are global. Having a transport
sector that engages in a very large foreign trade does not influence the modelling properties as
the international markets are kept fixed in the model.
4.3.6 Properties of the Applied Setup
Crucial to Krugman (1980) and other Economic Geography models are the dynamics of ag-
glomeration and diversification. The dynamics are typically introduced via labour mobility,
where labour relocates according to real wage differentials. When many firms concentrate in
a country, they increase wage competition, thus increasing the real wage which in turn leads
to an influx of labour. Conversely, when there is a low concentration of firms, the lower wage
competition decreases the real wage, and induces labour to migrate.
As mentioned earlier, this model substitutes the labour mobility with intraindustry trade, (Venables,
1996). The factor content embedded in the traded goods ensures the model has an indirect mo-
bility of factors, thus retaining the properties of the initial setup by Krugman (1980) and others.
Now, the allocation of the heterogeneous firms across regions defines the agglomeration pattern,
as opposed to the concentration of skilled labour in the Core-Periphery geographic setups.
The model in this paper exhibits the following important characteristics:
7International trade is fixed in the sense of a balanced trade budget, so international transport costs can be
disregarded.
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First, agglomeration forces work through intraindustry trade, which arises from the fact that
consumers in all locations demand all varieties. There is interregional trade in heterogeneous
goods, but it is restricted by transport costs.
Second, there is increasing returns to scale in the imperfectly competitive industries which
produce varieties, and there is free entry and exit of new firms.
Third, the introduction of a new firm to a location will result in a reduction of the consumer
price index in that location. This stems from the fact that the new firm’s variety is available to
the consumers and he receives the full extra utility from the variety without paying the transport
cost mark-up. Furthermore, firms will tend to locate in regions that are situated centrally to
achieve the best possible market access. However, a large concentration of firms will raise
demand for labour in those regions and the resulting wage increase will encourage firms to
relocate. In short, the centripetal force is market access and the centrifugal force is factor and
product competition. A more thorough description of the characteristics of this type of model
can be seen in Fujita et al. (1999).
With the modelling setup outlined, the paper continues with a description of the data used to
calibrate the model. The next section will go into detail on the Danish data.
4.4 Empirical Foundation
Now that the specification of the equations of the model is complete, it remains to calibrate
the parameters to the case of the Danish regional economy. The following sections describe in
detail the empirical foundation that is set up before the calibration.
There is a trade-off between spatial detail and computational complexity. The finer the geo-
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graphic resolution, the more complex the model becomes, e.g. a doubling of the number of
regions leads to a doubling of all markets, a doubling of agents, but a quadratic increase in the
number of trade flows. Thus, the number of equations in the model increases exponentially with
the number of regions. In addition, the availability of data on municipal level with a satisfactory
number of sectors is scarce, and finally, some of the Danish municipalities are so small, that it is
questionable to model them as separate economic entities. For instance, the recent Danish mu-
nicipal reform recommended that each municipality should encompass at least 20,000 citizens.
Therefore, the level of spatial detail is chosen as the five Danish administrative regions and not
the individual municipalities.
With the level of spatial aggregation decided, the following section describes another dimen-
sion. Namely, the specification of the aggregation level for sectors which is based on regional
clustering of industries.
4.4.1 Identification of Clusters
Positive spillover effects within localised cluster have been identified, cf. Porter (2003), and
such clusters can be interpreted as monopolistic competition sectors in a new economic geog-
raphy model. Sectors in these models are formulated exactly to catch positive externalities of
closeness.8 It can be argued that clusters group firms wrong, since they produce very different
types of goods. In the setup used in the present paper, this objection is disregarded and output
from clusters are interpreted as variants of the same type, i.e. firms in a cluster produce variants
from a cluster-composite, if you like. Equivalently, the concept of a firm in a monopolistic
competition sector is not the same as a physical firm in the economy, but an abstraction of a
representative firm in the observed cluster. Henceforth, I will refer to the model’s monopolistic
competition sectors as clusters and interpret them as such.
8Although, it needs to be stressed that the use of monopolistic competition sectors is an abstraction in order to
capture the mentioned effects.
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In Copenhagen Economics (2006) eleven such clusters are identified. The study uses two meth-
ods for this identification. First, by applying Porter’s (2003) methodology of analysing indus-
trial co-location patterns in order to uncover which industries tend to locate in the same area.
The hypothesis is, that closeness yields an intangible gain for the mutual benefit of firms. These
gains or spillovers can happen horizontally within the same type of industries, e.g. by imitating
products or cooperating in developing new product. Spillovers between firms can also happen
vertically between different industries, e.g. through the value chain of subcontractors. Second,
the study uses the ideas of Dahl (2002), which analyse labour mobility to determine which in-
dustries share the same labour pool. By using the same labour pool, firms can utilise knowledge
embedded in the skilled labour they share. The next paragraphs briefly summarises these two
methods for identifying clusters in the Danish economy.
Porter’s Method
Porter (2003) focuses on industries that supply on the global market, because firms in these
industries, in principle, are free to choose their location. Firms are not dictated by their supply
conditions to produce in a specific location. Opposed are firms that have to be local to reach
their market, e.g. hair dressers or tradesmen. The freedom of locational choice for global in-
dustries give them the possibility of locating close to each other or far from each other. Then, if
firms belonging to specific industries tend to build their factories in the same region, it must be
because there are more gains than drawbacks from that closeness. Those groups of industries
are identified as clusters. Statistically the clusters are found by examining the correlation in con-
centration of industries, a positive correlation signifies that they cluster together. The industry
make-up of each cluster is then evaluated subjectively to determine whether they form mean-
ingful and coherent clusters. The method captures both the horizontal and vertical elements of
spillovers.
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Dahl’s Method
The above results are combined with an analysis based on the work by Dahl (2002). He looks
into the mobility of labour across industries. A driving force in the success of clusters is the
prevalence of a large supply of highly skilled and specialised labour. In clusters, firms from
specific industries will locate to be able to recruit talented workers – they all recruit from the
same labour pool. Therefore, it is expected that, within a cluster, labour has a high rate of
job switching, i.e. workers move to jobs in other industries, but stay within the same kind
of industries that make up the cluster. So, by examining the whole labour force’s pattern of
mobility, it is possible to group industries that share the same labour pool, and thereby identify
clusters. The method captures the horizontal element of spillover effects, spillovers that happen
within the same type of firms, but the vertical element is also, to a certain degree, captured by
this method.
Finally, the results from these two methods are merged into a unique description of Danish
clusters. A description of which industries belong to what type of cluster. The result is a de-
tailed mapping from industry classification into a range of clusters. The work by Copenhagen
Economics (2006) is ground breaking in the mapping of clusters since it utilises tacit informa-
tion about non-pecuniary externalities inherent in the cluster – information which lies in the
observed co-location patterns of firms as well as the pattern of workers switching jobs. Thus, it
is possible for a cluster to encompass firms from different industries, both vertically and hori-
zontally. The study to identify clusters and quantify the spillover effects using the combination
of Porter’s and Dahl’s methods continues under the auspices of FORA in the InnoNet project.
The focus is now on clusters, their industry mix and their location in the Baltic Sea region.
Earlier studies of industrial clusters in Denmark have not been able to identify clusters, e.g.
The Economic Council (2003) that analyse clustering using firm level data. They use Statistics
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Denmark’s 53-industry classification as the cluster classification.9 Thus, both local and resource
based industries are mixed with globally oriented industries. In addition, this classification only
considers the horizontal dimension of clusters and neglects the vertical dimension. Finally, the
Economic Council analyse clusters in 51 separate regions in the Danish economy which is a too
narrow geographic scale for most clusters.
This paper defines the key to translate the 4-digit NACE industry classification to the clusters
in Copenhagen Economics’ (2006) cluster classification. This is used across the five regions
in the setup, and since it is the clusters that exhibit economies of agglomeration , they are, as
mentioned before, interpreted as the monopolistic competition sectors in the applied model.
Non-cluster industries are defined as producing under constant returns to scale, and are com-
bined into two broad sectors, resource based production, e.g. forestry and mining, and locally
supplied goods, e.g. grocery stores, hair dressers, and tradesmen. Lastly, the public sectors,
both local and national, are kept separate from the private sectors.
The transport sector is modelled in a special way. From the cluster identification process, the
transport sector is flagged as a clustering sector, however, for the purpose of the model, it is
separated from the other clusters and assumed to exhibit constant returns to scale. In addition,
the transport services supplied by the sector are treated as a nationally homogeneous good that
is available everywhere in the country.
4.4.2 Calibration Requirements
A large amount of data is required for calibrating a multi-regional CGE model. The process
uses information for all markets and all agents, and this for each region in the model. Thus,
the data needs to cover each region’s composition of total local supply. The supply consists of
9The 53-group is an aggregated version of 4-digit NACE codes.
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international imports, supply from other regions, and supply from local production. Similarly,
the data needs to cover each region’s total demand, which is split in-to international demand,
other regions’ demand, and demand from local agents. Local agents’ consumption levels and
their budget constraints are needed in order to quantify the agents’ optimisation problems. In
addition, data needs to cover the level of local public provision and the regions’ factor endow-
ments as well as how big each sector is in a region. Data for all these components is used in the
calibration process to quantify the equations in the model.
Most of this data, however, does not exist on a regional level at the level of detail required for the
model. There is no Danish regional data for the input-output flows and there is no data for the
regional trade flows. There is production data for aggregate sectors at the regional level, but this
is not detailed enough which is needed for the cluster classification. The next section describes,
in detail, how the lack of data problem is overcome. Briefly, the shortcomings of the data are
solved by assuming that the Danish economy is relatively small and integrated. Therefore, it
is reasonable to apply a top down approach in getting the required information. The method is
along the lines of Rutherford and Tarr (2008), who take the nationally aggregated information
from Russia and split it into regional data using information of capital and labour endowments
in Russian regions. That is, using national data and then regionalising them using a range of
micro-level data that is available on both the regional level and on the sector level.
4.4.3 Regionalisation of Supply and Intermediate Demands
The Danish national input-output table (National Accounts, 2006) is the main source of data.
The input-output coefficients represent the aggregate, i.e. national, flows of goods and services
between sectors. As a column reports the mix of inputs needed in producing a sector’s output,
the table is an expression of the aggregate technology for that sector. In addition, the table
reports the allocation of all sectors’ supply to final demands, whether private consumption,
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government consumption, investments or international exports. The exercise is to regionalise
the national data from the input-output table.
Statistics Denmark reports calculated labour shares in sectors across regions (Statistics Den-
mark, 2007). It is the employment, reported as the number of full time equivalent workers, for
each sector for each region. The labour share is then the region’s share of employed workers
compared to the full number employed in all regions for a sector. The shares tell how much of
an sector’s national employment is located in each of the five administrative regions.
The accountancy database, AMADEUS (Bureau van Dijk, 2006), supplies the stock of regional
production capital. The database covers 145,000 public companies employing 2,850,000 work-
ers, which is a representative selection of Danish companies. Again, this is used to calculate a
region’s share of fixed assets in a sector compared to the total fixed assets in Denmark. Thus,
the shares report how much of a sector’s capital stock is located in each of the five regions.
However, when using accounting data a few issues have to be mentioned. First, data is only
available for public companies, since private companies are not required to disclose their ac-
counts. Second, reported accounts are tied to the location of the firm’s headquarters, which
is not necessarily the same as where the production actually takes place. Third, only tangible
fixed assets are used in the calculation, thus sectors using more intangible assets, e.g. sectors
with service industries, may be skewed. Finally, reported accounts do not necessarily report the
real value of assets, as they are originally published for bookkeeping purposes. However, as the
firm level data is aggregated and only sector-wide ratios between regions are used, the possible
bias in data is minimised since any such bias will occur in both nominator and denominator of
the ratios. In addition, the firms covered by the database employ about 85% of the total em-
ployed work force and is considerede representative of firms present in Denmark. The data is,
therefore, deemed usable for regionalising captial stock in spite of the caveats reported above.10
10It is the total capital stock that is used. The mention of the number of workers covered by the database is only
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Following Rutherford and Tarr (2008), the regional shares of employment and regional shares
of capital give a spatial make-up of the distribution of sectors in the Danish economy, i.e. where
the sectors are located. The employment shares are used for splitting the national input-output
table’s labour expenditure into regional employment of labour. This creates a correspondence
between the national accounts’ reported labour costs in a sector to the regional level of em-
ployment in that sector. By using the employment shares for regionalising, there is an implicit
assumption that workers across regions have the same productivity for each sector, i.e. the
marginal product of labour is the same across the country. The national labour force in the
input-output table is given as the total value of the used labour, the value is reported as the total
compensation to workers, whereas the employment from Statistics Denmark is reported as the
number of equivalent full time workers employed. Thus, the regionalisation uses the value of
work multiplied by the share of workers in the region, and the consequence of this is that labour
productivity is the same across regions.
Equivalently, the capital shares from AMADEUS are used for splitting the national usage of
capital into each region. It is the share of a sector’s total assets in a region compared to all
the assets of the sector applied on the input-output table’s payment to capital owners. Note
again, that the input-output table reports the value of payments, i.e. the total value of rents
accruing to the capital input, while the capital stock is calculated from the total of fixed assets.
Regionalising is carried out using the rents multiplied by the region’s share of the stock. As for
the labour force, this method implies the assumption that the productivity of capital in a sector
is the same across regions, i.e. the marginal product of capital is assumed to be the same across
the country.
The above steps yield a spatial mapping of howmuch (value) of the primary inputs are employed
in each sector for each region, i.e. the distribution and levels of labour and capital across regions.
for the purpose of showing how representative the data is of Danish companies.
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Restating the regionalisation formally, the two primary factors in the input-output table are
distributed in two dimensions, by region and by sector, using the following formula:
Lid = L
i
nation
Empid
∑
d
Empid
, Kid = K
i
nation
Capid
∑
d
Capid
, (4.9)
where Lination and K
i
nation are the national endowments of labour and capital from the input-
output table. Empid is region d’s total number workers employed in sector i, andCap
i
d is region
d’s total value of assets in sector i.
The flows of intermediate goods and services between sectors also need regionalising. These
flows are given by the national input-output coefficients, which can be interpreted as the in-
termediate technology in production. The coefficients report the mix of intermediate inputs
chosen by each sector in the economy, thus, the mix represents what is required of intermedi-
ates in order to produce one value unit of output. Assuming technology is completely diffused
implies that all regions have access to the same technology, or that all regions have the same
input-output coefficients. The mix of intermediate inputs in a sector is the same regardless of
location, and the amount of required intermediate input is proportional to the size of that re-
gion’s sector. Using the regions’ labour shares as proxies for the size of the regions’ sectors, the
input requirement of intermediates is regionalised.
4.4.4 Differences in Capital Labour Ratios
The regionalisation using the regions’ capital and labour shares means that the capital-labour
ratios will be specific for each region within the sectors. The ratio of capital and labour in
an industry in one region is not necessary the same as the ratio in a different region for that
same sector. For example, the clothing sector has a higher capital-labour ratio in Copenhagen
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compared to Northern Jutland, or said differently, the sector is more capital intensive in Copen-
hagen. Similarly, for the rest of the sectors in the model; the intensities will vary across regions.
This does not mean that there are differences in available technology in regions, only that firms
have chosen different mixes of the primary factors. The firms in different regions have chosen
differently on the same production possibility frontier for the primary inputs as a result of the
difference in endowments. This also means that the relative prices of wages to rents are different
across regions in the benchmark.
With each sector’s use of capital, labour and intermediate inputs accounted for, the regions’ local
supply from local firms is given as the column sum in the new regional input-output tables. The
rest of the regional total supply comes from international imports. These are calculated from
the total national imports divided among regions using the size of region’s sectors. Thus, if
most of the clothing sector is located in Jutland, then international imports of clothing is mainly
imported to Jutland. As the underlying assumption of the applied model is to fix the balance
of payments, this way of splitting the imported goods is just of technical character in order to
maintain a balanced dataset, i.e. supply equal demand, and the assumption does not affect the
analysed properties of the model.
The row sum of intermediate input also yields the local intermediate demands, and it remains
to regionalise final demands to complete the dataset.
The final demands in the national input-output table reports the national level of private con-
sumption, the national government consumption, total investments, all stock changes and inter-
national exports. All these components also have to be split into regional values. The method
used follows in the next paragraphs.
Private consumption is given as the total value of household consumption of goods supplied na-
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tionally and through international imports. Given that households have homothetic preferences
over goods and services, they will have the same proportional composition of goods in the con-
sumption basket. Since homothetic preferences imply a linear expansion path of consumption
in income, the only difference between households in different regions will be the size of their
baskets, which depend on their incomes. Using data on family incomes from Statistic Denmark
reveals the spatial distribution of household income. A region’s share of total family income is
used to scale the private consumption basket, thus regionalising private final demand.
Continuing the same line of reasoning for local governments, the regional governments’ de-
mands can be extracted. If all the local governments’ composition of demand for government
consumption is the same, it is only the size of the total basket that differs between regions. And
the size of regional government demand is equivalent to the size of the regional government.
This is derived from the employment figures that were used for regionalising labour. Again
it is assumed that governments consume the same per employed worker, regardless of which
region the government is. In addition, the demand from the local government is transferred as
a publicly provided good to the benefit of the local agents, see the discussion of how the public
provision is treated in the model.
Finally, the investment demand and international demand are split into regions using the size
of the local production in each region, the same method used for splitting import supply into
regions. Since the CGE models’ setup fixes the investment levels as exogenous and fixes the
current account, the regionalisation of investment and export demands is reduced to make sure
all the numbers add up. The resulting spatial make-up of the sectors was previously presented
in table 4.2 on page 85.
With the calculation of each region’s total demands and supplies, only the exchange of goods
between regions is unaccounted for. The regionalisation maps the national accounts to regions,
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but using a range of micro-level information this results in an imbalance in how much each
region supplies compared to how much it consumes. Following the bookkeeping rules of na-
tional data, we know that any excess demand in one region is necessarily covered by supply
from another region. But, the new regional input-output tables only report the net flow excess
demands and supplies. They do not contain information on how much is bought and sold to and
from which region. The bilateral trade is missing. The following section describes a method to
calculate these gross bilateral flows of goods and services.
4.4.5 Calculating the Interregional Trade Matrix
With only data on net trade, and without data on bilateral trade, the calibration of interregional
trade patterns will result in a clear understatement of the real trade, and even worse to a deletion
of flows in the final model. From the net flows it follows that if there is net import of goods
to a region, there is no net exports. This will be carried into the calibration where the equation
governing import is understated and the equation governing exports is completely dropped.
Thus, if net trade flows are used, it means that half of the interregional trade flows are dropped
from the model and the rest are understated. A dropped equation implies that the economic
mechanism described by that equation is completely removed and it will not re-emerge.
To alleviate the problems of underestimating and dropping trade flows, an extra assumption on
the regional demand behaviour is made such that a full matrix of gross interregional trade flows
is found. Thus, it is possible deduce the shipments of goods between regions for all possible
trade flows. The assumption builds on the fact that the regions form a relatively small and
coherent economic sphere. The regions in Denmark are very closely integrated and they are
able to supply each other easily with goods from all industries. The assumption deals with the
consumers’ tendency toward preferring locally produced goods, or their degree of home-bias in
their choice of the consumption bundle. Two versions, the no-home-bias and the home-bias, are
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tried to evaluate the outcome on the model’s properties.
The no-home-bias version assumes that consumers do not care from where a good or service
originates. When the consumer decides on the composition of his consumption basket, he will
choose how much of each good he wants to consume, and not consider region of origin of the
goods. At the same time all regions supply the good through their local production, so for each
type of good the amount imported will be reflected by the production size is in each region.
An agent in Southern Denmark consuming Entertainment services, buys it and has it deliv-
ered from all five regions in the country. But the share imported from each region is the same
as the regions’ share of the national supply. So, when 40% of the Entertainment sector is lo-
cated in Copenhagen, then a consumer will import 40% of the Entertainment consumption from
Copenhagen, even if he lives in Southern Denmark. Equivalently, the sector in Copenhagen will
always supply 40% of any agent’s total consumption of Entertainment. And as consumers are
homothetic and the sizes of their consumption baskets are given by their incomes, the pattern
of regional exports from Entertainment produced in Copenhagen is the same as the regional
distribution of income. The share of export to Southern Denmark is equal to the income share
of Southern Denmark. Thus by this assumption, both the import and export pattern of each type
of good can be established, i.e. all bilateral trade flows can be found.11
The home-bias version of calculating the bilateral trade flows, takes the above approach, but
twists the observed consumption of goods in favour of locally supplied goods. This means
that the demand of goods with respect to region of origin is different in comparison to the
regional production structure. In the example of the Entertainment sector, the agent in Southern
Denmark will have a smaller share than 40% of entertainment originating from Copenhagen.
11Note that these assumptions on home bias in consumption are only relevant in the calculation of the interre-
gional trade flows. They do not carry over into the behavioural specification of the consumer problem, i.e. the
consumer will still maximise utility subject to the availability and prices of varieties from regions. However during
the calibration process, the baseline of the economy calibrates the parameters controlling the agents’ behaviour,
e.g. cost shares and substitution elasticities of consumers.
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Equivalently, the share of goods from Southern Denmark is increased, as well as the shares from
regions closer than Copenhagen. The pattern of exports from Copenhagen will also change to
being a kind of distance-weighted-income pattern.
I propose to adopt the straight forward methodology of re-balancing matrices. In order to
solve the problem of calculating balanced bilateral trade matrices, the accepted method of re-
balancing input-output tables, the RAS12 procedure (Möhr, Crown and Polenske, 1987) can be
readily applied. The procedure is typically used to balance input-output tables where new row
and column sums are available without new information about the matrix’s individual elements.
Thus, the matrix content can be considered as a ’seed’ that combined with new row and column
sums create a new table. A table, where the row and column sums fit the new information.
In particular, an element, ai j, in the bilateral trade matrix is the trade flow from region i to j.
The row sums, ai, are regions’ total export supply, while the column sums, a j, are the total
import demanded. But at the outset, the matrix is blank as there is no information of the trade
flows. There is no seed to start the calculation. However, the assumptions underlying the two
ways of considering home-bias from above actually gives information about the seed.
The no-home-bias is seeded as matrix of ones, and can be interpreted as the composition of a
demand basket with equal weights to region of origin. With the seed having equal weights, the
RAS procedure yields a trade pattern exactly as described for the no-home-bias assumption.
The home-bias version can be described in varying degrees of the bias. I choose the straightfor-
ward way of saying that the ’weight’ of goods is linear and depending on distance, i.e. goods
from home is weighted higher than goods from the farthest region. If all production of a good
12The RAS procedure is an algorithm that is used for re-balancing a matrix so that row sums are equal to column
sums, which is required in a bilateral trade matrix. The procedure is usually applied to balancing input-output
tables.
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Table 4.3: Seed Tables for Imputating Regional Trade Flows
No-home bias seed Home bias seed
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Copenhagen 1 1 1 1 1 Copenhagen 5 4 3 2 1
Zeeland 1 1 1 1 1 Zeeland 4 5 4 3 2
Southern Denmark 1 1 1 1 1 S. Denmark 3 4 5 4 3
Mid-Jutland 1 1 1 1 1 M. Jutland 2 3 4 5 4
Northern Denmark 1 1 1 1 1 N. Denmark 1 2 3 4 5
Source: Own calculations
is spread evenly, then the home-bias matrix will have 1/3 of the total consumption originating
in the home region, while the balanced matrix will have 1/5 of consumption from the home re-
gion. Thus, the matrix is seeded with numbers 5 to 1, with 5 for home and 1 for the most distant
neighbour. Other numbers could have been chosen for the seed, but refraining from extreme
weights and staying with some sort of distance-reduced weights, the yielded trade pattern are
very similar. The seed matrices are expressed in table 4.3.
The vector of row sums is the regionalised supply while the vector of column sums is the
regionalised demand. Plugging the seed and vectors into the RAS procedure, regions’ bilateral
trade flows are calculated for each good. As the assumptions of bias regarding region of origin
refrains from seeding the matrix with any zeros, the RAS procedure will always yield feasible
solutions, see Möhr et al. (1987).
Thus, the interregional trade flows are approximated, and now all the data required for the
calibration of the model is obtained.
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4.5 Changes in the Equalisation Grant Scheme
In the wake of the reform of the Danish municipal structure, a recasting of the equalisation
scheme was also needed. The new municipalities had different economic capabilities and a
different composition of citizens than the previous system was designed for. In addition, some
poor municipalities were merged with rich municipalities, so the new public local authorities
were better able to handle the financing of public procurement. The new structure of local gov-
ernments and a new financial foundation warranted an overhaul of the old equalisation scheme.
This reform was adopted in February 2006, where it was also decided to change the calculation
of the municipalities’ tax base. The new equalisation grant scheme meant an increase in the
flow of money from Copenhagen and Zealand to the other regions of Denmark.
The impact of these changes in interregional transfers are analysed using the CGE model pre-
sented in this chapter. As the previous equalisation scheme is embedded in the observed base-
line to which the model is calibrated, the impact of the reform is analysed using the changes
in interregional transfers, so the counterfactual imposed on the model is the difference in flows
between the old and the new equalisation scheme.
As the model is built using the five new administrative regions, the changes in transfer flows
are also aggregated to the regional level. This means that changes to interregional transfers
within a region are not taken into account, e.g. changes to the special Capital Equalisation
element where urban municipalities of Copenhagen are treated specially. In the model, the
reform is implemented through a lump sum transfer targeted at the local governments’ budgets.
The local governments in each region have a net change in their available budgets. Overall, the
governments in the Copenhagen region and Zealand region have their budget reduced, while
other regions have a net gain in their budget. Again, it has to be stressed that it is only the
change in interregional transfers that is analysed – not the total transfer flows between regions
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of Denmark.
The net changes to the equalisation scheme is given in first row in table 4.4. The table reports the
overall results from the model simulations in Equivalent Variations. When calculating equiv-
alent variation, the changes in consumer welfare are translated into how much the consumer’s
disposable income should change to be able to buy a consumption bundle that yield just as
much utility, given the baseline price and income level. The reported effects are based on sim-
ulations using the most general version of the presented model, with elasticities of substitution
for varieties are set at σ = 4 for all cluster sectors, and with a level of transport costs at 10% on
interregional trade flows, and using the no-home-bias seed for approximating the interregional
trade matrix.
Table 4.4: Overall Results in Equivalent Variations
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Changes in grants (mill. DKK) -790 -83 363 184 325
Changes in grants relative to disposable income -0.43% -0.11% 0.33% 0.16% 0.60%
Equivalent Variations for region’s agent -0.87% -0.12% 0.62% 0.33% 1.38%
Equivalent Variations, National Level 0.03%
Note: Transport costs at 10% and elasticity of subst. of varieties in cluster sectors of σ = 4
Source: Indenrigs- og Sundhedsministeriet (2005) and own calculations based on simulations.
Overall, the consumers in the Danish economy experience a welfare gain of 0.03%. This is an
aggregated number based on an income weighted sum of the gains and losses of the regions’
representative agents.13 Although overall gains consist of losses in the net paying regions, these
are countered by larger welfare gains in the net recieving regions. Thus, the transfers of just
under 900 million Danish kroner from the Eastern part of Denmark to the Western part yields a
small overall gain in welfare.
13The weights used in the sum are the agents’ share of disposable income in the baseline.
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For Copenhagen, the change in grants is a payment of 790 million kroner, equivalent to 0.43%
of disposable income in the region. However, as the grants are taken from the municipalities’
budgets, the immediate impact is a reduction in public goods provision to the consumers in
Copenhagen. The welfare loss of the change is equivalent to a reduction in baseline income of
twice the amount, i.e. a loss of 0.87%. Thus, the impact is doubled as the transfers are targeted
at municipality budgets instead of a being a lump sum transfer on consumers’ budgets. For the
Zealand region, the impact is 0.12%, about the same as the grant change relative to disposable
income. The largest welfare gain is in the Northern Jutland region where the transfers amount
to 0.60% of income, but where the impact is more than double, yielding a welfare gain of
1.38%. In the Southern Denmark and Mid-Jutland regions the welfare gains are 0.62% and
0.33% respectively.
The differences in the immediate change measured relative to income and the welfare impact
is due to the general equilibrium effects. The local governments are directly affected, and
they have to adjust the production of local public goods according to their new budgets. In
the net paying regions this contracts the local public sector, laying off workers and selling off
capital, and vice versa in the net receiving regions. Decreased public demand for labour and
capital lowers wages and rents in Copenhagen and Zealand regions, and higher demand for
factors increase wages and rents in the net receiving regions until labour and capital is absorbed
elsewhere in the economy, cf. table 4.5 and table 4.6.
Table 4.5: Changes in Prices across Regions
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Price index. consumption bundle -0.01% -0.01% -0.01% -0.01% -0.01%
Wages -0.24% -0.08% 0.21% 0.10% 0.42%
Capital rents -0.07% -0.03% 0.05% 0.02% 0.07%
Note: Transport costs at 10% of trade flows and elasticity of subst. of varieties in cluster sectors of σ = 4.
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Table 4.6: Changes Production across Sectors and Regions
Changes in output by cluster or sector Co
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Knowledge intensive clusters
Business Services 0.08% 0.03% -0.06% -0.02% -0.13% 0.02%
Entertainment 0.07% 0.03% -0.03% -0.01% -0.05% 0.01%
Financial Services 0.08% 0.04% -0.03% -0.01% -0.12% 0.05%
IT and Telecommunication 0.09% 0.05% -0.03% 0.01% -0.08% 0.05%
Tourism 0.09% 0.03% -0.07% -0.03% -0.14% 0.01%
Manufacturing clusters
Building Materials 0.03% 0.00% -0.06% -0.03% -0.09% -0.04%
Chemical and Pharmaceutical 0.08% 0.06% 0.02% 0.04% 0.00% 0.06%
Foodstuff 0.00% -0.02% -0.07% -0.05% -0.12% -0.05%
Machinery and Engineering 0.03% 0.00% -0.05% -0.03% -0.09% -0.03%
Textiles, Wood and Furniture 0.02% -0.01% -0.06% -0.04% -0.09% -0.04%
Non-cluster sectors
Transport and Logistics 0.06% 0.03% -0.03% 0.00% -0.06% 0.01%
Local Production 0.08% 0.04% -0.08% -0.03% -0.16% 0.01%
Natural Resource Based 0.02% 0.00% -0.06% -0.03% -0.10% -0.02%
Public Production** – – – – – –
Regional Public Production -1.16% -0.27% 0.90% 0.44% 1.73% -0.11%
Note: **National public sector kept exogeneous.
Transport costs at 10% of trade flows and elasticity of subst. of varieties in cluster sectors of σ = 4.
The wage level in Copenhagen drops by 0.24% and rents fall by 0.07%, so in addition to the
lower level of local public goods, consumers in Copenhagen also earn less on their factor en-
dowments. The biggest increase in factor income is in Northern Jutland where wages and rents
increase by 0.42% and 0.07% respectively. The higher impact on wages compared to other rents
is tied to the fact that local public production is labour intensive, so expanding production re-
quires relatively more labour. Similarly, the prices for the consumption bundle in each region is
close to unaffected, with a small fall of 0.01%. For citizens in the net paying regions of Copen-
hagen and Zealand, the combination of unchanged consumer prices, lower wages and fewer
local public goods, inflates the negative impact of the change in grants. Equivalently for the
other regions, the combination of these factors increase the positive impact of the equalisation
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reform.
Impact across Regions
The immediate effect of transferring money away from the local governments’ budgets is a
direct reduction in the government agents’ demand for local public production. As the gov-
ernments are the producers of local public production, and as the goods are non-traded across
regions, the impact is a one-to-one reduction in output.
The reduction in regional public production implies a release of inputs otherwise used, espe-
cially the release of the production factors, labour and capital. The increased supply on the
factor markets combined with the factors being immobile leads to a fall in the nominal wages
and capital rents in the Copenhagen and Zealand regions. In contrast, the released intermediate
inputs do not have a constraint to location, so they can be relocated to other regions.
As the local public production is labour intensive the impact on the wage is stronger compared to
rents, so the reduction in public production lowers the relative price of labour in the region. The
released resources are now free to be absorbed by the private sectors in the region, making them
able to expand production. This reverse crowding out effect thus supports the private sectors
in the region, and as they expand, they can supply more to other regions through interregional
exports.
To the consumer there is an immediate drop in welfare since the local government cannot supply
the public good in the same amount. The second round effect materialises as a drop in income
from the fall nominal factor payments, and also reduces the budget for the private agent to buy
consumer goods. The overall result for the consumers in the Copenhagen region is a sharp drop
in welfare of around 0.9%, reported in table 4.4.
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4.5.1 Impact across Sectors
Concerning the production in the different sectors, the contraction of the local public sector
is apparent. In Copenhagen it is reduced by 1.16% as the largest fall, while Nothern Jutland
expands by 1.73%. In the regions where the local public sector contracts, the increase in supply
of labour and capital enables private firms to expand output.
In Copenhagen, the biggest expansion is in the knowledge intensive clusters in the range of
0.07% to 0.09%. While the Zealand region also experience expansion in these sectors, the
sectors drop in the other regions. The largest impact is in Northern Jutland with Financial
Services and Tourism falling by more than 0.12%. Though, aggregated to the national level
the knowledge intensive sectors show an expansion, with both Financial Services and IT and
Telecommunication expanding production by 0.05%. This effect is tied to three things.
First, almost half the knowledge intensive production is located in the Copenhagen region.
Second, the expansion in production utilises the scale effects in clusters, embodied through va-
rieties. And third, the relative price of labour falls. The availability of more and cheaper factors
enables the sector to expand further in Copenhagen, and take advantage of the increasing re-
turns to scale. In addition, the labour intensive sectors ’win’ compared to the capital intensive
sectors, i.e. Knowledge intensive gain relative to Manufacturing. Again, this effect is the re-
verse in other regions where the expansion of the local public sector constricts the knowledge
intensive sectors.
The manufacturing cluster sectors also expand in Copenhagen and Zealand regions, although
not to the same extent. These sectors are more capital intensive in production, so they do not
benefit that much of the contraction of the labour intensive local public production. However,
the Copenhagen Chemical and Pharmaceutical cluster expands by 0.08%.
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Table 4.7: Changes in Regional Exports, Total Exports from Region
From region
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Knowledge intensive clusters
Business Services 0.19% 0.05% -0.09% -0.03% -0.15%
Entertainment 0.18% 0.04% -0.07% -0.02% -0.07%
Financial Services 0.21% 0.06% -0.06% -0.02% -0.14%
IT and Telecommunication 0.18% 0.07% -0.04% 0.00% -0.09%
Tourism 0.25% 0.06% -0.11% -0.05% -0.18%
Manufacturing clusters
Building Materials 0.05% 0.00% -0.07% -0.04% -0.10%
Chemical and Pharmaceutical 0.15% 0.08% 0.01% 0.04% -0.01%
Foodstuff 0.07% -0.01% -0.10% -0.06% -0.14%
Machinery and Engineering 0.05% 0.01% -0.06% -0.03% -0.10%
Textiles, Wood and Furniture 0.07% 0.00% -0.09% -0.05% -0.12%
Non-cluster sectors*
Transport and Logistics 0.19% 0.04% -0.11% -0.04% -0.19%
Local Production 0.04% 0.00% -0.07% -0.04% -0.11%
Natural Resource Based 0.01% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Note: *National public sector exogeneous and regional public goods are non-traded.
Transport costs at 10% and elast. of subst. of varieties of σ = 4
These changes in production is also reflected in the interregional trade pattern, cf. table 4.7.
As consumers in all regions demand goods from all other regions, the increase in output from
firms in the Copenhagen and Zealand regions are accompanied by increase in export volumes
to other regions. Opposite for the regions where the clusters sectors contract. Here the total
interregional exports falls. However, the increases in export volume is much higher than the
immediate increase in output warrants. This is because consumers in Southern Denmark and
the Jutland regions also experience higher income, and demand more varieties from the two
Eastern regions, and conversely the consumers in Copenhagen and Zealand experience a drop
in income and reduce their consumption.
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4.5.2 Sensitivity to Parameters
The above presented results are based on simulations with the CGE model for the specific
parameters of 10% transport costs and an elasticity of substitution of varieties of σ = 4 across
all clustering sectors, and using the no-home-bias seed for the calculation of the interregional
trade matrix. As the transport costs are important for the market access and supply access
effects in agglomeration forces, as well as the variety effects expres the market power of firms,
the simulation of the counterfactual is carried out using grid search, that is for a wide range of
parameters. Table 4.8 reports the equivalent variations for different elasticities, while keeping
the level of transport costs constant.14
Table 4.8: Sensitivity – Equivalent Variations
Elasticities of subst.
Knowledge Manufacturing Co
pe
nh
ag
en
Ze
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nd
So
uth
ern
De
nm
ark
M
id-
Ju
tla
nd
No
rth
ern
Ju
tla
nd
De
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ark
σk = 9.0 σm = 9.0 -0.88% -0.12% 0.61% 0.32% 1.37% 0.02%
σk = 9.0 σm = 4.0 -0.88% -0.12% 0.62% 0.32% 1.37% 0.02%
σk = 9.0 σm = 2.3 -0.84% -0.09% 0.65% 0.35% 1.41% 0.05%
σk = 4.0 σm = 9.0 -0.87% -0.12% 0.62% 0.32% 1.38% 0.02%
σk = 4.0 σm = 4.0 -0.87% -0.12% 0.62% 0.33% 1.38% 0.03%
σk = 4.0 σm = 2.3 -0.84% -0.08% 0.66% 0.36% 1.41% 0.06%
σk = 2.3 σm = 9.0 -0.86% -0.11% 0.63% 0.34% 1.39% 0.04%
σk = 2.3 σm = 4.0 -0.85% -0.11% 0.63% 0.34% 1.39% 0.04%
σk = 2.3 σm = 2.3 -0.82% -0.08% 0.67% 0.38% 1.43% 0.07%
Note: National values are weighted, cf. table 4.4. Transport costs at 10% of trade flows.
The variation of results for different elasticities is very small, except for the cases where the
elasticity of substitution of manufacturing varieties are low, σm = 2.3, i.e. the more differ-
entiated the varieties are. For these cases there are somewhat higher positive impacts in the
net receiving regions. Especially in Northern Jutland, where the equivalent variation is above
14Results for varying transport costs are reported in appendix D.
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1.4%, but just as importantly, the overall aggregated levels of equivalent variations are highest
for these cases, almost double the effect compared the aggregated effect in other combinations
of elasticities. However, effects stay within reasonable bounds, and the overall results of the lo-
cal public sector crowding out private production, as well as positive gains from more varieties,
both remain in spite of differences in magnitude of the variety effects and in turn the market
power.
More detailed reports of simulations with varying parameters are shown in appendices B through
D. These include simulations on models calibrated to interregional trade matrices based on the
home-bias assumption. In general, the positive aggregate welfare gains remain, regardless of
the level of transport costs and the varieties’ elasticity of substitution. Although, the choice of
parameters is not innocuous – there are differences in the scale of effects.
Looking strictly on the welfare gains, table D.1 and table D.2, it is apparent that the lower the
elasticity of substitution of the manufacturing varieties, σm, the higher the welfare gains. This
is the case for all regions, and it carries into the overall measure of welfare, i.e. the net paying
regions have a smaller drop in welfare and the net receiving regions have a larger increase, the
lower the elasticity of substitution. The same pattern is observed for the elasticity governing the
knowledge intensive clusters. Although, the differences in welfare gains are markedly smaller,
lowering the knowledge cluster elasticity, σk, increases the welfare effect.
Replacing the no-home-bias calculation of the interregional trade by the home-bias assumption,
amplifies the welfare effects, and again the lower the elasticities, the higher the gains. One set
of results stand out. For the specific combination of high transport costs and low elasticity for
the manufacturing clusters, and low transport costs for the knowledge intensive clusters, the
model yields very large welfare effects. For these parameter configurations, the model becomes
volatile. This is most likely because special parameter combinations with low elasticities of
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substitution begin to approach the so-called ’Black Hole’-parameter combination. Black Hole
combinations might cause the model to spin out of control, and utility and production tend
towards corner solutions. Fujita et al. (1999), chapter 2, have a discussion of this phenomenon.
Except for these special cases, the model’s results are overall robust to changes in parame-
ters. However, the exact parameters for the Danish economy remain to be estimated, which is
referred to future research.
4.6 Conclusion
The reform of the Danish equalisation grant scheme yields aggregated welfare gains. However,
these gains are unevenly distributed as consumers in Copenhagen and Zealand regions loose
while consumers in Southern Denmark, Mid-Jutland and Northern Jutland stand to gain in wel-
fare. The results are based on an general equilibrium analysis that take concentration effects,
scale effects from clusters and spatial effects into account.
The change in equalisation grants transfers money from Eastern part of Denmark to the Western
part, but as the transfers are targeted at the local governments’ budgets, they impact the local
public production directly. For the case of the major economic centre, which the Copenhagen
region is, the changes in equalisation grants mean a large outflow of finances from the public
sector. The smaller public sector, and in turn lower public production, makes room for the
private sectors to expand. Conversely, the private production in the Western regions is hurt by
the local public sector’s increased demand for factors, yielding the overall effect of a further
concentration of private production in Copenhagen and a reduction of concentration in West-
ern Denmark. Especially, the initial clustering of knowledge intensive sectors in Copenhagen
means that the inherent scale effects give those sectors an advantage. Therefore, the knowledge
intensive sectors grow more relative to the manufacturing clusters and other non-clustering sec-
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tors. The modelling setup does not take skill level into account, the labour is homogeneous, so
the effect is stronger since the labour released from the public sector can be easily employed in
the expanding private firms.
In addition to the crowding out (and crowding in) of the public sector vis-à-vis the private
sector, there are significant changes to the relative prices of primary factors. As the public
sector is labour intensive, the impact of the changes in public production is relatively stronger
regarding wages, and this in turn impacts the output of labour intensive sectors more than the
capital intensive sectors. This leads to an even stronger bias in the Copenhagen and Zealand
regions towards knowledge intensive production.
Further, the expansion of knowledge sectors in these regions also means that the production is
concentrated more. Meanwhile, the manufacturing sectors are diminished in the strongholds in
the Western regions. The equalisation reform, thus, reinforces the agglomeration of knowledge
intensive production in Copenhagen, and disperses the manufacturing sectors from the Western
part to the rest of the country. The driver being the agglomeration forces at play for the different
sectors.
Overall, the transfer of money from the rich regions to the poor regions, although reducing wel-
fare in the net-paying regions, will benefit the private sector, to the overall benefit of the whole
country. But it has to be stressed, that this does not mean that a further reform should transfer so
much money that the public sector disappears. There are still issues of minimum required pub-
lic provision from the local municipalities, and the consideration that a key assumption for this
result is that factors are highly mobile across sectors, whereas labour and capital are immobile
between regions.
Since this model is constructed to be able to be used in policy decisions, there are several
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issues that perhaps also need to be addressed through further development. The dependence on
labour being mobile across sectors highlights the need for introducing a heterogeneous labour
force, e.g. a split into high and low skilled labour. Since the public sector, especially the
regional public sector, is labour intensive in low-skilled compared to for example the knowledge
intensive sectors, the crowding out effects reported could be less. However, the immobility of
labour across regions is another assumption that also could be addressed in more detail. These
are all topics for future research.
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Chapter 5
Concluding Remarks
On the preceding pages CGE models within the economic geography framework have been pre-
sented. The first chapters analysed conceptual versions of the models in order to yield insights
to how extra features change the models’ agglomeration properties. These features covered
interregional transfers between local authorities as well as supply of local public provision.
Introducing interregional transfers to take equalisation grants between regions into account,
chapter 2 analysed the standard Core-Periphery model, and revealed that such transfers will
alter the concentration patterns in the model; in particular the range of stable equilibria where
the economy exhibits agglomeration in one region, the Core-Periphery outcomes, as these out-
come requires still greater integration, i.e. lower costs associated with trade between regions.
The analysis showed that a core can be taxed and some of the revenue transferred to a periph-
ery. But at the expense of the agglomeration becoming unsustainable for medium transport
costs. Introducing an equalisation scheme through interregional transfers of tax revenue thus
has significant effects on the agglomeration pattern in the standard Core-Periphery model.
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The issue of policies that intervene with agglomeration forces was further stressed in chapter
3. The chapter took the analysis further by introducing local public goods, congestion costs in
addition to equalisation grants. When all these factors were taken into account, several factors
governing the agglomeration pattern of the economy emerged. First, congestion costs are an
extra indirect dispersion force. Congestion has the effect that symmetric outcomes emerge for
high levels of integration. The domination of the concentrating forces when there is full in-
tegration between regions, disappears and the dispersion forces take over. The economy only
exhibits agglomeration for an intermediate range of transport costs. Second, transfers between
regions taps resources from economic centres for the benefit of consumers in poorer regions.
This also increases the dispersion forces in the model. Third, provision of public goods in-
crease the utility of agents. More immigration increase the tax base to finance public provision.
However, local public production draws resources from the private sectors. Besides reducing
the full agglomeration to partial agglomeration, the concentration patterns of the economy is
only changed when introducing transfers in addition to public production. And this changes the
concentration patterns dramatically, creating much more path dependency expressed through
the increased area of the hysteresis zone.
Chapter 4 built on the experiences from the previous chapter. An applied regional computable
general equilibrium model was set up of the Danish economy. The model was used for analysis
of the changes in the equalisation grants which were introduced in 2007. The reform trans-
ferred money from the Eastern part of Denmark to the Western part. The simulations showed
that, as the transfers were targeted at the local governments’ public production, major economic
centres reduced the size of the public sector freeing resources for the private sectors to ex-
pand. Conversely, the private production in the Western regions was hurt by the local public
sector’s higher demand for factors. The equalisation reform thus reinforced the agglomeration
of knowledge intensive production in Copenhagen and dispersed manufacturing sectors across
the country. The driver being the agglomeration forces at play for the different sectors, a direct
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consequence of the cluster effects built into the agglomeration models through the assumption
of monopolistic competition. Thus, overall the increased agglomeration lead to an overall wel-
fare increase in the economy, but still consumers in the Eastern part of Denmark lost compared
to the consumers in the Western part.
The work presented in this dissertation is a first step in building applied regional economic
geography CGE models. These models can account for clustering of economic activity, and can
be used for regional policy analysis with special emphasis on regional production and welfare
effects. Thus, the presented papers lay a much needed foundation for developing new tools
for regional applied computable general equilibrium. Tools needed for policy-makers enabling
them to make informed decisions.
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Table B.1: Changes in Prices and Production
Scenario τk = 10%, τm = 10%, σk = 9 and σm = 9
Changes in prices Co
pe
nh
ag
en
Ze
ala
nd
So
uth
ern
De
nm
ark
M
id-
Ju
tla
nd
No
rth
ern
Ju
tla
nd
De
nm
ark
Price index. consumption bundle -0.01% -0.01% -0.01% -0.01% -0.01% –*
Wages -0.25% -0.09% 0.20% 0.09% 0.41% –*
Capital rents -0.07% -0.03% 0.05% 0.01% 0.07% –*
Changes in output by cluster or sector
Knowledge intensive clusters
Business Services 0.08% 0.03% -0.07% -0.02% -0.13% 0.02%
Entertainment 0.07% 0.02% -0.04% -0.01% -0.06% 0.01%
Financial Services 0.08% 0.03% -0.04% -0.02% -0.12% 0.05%
IT and Telecommunication 0.08% 0.04% -0.04% 0.00% -0.09% 0.04%
Tourism 0.08% 0.03% -0.07% -0.03% -0.15% 0.01%
Manufacturing clusters
Building Materials 0.02% 0.00% -0.07% -0.04% -0.10% -0.04%
Chemical and Pharmaceutical 0.07% 0.04% 0.00% 0.02% -0.02% 0.04%
Foodstuff 0.01% -0.02% -0.07% -0.05% -0.11% -0.05%
Machinery and Engineering 0.03% 0.00% -0.05% -0.03% -0.09% -0.03%
Textiles, Wood and Furniture 0.01% -0.01% -0.06% -0.04% -0.10% -0.05%
Non-cluster sectors**
Transport and Logistics 0.05% 0.02% -0.04% -0.01% -0.07% 0.00%
Local Production 0.08% 0.03% -0.08% -0.03% -0.16% 0.01%
Natural Resource Based 0.02% 0.00% -0.06% -0.03% -0.10% -0.02%
Regional Public Production -1.16% -0.27% 0.91% 0.44% 1.73% 0.00%
Note: *Aggregated price indices not available. **National public sector kept exogeneous.
Table B.2: Changes in Prices and Production
Scenario τk = 10%, τm = 10%, σk = 9 and σm = 4
Changes in prices Co
pe
nh
ag
en
Ze
ala
nd
So
uth
ern
De
nm
ark
M
id-
Ju
tla
nd
No
rth
ern
Ju
tla
nd
De
nm
ark
Price index. consumption bundle -0.01% -0.01% -0.01% -0.01% -0.01% –*
Wages -0.25% -0.08% 0.21% 0.10% 0.41% –*
Capital rents -0.07% -0.03% 0.05% 0.01% 0.07% –*
Changes in output by cluster or sector
Knowledge intensive clusters
Business Services 0.08% 0.03% -0.06% -0.02% -0.13% 0.02%
Entertainment 0.07% 0.03% -0.04% -0.01% -0.06% 0.01%
Financial Services 0.08% 0.04% -0.04% -0.01% -0.12% 0.05%
IT and Telecommunication 0.08% 0.04% -0.04% 0.00% -0.09% 0.04%
Tourism 0.09% 0.03% -0.07% -0.03% -0.14% 0.01%
Manufacturing clusters
Building Materials 0.02% 0.00% -0.06% -0.04% -0.10% -0.04%
Chemical and Pharmaceutical 0.08% 0.05% 0.02% 0.03% -0.01% 0.06%
Foodstuff 0.01% -0.02% -0.07% -0.05% -0.12% -0.05%
Machinery and Engineering 0.03% 0.00% -0.05% -0.03% -0.09% -0.03%
Textiles, Wood and Furniture 0.01% -0.01% -0.06% -0.04% -0.10% -0.05%
Non-cluster sectors**
Transport and Logistics 0.05% 0.02% -0.03% -0.01% -0.06% 0.01%
Local Production 0.08% 0.03% -0.08% -0.03% -0.16% 0.01%
Natural Resource Based 0.02% 0.00% -0.06% -0.03% -0.10% -0.02%
Regional Public Production -1.16% -0.27% 0.90% 0.44% 1.73% 0.00%
Note: *Aggregated price indices not available. **National public sector kept exogeneous.
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Table B.3: Changes in Prices and Production
Scenario τk = 10%, τm = 10%, σk = 9 and σm = 2.3
Changes in prices Co
pe
nh
ag
en
Ze
ala
nd
So
uth
ern
De
nm
ark
M
id-
Ju
tla
nd
No
rth
ern
Ju
tla
nd
De
nm
ark
Price index. consumption bundle 0.02% 0.02% 0.02% 0.02% 0.02% –*
Wages -0.21% -0.04% 0.25% 0.14% 0.46% –*
Capital rents -0.03% 0.03% 0.10% 0.05% 0.12% –*
Changes in output by cluster or sector
Knowledge intensive clusters
Business Services 0.09% 0.03% -0.06% -0.01% -0.13% 0.03%
Entertainment 0.08% 0.03% -0.03% -0.01% -0.05% 0.01%
Financial Services 0.09% 0.05% -0.03% 0.00% -0.11% 0.06%
IT and Telecommunication 0.06% 0.02% -0.06% -0.03% -0.11% 0.02%
Tourism 0.10% 0.05% -0.06% -0.02% -0.13% 0.02%
Manufacturing clusters
Building Materials 0.00% -0.02% -0.09% -0.06% -0.12% -0.06%
Chemical and Pharmaceutical 0.07% 0.05% 0.02% 0.03% 0.00% 0.05%
Foodstuff 0.18% 0.16% 0.12% 0.14% 0.08% 0.14%
Machinery and Engineering 0.02% -0.01% -0.06% -0.04% -0.10% -0.04%
Textiles, Wood and Furniture 0.00% -0.03% -0.09% -0.07% -0.12% -0.07%
Non-cluster sectors**
Transport and Logistics 0.05% 0.02% -0.04% -0.01% -0.06% 0.01%
Local Production 0.08% 0.03% -0.08% -0.03% -0.16% 0.01%
Natural Resource Based 0.11% 0.09% 0.03% 0.06% -0.01% 0.07%
Regional Public Production -1.16% -0.28% 0.90% 0.43% 1.72% -0.01%
Note: *Aggregated price indices not available. **National public sector kept exogeneous.
Table B.4: Changes in Prices and Production
Scenario τk = 10%, τm = 10%, σk = 4 and σm = 9
Changes in prices Co
pe
nh
ag
en
Ze
ala
nd
So
uth
ern
De
nm
ark
M
id-
Ju
tla
nd
No
rth
ern
Ju
tla
nd
De
nm
ark
Price index. consumption bundle -0.01% -0.01% -0.01% -0.01% -0.01% –*
Wages -0.25% -0.08% 0.21% 0.10% 0.41% –*
Capital rents -0.07% -0.03% 0.05% 0.01% 0.07% –*
Changes in output by cluster or sector
Knowledge intensive clusters
Business Services 0.08% 0.03% -0.06% -0.02% -0.13% 0.02%
Entertainment 0.07% 0.03% -0.03% -0.01% -0.05% 0.01%
Financial Services 0.08% 0.04% -0.03% -0.01% -0.12% 0.05%
IT and Telecommunication 0.09% 0.05% -0.03% 0.01% -0.08% 0.05%
Tourism 0.09% 0.03% -0.07% -0.03% -0.14% 0.01%
Manufacturing clusters
Building Materials 0.02% 0.00% -0.06% -0.04% -0.10% -0.04%
Chemical and Pharmaceutical 0.07% 0.04% 0.00% 0.02% -0.02% 0.05%
Foodstuff 0.01% -0.02% -0.07% -0.05% -0.11% -0.05%
Machinery and Engineering 0.03% 0.00% -0.05% -0.03% -0.09% -0.03%
Textiles, Wood and Furniture 0.02% -0.01% -0.06% -0.04% -0.10% -0.05%
Non-cluster sectors**
Transport and Logistics 0.05% 0.02% -0.03% -0.01% -0.06% 0.01%
Local Production 0.08% 0.04% -0.08% -0.03% -0.16% 0.01%
Natural Resource Based 0.02% 0.00% -0.06% -0.03% -0.10% -0.02%
Regional Public Production -1.16% -0.27% 0.90% 0.44% 1.73% 0.00%
Note: *Aggregated price indices not available. **National public sector kept exogeneous.
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Table B.5: Changes in Prices and Production
Scenario τk = 10%, τm = 10%, σk = 4 and σm = 4
Changes in prices Co
pe
nh
ag
en
Ze
ala
nd
So
uth
ern
De
nm
ark
M
id-
Ju
tla
nd
No
rth
ern
Ju
tla
nd
De
nm
ark
Price index. consumption bundle -0.01% -0.01% -0.01% -0.01% -0.01% –*
Wages -0.24% -0.08% 0.21% 0.10% 0.42% –*
Capital rents -0.07% -0.03% 0.05% 0.02% 0.07% –*
Changes in output by cluster or sector
Knowledge intensive clusters
Business Services 0.08% 0.03% -0.06% -0.02% -0.13% 0.02%
Entertainment 0.07% 0.03% -0.03% -0.01% -0.05% 0.01%
Financial Services 0.08% 0.04% -0.03% -0.01% -0.12% 0.05%
IT and Telecommunication 0.09% 0.05% -0.03% 0.01% -0.08% 0.05%
Tourism 0.09% 0.03% -0.07% -0.03% -0.14% 0.01%
Manufacturing clusters
Building Materials 0.03% 0.00% -0.06% -0.03% -0.09% -0.04%
Chemical and Pharmaceutical 0.08% 0.06% 0.02% 0.04% 0.00% 0.06%
Foodstuff 0.00% -0.02% -0.07% -0.05% -0.12% -0.05%
Machinery and Engineering 0.03% 0.00% -0.05% -0.03% -0.09% -0.03%
Textiles, Wood and Furniture 0.02% -0.01% -0.06% -0.04% -0.09% -0.04%
Non-cluster sectors**
Transport and Logistics 0.06% 0.03% -0.03% 0.00% -0.06% 0.01%
Local Production 0.08% 0.04% -0.08% -0.03% -0.16% 0.01%
Natural Resource Based 0.02% 0.00% -0.06% -0.03% -0.10% -0.02%
Regional Public Production -1.16% -0.27% 0.90% 0.44% 1.73% 0.00%
Note: *Aggregated price indices not available. **National public sector kept exogeneous.
Table B.6: Changes in Prices and Production
Scenario τk = 10%, τm = 10%, σk = 4 and σm = 2.3
Changes in prices Co
pe
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ag
en
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ala
nd
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uth
ern
De
nm
ark
M
id-
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tla
nd
No
rth
ern
Ju
tla
nd
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ark
Price index. consumption bundle 0.02% 0.02% 0.02% 0.02% 0.02% –*
Wages -0.21% -0.04% 0.25% 0.14% 0.46% –*
Capital rents -0.03% 0.03% 0.10% 0.06% 0.12% –*
Changes in output by cluster or sector
Knowledge intensive clusters
Business Services 0.09% 0.03% -0.06% -0.01% -0.13% 0.03%
Entertainment 0.08% 0.03% -0.03% 0.00% -0.05% 0.02%
Financial Services 0.09% 0.05% -0.02% 0.00% -0.11% 0.06%
IT and Telecommunication 0.07% 0.03% -0.05% -0.02% -0.10% 0.02%
Tourism 0.10% 0.05% -0.05% -0.01% -0.13% 0.02%
Manufacturing clusters
Building Materials 0.01% -0.02% -0.09% -0.06% -0.12% -0.06%
Chemical and Pharmaceutical 0.08% 0.05% 0.02% 0.04% 0.00% 0.05%
Foodstuff 0.18% 0.16% 0.12% 0.14% 0.08% 0.14%
Machinery and Engineering 0.02% -0.01% -0.06% -0.04% -0.10% -0.04%
Textiles, Wood and Furniture 0.00% -0.03% -0.09% -0.07% -0.12% -0.07%
Non-cluster sectors**
Transport and Logistics 0.06% 0.03% -0.03% 0.00% -0.06% 0.01%
Local Production 0.08% 0.03% -0.08% -0.02% -0.16% 0.01%
Natural Resource Based 0.11% 0.09% 0.03% 0.06% -0.01% 0.07%
Regional Public Production -1.16% -0.28% 0.90% 0.43% 1.72% -0.01%
Note: *Aggregated price indices not available. **National public sector kept exogeneous.
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Table B.7: Changes in Prices and Production
Scenario τk = 10%, τm = 10%, σk = 2.3 and σm = 9
Changes in prices Co
pe
nh
ag
en
Ze
ala
nd
So
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De
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ark
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id-
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tla
nd
No
rth
ern
Ju
tla
nd
De
nm
ark
Price index. consumption bundle -0.01% -0.01% -0.01% -0.01% -0.01% –*
Wages -0.24% -0.08% 0.21% 0.10% 0.42% –*
Capital rents -0.06% -0.03% 0.06% 0.02% 0.08% –*
Changes in output by cluster or sector
Knowledge intensive clusters
Business Services 0.09% 0.04% -0.05% -0.01% -0.12% 0.03%
Entertainment 0.08% 0.03% -0.02% 0.00% -0.04% 0.02%
Financial Services 0.09% 0.05% -0.01% 0.01% -0.10% 0.06%
IT and Telecommunication 0.10% 0.06% 0.00% 0.03% -0.05% 0.06%
Tourism 0.09% 0.04% -0.06% -0.02% -0.13% 0.02%
Manufacturing clusters
Building Materials 0.03% 0.00% -0.06% -0.03% -0.09% -0.04%
Chemical and Pharmaceutical 0.08% 0.05% 0.01% 0.02% -0.02% 0.05%
Foodstuff 0.00% -0.02% -0.07% -0.05% -0.12% -0.05%
Machinery and Engineering 0.03% 0.00% -0.05% -0.03% -0.09% -0.03%
Textiles, Wood and Furniture 0.02% 0.00% -0.06% -0.04% -0.09% -0.04%
Non-cluster sectors**
Transport and Logistics 0.07% 0.03% -0.02% 0.00% -0.05% 0.02%
Local Production 0.09% 0.04% -0.07% -0.02% -0.15% 0.01%
Natural Resource Based 0.01% 0.00% -0.07% -0.04% -0.10% -0.02%
Regional Public Production -1.16% -0.27% 0.90% 0.44% 1.73% 0.00%
Note: *Aggregated price indices not available. **National public sector kept exogeneous.
Table B.8: Changes in Prices and Production
Scenario τk = 10%, τm = 10%, σk = 2.3 and σm = 4
Changes in prices Co
pe
nh
ag
en
Ze
ala
nd
So
uth
ern
De
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ark
M
id-
Ju
tla
nd
No
rth
ern
Ju
tla
nd
De
nm
ark
Price index. consumption bundle -0.01% -0.01% -0.01% -0.01% -0.01% –*
Wages -0.24% -0.07% 0.22% 0.11% 0.42% –*
Capital rents -0.06% -0.02% 0.06% 0.02% 0.08% –*
Changes in output by cluster or sector
Knowledge intensive clusters
Business Services 0.09% 0.04% -0.05% -0.01% -0.12% 0.03%
Entertainment 0.08% 0.04% -0.02% 0.01% -0.04% 0.02%
Financial Services 0.09% 0.05% -0.01% 0.01% -0.10% 0.06%
IT and Telecommunication 0.10% 0.06% 0.00% 0.03% -0.05% 0.06%
Tourism 0.09% 0.04% -0.06% -0.02% -0.13% 0.02%
Manufacturing clusters
Building Materials 0.03% 0.00% -0.06% -0.03% -0.09% -0.04%
Chemical and Pharmaceutical 0.09% 0.06% 0.02% 0.04% 0.00% 0.06%
Foodstuff 0.00% -0.02% -0.07% -0.05% -0.12% -0.05%
Machinery and Engineering 0.03% 0.01% -0.05% -0.02% -0.09% -0.03%
Textiles, Wood and Furniture 0.02% 0.00% -0.06% -0.04% -0.09% -0.04%
Non-cluster sectors**
Transport and Logistics 0.07% 0.04% -0.02% 0.01% -0.05% 0.02%
Local Production 0.09% 0.04% -0.07% -0.02% -0.15% 0.01%
Natural Resource Based 0.01% 0.00% -0.07% -0.04% -0.10% -0.02%
Regional Public Production -1.16% -0.27% 0.90% 0.44% 1.73% 0.00%
Note: *Aggregated price indices not available. **National public sector kept exogeneous.
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Table B.9: Changes in Prices and Production
Scenario τk = 10%, τm = 10%, σk = 2.3 and σm = 2.3
Changes in prices Co
pe
nh
ag
en
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nd
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De
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ark
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tla
nd
No
rth
ern
Ju
tla
nd
De
nm
ark
Price index. consumption bundle 0.02% 0.02% 0.02% 0.02% 0.02% –*
Wages -0.20% -0.03% 0.26% 0.15% 0.47% –*
Capital rents -0.02% 0.04% 0.11% 0.06% 0.13% –*
Changes in output by cluster or sector
Knowledge intensive clusters
Business Services 0.09% 0.04% -0.05% 0.00% -0.12% 0.04%
Entertainment 0.08% 0.04% -0.02% 0.01% -0.03% 0.03%
Financial Services 0.10% 0.06% 0.00% 0.02% -0.09% 0.07%
IT and Telecommunication 0.07% 0.04% -0.04% 0.00% -0.09% 0.03%
Tourism 0.11% 0.06% -0.04% 0.00% -0.12% 0.03%
Manufacturing clusters
Building Materials 0.01% -0.02% -0.08% -0.05% -0.11% -0.06%
Chemical and Pharmaceutical 0.08% 0.06% 0.03% 0.04% 0.01% 0.06%
Foodstuff 0.18% 0.16% 0.12% 0.14% 0.08% 0.14%
Machinery and Engineering 0.02% 0.00% -0.06% -0.03% -0.10% -0.04%
Textiles, Wood and Furniture 0.00% -0.02% -0.09% -0.07% -0.12% -0.07%
Non-cluster sectors**
Transport and Logistics 0.07% 0.04% -0.02% 0.00% -0.05% 0.02%
Local Production 0.09% 0.04% -0.07% -0.02% -0.16% 0.01%
Natural Resource Based 0.10% 0.09% 0.03% 0.06% -0.01% 0.07%
Regional Public Production -1.17% -0.28% 0.90% 0.43% 1.72% -0.01%
Note: *Aggregated price indices not available. **National public sector kept exogeneous.
Table B.10: Changes in Prices and Production
Scenario τk = 10%, τm = 20%, σk = 9 and σm = 9
Changes in prices Co
pe
nh
ag
en
Ze
ala
nd
So
uth
ern
De
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ark
M
id-
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tla
nd
No
rth
ern
Ju
tla
nd
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nm
ark
Price index. consumption bundle 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% –*
Wages -0.24% -0.08% 0.21% 0.10% 0.42% –*
Capital rents -0.07% -0.03% 0.06% 0.02% 0.08% –*
Changes in output by cluster or sector
Knowledge intensive clusters
Business Services 0.08% 0.03% -0.07% -0.02% -0.14% 0.02%
Entertainment 0.07% 0.02% -0.04% -0.02% -0.06% 0.00%
Financial Services 0.09% 0.05% -0.03% -0.01% -0.11% 0.06%
IT and Telecommunication 0.08% 0.04% -0.04% -0.01% -0.09% 0.04%
Tourism 0.09% 0.03% -0.07% -0.03% -0.14% 0.01%
Manufacturing clusters
Building Materials 0.02% 0.00% -0.06% -0.03% -0.09% -0.04%
Chemical and Pharmaceutical 0.06% 0.03% 0.00% 0.01% -0.03% 0.03%
Foodstuff -0.01% -0.03% -0.08% -0.06% -0.12% -0.06%
Machinery and Engineering 0.04% 0.01% -0.04% -0.02% -0.08% -0.02%
Textiles, Wood and Furniture 0.01% -0.01% -0.06% -0.04% -0.09% -0.04%
Non-cluster sectors**
Transport and Logistics 0.11% 0.08% 0.02% 0.05% -0.01% 0.06%
Local Production 0.08% 0.03% -0.08% -0.03% -0.16% 0.00%
Natural Resource Based 0.00% -0.01% -0.08% -0.05% -0.11% -0.03%
Regional Public Production -1.16% -0.27% 0.90% 0.44% 1.73% 0.00%
Note: *Aggregated price indices not available. **National public sector kept exogeneous.
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Table B.11: Changes in Prices and Production
Scenario τk = 10%, τm = 20%, σk = 9 and σm = 4
Changes in prices Co
pe
nh
ag
en
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nd
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ern
De
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ark
M
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nd
No
rth
ern
Ju
tla
nd
De
nm
ark
Price index. consumption bundle 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% –*
Wages -0.24% -0.08% 0.22% 0.11% 0.42% –*
Capital rents -0.06% -0.03% 0.06% 0.02% 0.08% –*
Changes in output by cluster or sector
Knowledge intensive clusters
Business Services 0.08% 0.03% -0.07% -0.02% -0.14% 0.02%
Entertainment 0.07% 0.02% -0.04% -0.02% -0.06% 0.01%
Financial Services 0.09% 0.05% -0.03% 0.00% -0.11% 0.06%
IT and Telecommunication 0.08% 0.04% -0.04% -0.01% -0.09% 0.04%
Tourism 0.09% 0.03% -0.07% -0.03% -0.14% 0.01%
Manufacturing clusters
Building Materials 0.02% 0.00% -0.06% -0.03% -0.09% -0.04%
Chemical and Pharmaceutical 0.06% 0.04% 0.00% 0.02% -0.02% 0.04%
Foodstuff -0.01% -0.03% -0.08% -0.06% -0.12% -0.06%
Machinery and Engineering 0.03% 0.01% -0.04% -0.02% -0.07% -0.02%
Textiles, Wood and Furniture 0.01% -0.01% -0.06% -0.04% -0.09% -0.04%
Non-cluster sectors**
Transport and Logistics 0.11% 0.08% 0.03% 0.05% 0.00% 0.07%
Local Production 0.08% 0.03% -0.08% -0.03% -0.16% 0.00%
Natural Resource Based 0.00% -0.01% -0.08% -0.05% -0.11% -0.03%
Regional Public Production -1.16% -0.27% 0.90% 0.44% 1.73% 0.00%
Note: *Aggregated price indices not available. **National public sector kept exogeneous.
Table B.12: Changes in Prices and Production
Scenario τk = 10%, τm = 20%, σk = 9 and σm = 2.3
Changes in prices Co
pe
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ag
en
Ze
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nd
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De
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M
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tla
nd
No
rth
ern
Ju
tla
nd
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ark
Price index. consumption bundle 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% –*
Wages -0.24% -0.08% 0.21% 0.10% 0.42% –*
Capital rents -0.07% -0.03% 0.05% 0.02% 0.07% –*
Changes in output by cluster or sector
Knowledge intensive clusters
Business Services 0.08% 0.02% -0.07% -0.02% -0.14% 0.02%
Entertainment 0.07% 0.02% -0.05% -0.02% -0.07% 0.00%
Financial Services 0.09% 0.04% -0.03% -0.01% -0.12% 0.06%
IT and Telecommunication 0.08% 0.03% -0.05% -0.01% -0.10% 0.03%
Tourism 0.08% 0.03% -0.07% -0.04% -0.15% 0.00%
Manufacturing clusters
Building Materials 0.02% 0.00% -0.06% -0.03% -0.09% -0.04%
Chemical and Pharmaceutical 0.06% 0.03% -0.01% 0.01% -0.03% 0.03%
Foodstuff -0.01% -0.03% -0.08% -0.06% -0.12% -0.06%
Machinery and Engineering 0.04% 0.01% -0.04% -0.02% -0.08% -0.02%
Textiles, Wood and Furniture 0.01% -0.01% -0.06% -0.04% -0.09% -0.04%
Non-cluster sectors**
Transport and Logistics 0.11% 0.07% 0.02% 0.05% -0.01% 0.06%
Local Production 0.08% 0.03% -0.08% -0.03% -0.16% 0.00%
Natural Resource Based 0.00% -0.01% -0.08% -0.05% -0.11% -0.03%
Regional Public Production -1.16% -0.27% 0.90% 0.44% 1.73% 0.00%
Note: *Aggregated price indices not available. **National public sector kept exogeneous.
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Table B.13: Changes in Prices and Production
Scenario τk = 10%, τm = 20%, σk = 4 and σm = 9
Changes in prices Co
pe
nh
ag
en
Ze
ala
nd
So
uth
ern
De
nm
ark
M
id-
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tla
nd
No
rth
ern
Ju
tla
nd
De
nm
ark
Price index. consumption bundle 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% –*
Wages -0.24% -0.08% 0.22% 0.11% 0.42% –*
Capital rents -0.06% -0.03% 0.06% 0.02% 0.08% –*
Changes in output by cluster or sector
Knowledge intensive clusters
Business Services 0.08% 0.03% -0.06% -0.02% -0.13% 0.02%
Entertainment 0.07% 0.02% -0.04% -0.01% -0.06% 0.01%
Financial Services 0.09% 0.05% -0.02% 0.00% -0.11% 0.06%
IT and Telecommunication 0.08% 0.04% -0.04% 0.00% -0.08% 0.04%
Tourism 0.09% 0.03% -0.07% -0.03% -0.14% 0.01%
Manufacturing clusters
Building Materials 0.02% 0.00% -0.06% -0.03% -0.09% -0.04%
Chemical and Pharmaceutical 0.06% 0.03% 0.00% 0.01% -0.03% 0.03%
Foodstuff -0.01% -0.03% -0.08% -0.06% -0.12% -0.06%
Machinery and Engineering 0.04% 0.01% -0.04% -0.02% -0.08% -0.02%
Textiles, Wood and Furniture 0.02% -0.01% -0.06% -0.04% -0.09% -0.04%
Non-cluster sectors**
Transport and Logistics 0.11% 0.08% 0.03% 0.05% 0.00% 0.07%
Local Production 0.08% 0.03% -0.08% -0.03% -0.16% 0.01%
Natural Resource Based 0.00% -0.01% -0.08% -0.05% -0.11% -0.03%
Regional Public Production -1.16% -0.27% 0.90% 0.44% 1.73% 0.00%
Note: *Aggregated price indices not available. **National public sector kept exogeneous.
Table B.14: Changes in Prices and Production
Scenario τk = 10%, τm = 20%, σk = 4 and σm = 4
Changes in prices Co
pe
nh
ag
en
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ala
nd
So
uth
ern
De
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ark
M
id-
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tla
nd
No
rth
ern
Ju
tla
nd
De
nm
ark
Price index. consumption bundle 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% –*
Wages -0.24% -0.08% 0.21% 0.10% 0.42% –*
Capital rents -0.07% -0.03% 0.05% 0.02% 0.07% –*
Changes in output by cluster or sector
Knowledge intensive clusters
Business Services 0.08% 0.02% -0.07% -0.02% -0.14% 0.02%
Entertainment 0.07% 0.02% -0.05% -0.02% -0.07% 0.00%
Financial Services 0.09% 0.04% -0.03% -0.01% -0.12% 0.06%
IT and Telecommunication 0.08% 0.03% -0.05% -0.01% -0.10% 0.03%
Tourism 0.08% 0.03% -0.07% -0.04% -0.15% 0.00%
Manufacturing clusters
Building Materials 0.02% 0.00% -0.06% -0.03% -0.09% -0.04%
Chemical and Pharmaceutical 0.06% 0.03% -0.01% 0.01% -0.03% 0.03%
Foodstuff -0.01% -0.03% -0.08% -0.06% -0.12% -0.06%
Machinery and Engineering 0.04% 0.01% -0.04% -0.02% -0.08% -0.02%
Textiles, Wood and Furniture 0.01% -0.01% -0.06% -0.04% -0.09% -0.04%
Non-cluster sectors**
Transport and Logistics 0.11% 0.07% 0.02% 0.05% -0.01% 0.06%
Local Production 0.08% 0.03% -0.08% -0.03% -0.16% 0.00%
Natural Resource Based 0.00% -0.01% -0.08% -0.05% -0.11% -0.03%
Regional Public Production -1.16% -0.27% 0.90% 0.44% 1.73% 0.00%
Note: *Aggregated price indices not available. **National public sector kept exogeneous.
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Table B.15: Changes in Prices and Production
Scenario τk = 10%, τm = 20%, σk = 4 and σm = 2.3
Changes in prices Co
pe
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rth
ern
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tla
nd
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ark
Price index. consumption bundle 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% –*
Wages -0.24% -0.08% 0.21% 0.10% 0.42% –*
Capital rents -0.07% -0.03% 0.05% 0.02% 0.07% –*
Changes in output by cluster or sector
Knowledge intensive clusters
Business Services 0.08% 0.02% -0.07% -0.02% -0.14% 0.02%
Entertainment 0.07% 0.02% -0.05% -0.02% -0.07% 0.00%
Financial Services 0.09% 0.04% -0.03% -0.01% -0.12% 0.06%
IT and Telecommunication 0.08% 0.03% -0.05% -0.01% -0.10% 0.03%
Tourism 0.08% 0.03% -0.07% -0.04% -0.15% 0.00%
Manufacturing clusters
Building Materials 0.02% 0.00% -0.06% -0.03% -0.09% -0.04%
Chemical and Pharmaceutical 0.06% 0.03% -0.01% 0.01% -0.03% 0.03%
Foodstuff -0.01% -0.03% -0.08% -0.06% -0.12% -0.06%
Machinery and Engineering 0.04% 0.01% -0.04% -0.02% -0.08% -0.02%
Textiles, Wood and Furniture 0.01% -0.01% -0.06% -0.04% -0.09% -0.04%
Non-cluster sectors**
Transport and Logistics 0.11% 0.07% 0.02% 0.05% -0.01% 0.06%
Local Production 0.08% 0.03% -0.08% -0.03% -0.16% 0.00%
Natural Resource Based 0.00% -0.01% -0.08% -0.05% -0.11% -0.03%
Regional Public Production -1.16% -0.27% 0.90% 0.44% 1.73% 0.00%
Note: *Aggregated price indices not available. **National public sector kept exogeneous.
Table B.16: Changes in Prices and Production
Scenario τk = 10%, τm = 20%, σk = 2.3 and σm = 9
Changes in prices Co
pe
nh
ag
en
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nd
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uth
ern
De
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ark
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tla
nd
No
rth
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Ju
tla
nd
De
nm
ark
Price index. consumption bundle 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% –*
Wages -0.24% -0.08% 0.21% 0.10% 0.42% –*
Capital rents -0.07% -0.03% 0.05% 0.02% 0.07% –*
Changes in output by cluster or sector
Knowledge intensive clusters
Business Services 0.08% 0.02% -0.07% -0.02% -0.14% 0.02%
Entertainment 0.07% 0.02% -0.05% -0.02% -0.07% 0.00%
Financial Services 0.09% 0.04% -0.03% -0.01% -0.12% 0.06%
IT and Telecommunication 0.08% 0.03% -0.05% -0.01% -0.10% 0.03%
Tourism 0.08% 0.03% -0.07% -0.04% -0.15% 0.00%
Manufacturing clusters
Building Materials 0.02% 0.00% -0.06% -0.03% -0.09% -0.04%
Chemical and Pharmaceutical 0.06% 0.03% -0.01% 0.01% -0.03% 0.03%
Foodstuff -0.01% -0.03% -0.08% -0.06% -0.12% -0.06%
Machinery and Engineering 0.04% 0.01% -0.04% -0.02% -0.08% -0.02%
Textiles, Wood and Furniture 0.01% -0.01% -0.06% -0.04% -0.09% -0.04%
Non-cluster sectors**
Transport and Logistics 0.11% 0.07% 0.02% 0.05% -0.01% 0.06%
Local Production 0.08% 0.03% -0.08% -0.03% -0.16% 0.00%
Natural Resource Based 0.00% -0.01% -0.08% -0.05% -0.11% -0.03%
Regional Public Production -1.16% -0.27% 0.90% 0.44% 1.73% 0.00%
Note: *Aggregated price indices not available. **National public sector kept exogeneous.
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Table B.17: Changes in Prices and Production
Scenario τk = 10%, τm = 20%, σk = 2.3 and σm = 4
Changes in prices Co
pe
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nd
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rth
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ark
Price index. consumption bundle 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% –*
Wages -0.24% -0.08% 0.21% 0.10% 0.42% –*
Capital rents -0.07% -0.03% 0.05% 0.02% 0.07% –*
Changes in output by cluster or sector
Knowledge intensive clusters
Business Services 0.08% 0.02% -0.07% -0.02% -0.14% 0.02%
Entertainment 0.07% 0.02% -0.05% -0.02% -0.07% 0.00%
Financial Services 0.09% 0.04% -0.03% -0.01% -0.12% 0.06%
IT and Telecommunication 0.08% 0.03% -0.05% -0.01% -0.10% 0.03%
Tourism 0.08% 0.03% -0.07% -0.04% -0.15% 0.00%
Manufacturing clusters
Building Materials 0.02% 0.00% -0.06% -0.03% -0.09% -0.04%
Chemical and Pharmaceutical 0.06% 0.03% -0.01% 0.01% -0.03% 0.03%
Foodstuff -0.01% -0.03% -0.08% -0.06% -0.12% -0.06%
Machinery and Engineering 0.04% 0.01% -0.04% -0.02% -0.08% -0.02%
Textiles, Wood and Furniture 0.01% -0.01% -0.06% -0.04% -0.09% -0.04%
Non-cluster sectors**
Transport and Logistics 0.11% 0.07% 0.02% 0.05% -0.01% 0.06%
Local Production 0.08% 0.03% -0.08% -0.03% -0.16% 0.00%
Natural Resource Based 0.00% -0.01% -0.08% -0.05% -0.11% -0.03%
Regional Public Production -1.16% -0.27% 0.90% 0.44% 1.73% 0.00%
Note: *Aggregated price indices not available. **National public sector kept exogeneous.
Table B.18: Changes in Prices and Production
Scenario τk = 10%, τm = 20%, σk = 2.3 and σm = 2.3
Changes in prices Co
pe
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ag
en
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nd
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De
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No
rth
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Ju
tla
nd
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ark
Price index. consumption bundle 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% –*
Wages -0.24% -0.08% 0.21% 0.10% 0.42% –*
Capital rents -0.07% -0.03% 0.05% 0.02% 0.07% –*
Changes in output by cluster or sector
Knowledge intensive clusters
Business Services 0.08% 0.02% -0.07% -0.02% -0.14% 0.02%
Entertainment 0.07% 0.02% -0.05% -0.02% -0.07% 0.00%
Financial Services 0.09% 0.04% -0.03% -0.01% -0.12% 0.06%
IT and Telecommunication 0.08% 0.03% -0.05% -0.01% -0.10% 0.03%
Tourism 0.08% 0.03% -0.07% -0.04% -0.15% 0.00%
Manufacturing clusters
Building Materials 0.02% 0.00% -0.06% -0.03% -0.09% -0.04%
Chemical and Pharmaceutical 0.06% 0.03% -0.01% 0.01% -0.03% 0.03%
Foodstuff -0.01% -0.03% -0.08% -0.06% -0.12% -0.06%
Machinery and Engineering 0.04% 0.01% -0.04% -0.02% -0.08% -0.02%
Textiles, Wood and Furniture 0.01% -0.01% -0.06% -0.04% -0.09% -0.04%
Non-cluster sectors**
Transport and Logistics 0.11% 0.07% 0.02% 0.05% -0.01% 0.06%
Local Production 0.08% 0.03% -0.08% -0.03% -0.16% 0.00%
Natural Resource Based 0.00% -0.01% -0.08% -0.05% -0.11% -0.03%
Regional Public Production -1.16% -0.27% 0.90% 0.44% 1.73% 0.00%
Note: *Aggregated price indices not available. **National public sector kept exogeneous.
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Table B.19: Changes in Prices and Production
Scenario τk = 20%, τm = 10%, σk = 9 and σm = 9
Changes in prices Co
pe
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No
rth
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Price index. consumption bundle -0.01% -0.01% -0.01% -0.01% -0.01% –*
Wages -0.25% -0.09% 0.20% 0.09% 0.41% –*
Capital rents -0.08% -0.04% 0.05% 0.01% 0.07% –*
Changes in output by cluster or sector
Knowledge intensive clusters
Business Services 0.07% 0.02% -0.07% -0.02% -0.13% 0.02%
Entertainment 0.07% 0.02% -0.04% -0.01% -0.06% 0.01%
Financial Services 0.07% 0.02% -0.04% -0.02% -0.12% 0.04%
IT and Telecommunication 0.08% 0.03% -0.04% -0.01% -0.08% 0.04%
Tourism 0.08% 0.02% -0.07% -0.03% -0.14% 0.00%
Manufacturing clusters
Building Materials 0.02% 0.00% -0.07% -0.04% -0.10% -0.04%
Chemical and Pharmaceutical 0.07% 0.04% 0.00% 0.02% -0.02% 0.05%
Foodstuff 0.01% -0.02% -0.07% -0.05% -0.11% -0.05%
Machinery and Engineering 0.03% 0.00% -0.05% -0.03% -0.09% -0.03%
Textiles, Wood and Furniture 0.02% -0.01% -0.06% -0.04% -0.10% -0.05%
Non-cluster sectors**
Transport and Logistics 0.05% 0.01% -0.04% -0.01% -0.07% 0.00%
Local Production 0.08% 0.03% -0.08% -0.03% -0.16% 0.01%
Natural Resource Based 0.02% 0.00% -0.06% -0.03% -0.10% -0.01%
Regional Public Production -1.16% -0.27% 0.91% 0.44% 1.73% 0.00%
Note: *Aggregated price indices not available. **National public sector kept exogeneous.
Table B.20: Changes in Prices and Production
Scenario τk = 20%, τm = 10%, σk = 9 and σm = 4
Changes in prices Co
pe
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ag
en
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De
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nd
No
rth
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Ju
tla
nd
De
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ark
Price index. consumption bundle -0.01% -0.01% -0.01% -0.01% -0.01% –*
Wages -0.25% -0.08% 0.20% 0.09% 0.41% –*
Capital rents -0.07% -0.03% 0.05% 0.01% 0.07% –*
Changes in output by cluster or sector
Knowledge intensive clusters
Business Services 0.07% 0.02% -0.06% -0.02% -0.13% 0.02%
Entertainment 0.07% 0.02% -0.04% -0.01% -0.05% 0.01%
Financial Services 0.07% 0.03% -0.04% -0.02% -0.12% 0.04%
IT and Telecommunication 0.08% 0.03% -0.04% -0.01% -0.08% 0.04%
Tourism 0.08% 0.03% -0.07% -0.03% -0.14% 0.00%
Manufacturing clusters
Building Materials 0.02% 0.00% -0.06% -0.04% -0.10% -0.04%
Chemical and Pharmaceutical 0.08% 0.06% 0.02% 0.04% -0.01% 0.06%
Foodstuff 0.01% -0.02% -0.07% -0.05% -0.11% -0.05%
Machinery and Engineering 0.03% 0.00% -0.05% -0.03% -0.09% -0.03%
Textiles, Wood and Furniture 0.02% -0.01% -0.06% -0.04% -0.10% -0.04%
Non-cluster sectors**
Transport and Logistics 0.05% 0.02% -0.04% -0.01% -0.07% 0.01%
Local Production 0.08% 0.03% -0.08% -0.03% -0.16% 0.01%
Natural Resource Based 0.02% 0.00% -0.06% -0.03% -0.10% -0.01%
Regional Public Production -1.16% -0.27% 0.90% 0.44% 1.73% 0.00%
Note: *Aggregated price indices not available. **National public sector kept exogeneous.
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Table B.21: Changes in Prices and Production
Scenario τk = 20%, τm = 10%, σk = 9 and σm = 2.3
Changes in prices Co
pe
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nd
No
rth
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Ju
tla
nd
De
nm
ark
Price index. consumption bundle 0.02% 0.02% 0.02% 0.02% 0.02% –*
Wages -0.21% -0.04% 0.25% 0.14% 0.47% –*
Capital rents -0.03% 0.03% 0.10% 0.06% 0.12% –*
Changes in output by cluster or sector
Knowledge intensive clusters
Business Services 0.08% 0.02% -0.06% -0.02% -0.12% 0.02%
Entertainment 0.07% 0.03% -0.03% -0.01% -0.05% 0.01%
Financial Services 0.08% 0.04% -0.03% -0.01% -0.11% 0.05%
IT and Telecommunication 0.06% 0.01% -0.06% -0.03% -0.11% 0.02%
Tourism 0.09% 0.05% -0.05% -0.01% -0.12% 0.02%
Manufacturing clusters
Building Materials 0.00% -0.02% -0.09% -0.06% -0.12% -0.06%
Chemical and Pharmaceutical 0.08% 0.05% 0.02% 0.04% 0.01% 0.06%
Foodstuff 0.18% 0.17% 0.12% 0.14% 0.09% 0.14%
Machinery and Engineering 0.02% -0.01% -0.06% -0.04% -0.10% -0.04%
Textiles, Wood and Furniture 0.00% -0.03% -0.09% -0.07% -0.12% -0.07%
Non-cluster sectors**
Transport and Logistics 0.07% 0.04% -0.02% 0.01% -0.05% 0.02%
Local Production 0.08% 0.03% -0.08% -0.03% -0.16% 0.01%
Natural Resource Based 0.11% 0.09% 0.03% 0.06% 0.00% 0.08%
Regional Public Production -1.16% -0.28% 0.90% 0.43% 1.72% -0.01%
Note: *Aggregated price indices not available. **National public sector kept exogeneous.
Table B.22: Changes in Prices and Production
Scenario τk = 20%, τm = 10%, σk = 4 and σm = 9
Changes in prices Co
pe
nh
ag
en
Ze
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nd
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De
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ark
M
id-
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tla
nd
No
rth
ern
Ju
tla
nd
De
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ark
Price index. consumption bundle -0.01% -0.01% -0.01% -0.01% -0.01% –*
Wages -0.25% -0.09% 0.20% 0.09% 0.41% –*
Capital rents -0.07% -0.03% 0.05% 0.01% 0.07% –*
Changes in output by cluster or sector
Knowledge intensive clusters
Business Services 0.07% 0.02% -0.06% -0.02% -0.13% 0.02%
Entertainment 0.07% 0.02% -0.03% -0.01% -0.05% 0.01%
Financial Services 0.07% 0.03% -0.04% -0.02% -0.12% 0.04%
IT and Telecommunication 0.08% 0.03% -0.03% 0.00% -0.08% 0.04%
Tourism 0.08% 0.03% -0.07% -0.03% -0.14% 0.00%
Manufacturing clusters
Building Materials 0.02% 0.00% -0.07% -0.04% -0.10% -0.04%
Chemical and Pharmaceutical 0.07% 0.04% 0.01% 0.02% -0.02% 0.05%
Foodstuff 0.01% -0.02% -0.07% -0.05% -0.11% -0.05%
Machinery and Engineering 0.03% 0.00% -0.05% -0.03% -0.09% -0.03%
Textiles, Wood and Furniture 0.02% -0.01% -0.06% -0.04% -0.09% -0.04%
Non-cluster sectors**
Transport and Logistics 0.05% 0.02% -0.03% -0.01% -0.06% 0.01%
Local Production 0.08% 0.04% -0.08% -0.03% -0.16% 0.01%
Natural Resource Based 0.02% 0.00% -0.06% -0.03% -0.10% -0.01%
Regional Public Production -1.16% -0.27% 0.91% 0.44% 1.73% 0.00%
Note: *Aggregated price indices not available. **National public sector kept exogeneous.
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Table B.23: Changes in Prices and Production
Scenario τk = 20%, τm = 10%, σk = 4 and σm = 4
Changes in prices Co
pe
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en
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nd
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De
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No
rth
ern
Ju
tla
nd
De
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ark
Price index. consumption bundle -0.01% -0.01% -0.01% -0.01% -0.01% –*
Wages -0.25% -0.08% 0.21% 0.10% 0.42% –*
Capital rents -0.07% -0.03% 0.05% 0.01% 0.07% –*
Changes in output by cluster or sector
Knowledge intensive clusters
Business Services 0.07% 0.02% -0.06% -0.02% -0.13% 0.02%
Entertainment 0.07% 0.02% -0.03% -0.01% -0.05% 0.01%
Financial Services 0.07% 0.03% -0.04% -0.02% -0.12% 0.04%
IT and Telecommunication 0.08% 0.04% -0.03% 0.00% -0.08% 0.04%
Tourism 0.08% 0.03% -0.07% -0.03% -0.13% 0.01%
Manufacturing clusters
Building Materials 0.03% 0.00% -0.06% -0.03% -0.09% -0.04%
Chemical and Pharmaceutical 0.08% 0.06% 0.02% 0.04% 0.00% 0.06%
Foodstuff 0.01% -0.02% -0.07% -0.05% -0.11% -0.05%
Machinery and Engineering 0.03% 0.00% -0.05% -0.03% -0.09% -0.03%
Textiles, Wood and Furniture 0.02% -0.01% -0.06% -0.04% -0.09% -0.04%
Non-cluster sectors**
Transport and Logistics 0.06% 0.02% -0.03% -0.01% -0.06% 0.01%
Local Production 0.08% 0.04% -0.08% -0.03% -0.16% 0.01%
Natural Resource Based 0.02% 0.00% -0.06% -0.03% -0.10% -0.01%
Regional Public Production -1.16% -0.27% 0.90% 0.44% 1.73% 0.00%
Note: *Aggregated price indices not available. **National public sector kept exogeneous.
Table B.24: Changes in Prices and Production
Scenario τk = 20%, τm = 10%, σk = 4 and σm = 2.3
Changes in prices Co
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nd
No
rth
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Ju
tla
nd
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nm
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Price index. consumption bundle 0.02% 0.02% 0.02% 0.02% 0.02% –*
Wages -0.21% -0.04% 0.26% 0.14% 0.47% –*
Capital rents -0.02% 0.03% 0.11% 0.06% 0.12% –*
Changes in output by cluster or sector
Knowledge intensive clusters
Business Services 0.08% 0.03% -0.06% -0.01% -0.12% 0.02%
Entertainment 0.07% 0.03% -0.03% 0.00% -0.05% 0.01%
Financial Services 0.08% 0.04% -0.02% 0.00% -0.10% 0.05%
IT and Telecommunication 0.06% 0.02% -0.06% -0.02% -0.10% 0.02%
Tourism 0.09% 0.05% -0.05% -0.01% -0.12% 0.02%
Manufacturing clusters
Building Materials 0.01% -0.02% -0.09% -0.06% -0.12% -0.06%
Chemical and Pharmaceutical 0.08% 0.06% 0.03% 0.04% 0.01% 0.06%
Foodstuff 0.18% 0.17% 0.12% 0.14% 0.09% 0.14%
Machinery and Engineering 0.02% 0.00% -0.06% -0.03% -0.10% -0.04%
Textiles, Wood and Furniture 0.00% -0.03% -0.09% -0.07% -0.12% -0.07%
Non-cluster sectors**
Transport and Logistics 0.07% 0.05% -0.02% 0.01% -0.05% 0.03%
Local Production 0.08% 0.03% -0.08% -0.03% -0.16% 0.01%
Natural Resource Based 0.11% 0.09% 0.03% 0.06% -0.01% 0.07%
Regional Public Production -1.17% -0.28% 0.90% 0.43% 1.72% -0.01%
Note: *Aggregated price indices not available. **National public sector kept exogeneous.
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Table B.25: Changes in Prices and Production
Scenario τk = 20%, τm = 10%, σk = 2.3 and σm = 9
Changes in prices Co
pe
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ag
en
Ze
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nd
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ern
De
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ark
M
id-
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tla
nd
No
rth
ern
Ju
tla
nd
De
nm
ark
Price index. consumption bundle -0.01% -0.01% -0.01% -0.01% -0.01% –*
Wages -0.25% -0.08% 0.21% 0.10% 0.42% –*
Capital rents -0.07% -0.03% 0.05% 0.02% 0.07% –*
Changes in output by cluster or sector
Knowledge intensive clusters
Business Services 0.07% 0.02% -0.06% -0.02% -0.12% 0.02%
Entertainment 0.06% 0.03% -0.03% 0.00% -0.05% 0.01%
Financial Services 0.07% 0.03% -0.03% -0.01% -0.11% 0.05%
IT and Telecommunication 0.08% 0.04% -0.02% 0.01% -0.06% 0.05%
Tourism 0.08% 0.03% -0.06% -0.03% -0.13% 0.01%
Manufacturing clusters
Building Materials 0.03% 0.00% -0.06% -0.03% -0.09% -0.04%
Chemical and Pharmaceutical 0.08% 0.05% 0.01% 0.03% -0.02% 0.05%
Foodstuff 0.01% -0.02% -0.07% -0.05% -0.11% -0.05%
Machinery and Engineering 0.03% 0.00% -0.05% -0.03% -0.09% -0.03%
Textiles, Wood and Furniture 0.02% 0.00% -0.06% -0.04% -0.09% -0.04%
Non-cluster sectors**
Transport and Logistics 0.06% 0.03% -0.03% 0.00% -0.06% 0.01%
Local Production 0.09% 0.04% -0.08% -0.02% -0.16% 0.01%
Natural Resource Based 0.02% 0.00% -0.06% -0.03% -0.10% -0.02%
Regional Public Production -1.16% -0.27% 0.90% 0.44% 1.73% 0.00%
Note: *Aggregated price indices not available. **National public sector kept exogeneous.
Table B.26: Changes in Prices and Production
Scenario τk = 20%, τm = 10%, σk = 2.3 and σm = 4
Changes in prices Co
pe
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De
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No
rth
ern
Ju
tla
nd
De
nm
ark
Price index. consumption bundle -0.01% -0.01% -0.01% -0.01% -0.01% –*
Wages -0.24% -0.08% 0.21% 0.10% 0.42% –*
Capital rents -0.07% -0.03% 0.06% 0.02% 0.08% –*
Changes in output by cluster or sector
Knowledge intensive clusters
Business Services 0.07% 0.03% -0.06% -0.01% -0.12% 0.02%
Entertainment 0.07% 0.03% -0.03% 0.00% -0.04% 0.01%
Financial Services 0.07% 0.03% -0.03% -0.01% -0.11% 0.05%
IT and Telecommunication 0.08% 0.04% -0.02% 0.01% -0.06% 0.05%
Tourism 0.08% 0.03% -0.06% -0.02% -0.13% 0.01%
Manufacturing clusters
Building Materials 0.03% 0.00% -0.06% -0.03% -0.09% -0.04%
Chemical and Pharmaceutical 0.09% 0.06% 0.02% 0.04% 0.00% 0.06%
Foodstuff 0.01% -0.02% -0.07% -0.05% -0.11% -0.05%
Machinery and Engineering 0.03% 0.00% -0.05% -0.02% -0.09% -0.03%
Textiles, Wood and Furniture 0.02% 0.00% -0.06% -0.04% -0.09% -0.04%
Non-cluster sectors**
Transport and Logistics 0.07% 0.03% -0.02% 0.00% -0.05% 0.02%
Local Production 0.09% 0.04% -0.07% -0.02% -0.16% 0.01%
Natural Resource Based 0.02% 0.00% -0.06% -0.03% -0.10% -0.02%
Regional Public Production -1.16% -0.27% 0.90% 0.44% 1.73% 0.00%
Note: *Aggregated price indices not available. **National public sector kept exogeneous.
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Table B.27: Changes in Prices and Production
Scenario τk = 20%, τm = 10%, σk = 2.3 and σm = 2.3
Changes in prices Co
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ark
Price index. consumption bundle 0.02% 0.02% 0.02% 0.02% 0.02% –*
Wages -0.20% -0.03% 0.26% 0.15% 0.47% –*
Capital rents -0.02% 0.04% 0.11% 0.07% 0.13% –*
Changes in output by cluster or sector
Knowledge intensive clusters
Business Services 0.08% 0.03% -0.05% -0.01% -0.11% 0.03%
Entertainment 0.07% 0.03% -0.02% 0.00% -0.04% 0.02%
Financial Services 0.09% 0.05% -0.01% 0.01% -0.09% 0.06%
IT and Telecommunication 0.06% 0.02% -0.04% -0.01% -0.09% 0.02%
Tourism 0.09% 0.05% -0.05% -0.01% -0.11% 0.02%
Manufacturing clusters
Building Materials 0.01% -0.02% -0.08% -0.05% -0.11% -0.06%
Chemical and Pharmaceutical 0.09% 0.07% 0.04% 0.05% 0.02% 0.07%
Foodstuff 0.19% 0.17% 0.12% 0.14% 0.09% 0.14%
Machinery and Engineering 0.02% 0.00% -0.06% -0.03% -0.10% -0.04%
Textiles, Wood and Furniture 0.00% -0.02% -0.09% -0.07% -0.12% -0.07%
Non-cluster sectors**
Transport and Logistics 0.08% 0.05% -0.01% 0.02% -0.04% 0.04%
Local Production 0.09% 0.04% -0.08% -0.02% -0.16% 0.01%
Natural Resource Based 0.11% 0.09% 0.03% 0.06% -0.01% 0.07%
Regional Public Production -1.17% -0.28% 0.90% 0.43% 1.72% -0.01%
Note: *Aggregated price indices not available. **National public sector kept exogeneous.
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Table C.1: Changes in Regional Exports
Scenario τk = 10%, τm = 10%, σk = 2.3 and σm = 2.3
From region
Co
pe
nh
ag
en
Ze
ala
nd
So
uth
ern
De
nm
ark
M
id-
Ju
tla
nd
No
rth
ern
Ju
tla
nd
Knowledge intensive clusters
Business Services 0.25% 0.07% -0.08% -0.02% -0.14%
Entertainment 0.22% 0.07% -0.05% 0.00% -0.05%
Financial Services 0.27% 0.11% -0.03% 0.02% -0.11%
IT and Telecommunication 0.20% 0.06% -0.05% -0.01% -0.10%
Tourism 0.31% 0.11% -0.09% -0.03% -0.15%
Manufacturing clusters
Building Materials 0.02% -0.02% -0.09% -0.05% -0.12%
Chemical and Pharmaceutical 0.19% 0.10% 0.04% 0.07% 0.01%
Foodstuff 0.40% 0.30% 0.17% 0.23% 0.12%
Machinery and Engineering 0.04% 0.00% -0.06% -0.03% -0.10%
Textiles, Wood and Furniture 0.05% -0.02% -0.11% -0.06% -0.14%
Non-cluster sectors*
Transport and Logistics 0.20% 0.05% -0.11% -0.04% -0.19%
Local Production 0.15% 0.09% 0.01% 0.05% -0.02%
Natural Resource Based 0.01% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Note: *National public sector fixed and regional public goods are non-traded.
Table C.2: Changes in Regional Exports
Scenario τk = 10%, τm = 10%, σk = 2.3 and σm = 4.0
From region
Co
pe
nh
ag
en
Ze
ala
nd
So
uth
ern
De
nm
ark
M
id-
Ju
tla
nd
No
rth
ern
Ju
tla
nd
Knowledge intensive clusters
Business Services 0.23% 0.07% -0.08% -0.02% -0.14%
Entertainment 0.21% 0.07% -0.05% -0.01% -0.06%
Financial Services 0.25% 0.09% -0.04% 0.00% -0.12%
IT and Telecommunication 0.24% 0.11% -0.02% 0.03% -0.07%
Tourism 0.29% 0.08% -0.11% -0.04% -0.17%
Manufacturing clusters
Building Materials 0.05% 0.01% -0.06% -0.03% -0.10%
Chemical and Pharmaceutical 0.16% 0.08% 0.01% 0.04% -0.01%
Foodstuff 0.06% -0.01% -0.10% -0.06% -0.14%
Machinery and Engineering 0.05% 0.01% -0.05% -0.02% -0.09%
Textiles, Wood and Furniture 0.08% 0.00% -0.08% -0.05% -0.11%
Non-cluster sectors*
Transport and Logistics 0.19% 0.05% -0.11% -0.04% -0.18%
Local Production 0.04% 0.00% -0.08% -0.04% -0.11%
Natural Resource Based 0.01% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Note: *National public sector fixed and regional public goods are non-traded.
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Table C.3: Changes in Regional Exports
Scenario τk = 10%, τm = 10%, σk = 2.3 and σm = 9.0
From region
Co
pe
nh
ag
en
Ze
ala
nd
So
uth
ern
De
nm
ark
M
id-
Ju
tla
nd
No
rth
ern
Ju
tla
nd
Knowledge intensive clusters
Business Services 0.23% 0.07% -0.08% -0.02% -0.14%
Entertainment 0.21% 0.07% -0.05% -0.01% -0.06%
Financial Services 0.25% 0.09% -0.04% 0.00% -0.12%
IT and Telecommunication 0.24% 0.11% -0.02% 0.03% -0.07%
Tourism 0.29% 0.08% -0.11% -0.04% -0.17%
Manufacturing clusters
Building Materials 0.05% 0.01% -0.07% -0.03% -0.10%
Chemical and Pharmaceutical 0.13% 0.05% -0.01% 0.02% -0.03%
Foodstuff 0.06% -0.01% -0.10% -0.06% -0.14%
Machinery and Engineering 0.05% 0.01% -0.05% -0.03% -0.09%
Textiles, Wood and Furniture 0.07% 0.00% -0.08% -0.05% -0.11%
Non-cluster sectors*
Transport and Logistics 0.19% 0.05% -0.11% -0.04% -0.18%
Local Production 0.04% 0.00% -0.08% -0.04% -0.11%
Natural Resource Based 0.01% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Note: *National public sector fixed and regional public goods are non-traded.
Table C.4: Changes in Regional Exports
Scenario τk = 10%, τm = 10%, σk = 4.0 and σm = 2.3
From region
Co
pe
nh
ag
en
Ze
ala
nd
So
uth
ern
De
nm
ark
M
id-
Ju
tla
nd
No
rth
ern
Ju
tla
nd
Knowledge intensive clusters
Business Services 0.21% 0.05% -0.08% -0.03% -0.15%
Entertainment 0.18% 0.05% -0.06% -0.02% -0.07%
Financial Services 0.23% 0.07% -0.05% -0.01% -0.13%
IT and Telecommunication 0.16% 0.04% -0.07% -0.03% -0.12%
Tourism 0.27% 0.08% -0.10% -0.03% -0.16%
Manufacturing clusters
Building Materials 0.02% -0.02% -0.09% -0.06% -0.12%
Chemical and Pharmaceutical 0.18% 0.09% 0.03% 0.06% 0.00%
Foodstuff 0.39% 0.29% 0.17% 0.23% 0.11%
Machinery and Engineering 0.04% -0.01% -0.07% -0.04% -0.11%
Textiles, Wood and Furniture 0.04% -0.02% -0.11% -0.07% -0.14%
Non-cluster sectors*
Transport and Logistics 0.19% 0.04% -0.11% -0.04% -0.19%
Local Production 0.15% 0.09% 0.01% 0.05% -0.02%
Natural Resource Based 0.01% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Note: *National public sector fixed and regional public goods are non-traded.
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Table C.5: Changes in Regional Exports
Scenario τk = 10%, τm = 10%, σk = 4.0 and σm = 4.0
From region
Co
pe
nh
ag
en
Ze
ala
nd
So
uth
ern
De
nm
ark
M
id-
Ju
tla
nd
No
rth
ern
Ju
tla
nd
Knowledge intensive clusters
Business Services 0.19% 0.05% -0.09% -0.03% -0.15%
Entertainment 0.18% 0.04% -0.07% -0.02% -0.07%
Financial Services 0.21% 0.06% -0.06% -0.02% -0.14%
IT and Telecommunication 0.18% 0.07% -0.04% 0.00% -0.09%
Tourism 0.25% 0.06% -0.11% -0.05% -0.18%
Manufacturing clusters
Building Materials 0.05% 0.00% -0.07% -0.04% -0.10%
Chemical and Pharmaceutical 0.15% 0.08% 0.01% 0.04% -0.01%
Foodstuff 0.07% -0.01% -0.10% -0.06% -0.14%
Machinery and Engineering 0.05% 0.01% -0.06% -0.03% -0.10%
Textiles, Wood and Furniture 0.07% 0.00% -0.09% -0.05% -0.12%
Non-cluster sectors*
Transport and Logistics 0.19% 0.04% -0.11% -0.04% -0.19%
Local Production 0.04% 0.00% -0.07% -0.04% -0.11%
Natural Resource Based 0.01% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Note: *National public sector fixed and regional public goods are non-traded.
Table C.6: Changes in Regional Exports
Scenario τk = 10%, τm = 10%, σk = 4.0 and σm = 9.0
From region
Co
pe
nh
ag
en
Ze
ala
nd
So
uth
ern
De
nm
ark
M
id-
Ju
tla
nd
No
rth
ern
Ju
tla
nd
Knowledge intensive clusters
Business Services 0.19% 0.04% -0.09% -0.03% -0.15%
Entertainment 0.17% 0.04% -0.07% -0.02% -0.07%
Financial Services 0.21% 0.06% -0.06% -0.02% -0.14%
IT and Telecommunication 0.18% 0.06% -0.04% 0.00% -0.09%
Tourism 0.25% 0.05% -0.12% -0.05% -0.18%
Manufacturing clusters
Building Materials 0.04% 0.00% -0.07% -0.04% -0.10%
Chemical and Pharmaceutical 0.13% 0.05% -0.01% 0.02% -0.03%
Foodstuff 0.07% -0.01% -0.10% -0.06% -0.14%
Machinery and Engineering 0.04% 0.00% -0.06% -0.03% -0.10%
Textiles, Wood and Furniture 0.07% 0.00% -0.09% -0.05% -0.12%
Non-cluster sectors*
Transport and Logistics 0.19% 0.04% -0.11% -0.05% -0.19%
Local Production 0.04% 0.00% -0.07% -0.04% -0.11%
Natural Resource Based 0.01% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Note: *National public sector fixed and regional public goods are non-traded.
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Table C.7: Changes in Regional Exports
Scenario τk = 10%, τm = 10%, σk = 9.0 and σm = 2.3
From region
Co
pe
nh
ag
en
Ze
ala
nd
So
uth
ern
De
nm
ark
M
id-
Ju
tla
nd
No
rth
ern
Ju
tla
nd
Knowledge intensive clusters
Business Services 0.19% 0.04% -0.09% -0.03% -0.15%
Entertainment 0.17% 0.04% -0.07% -0.02% -0.07%
Financial Services 0.21% 0.06% -0.05% -0.02% -0.13%
IT and Telecommunication 0.15% 0.02% -0.08% -0.04% -0.12%
Tourism 0.24% 0.07% -0.10% -0.04% -0.17%
Manufacturing clusters
Building Materials 0.01% -0.02% -0.09% -0.06% -0.12%
Chemical and Pharmaceutical 0.17% 0.09% 0.02% 0.05% -0.01%
Foodstuff 0.39% 0.29% 0.17% 0.23% 0.11%
Machinery and Engineering 0.04% -0.01% -0.07% -0.04% -0.11%
Textiles, Wood and Furniture 0.04% -0.02% -0.11% -0.07% -0.14%
Non-cluster sectors*
Transport and Logistics 0.19% 0.04% -0.12% -0.05% -0.19%
Local Production 0.15% 0.09% 0.01% 0.05% -0.02%
Natural Resource Based 0.01% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Note: *National public sector fixed and regional public goods are non-traded.
Table C.8: Changes in Regional Exports
Scenario τk = 10%, τm = 10%, σk = 9.0 and σm = 4.0
From region
Co
pe
nh
ag
en
Ze
ala
nd
So
uth
ern
De
nm
ark
M
id-
Ju
tla
nd
No
rth
ern
Ju
tla
nd
Knowledge intensive clusters
Business Services 0.17% 0.04% -0.09% -0.04% -0.16%
Entertainment 0.16% 0.03% -0.07% -0.03% -0.08%
Financial Services 0.19% 0.05% -0.06% -0.03% -0.14%
IT and Telecommunication 0.16% 0.05% -0.05% -0.01% -0.10%
Tourism 0.23% 0.04% -0.12% -0.06% -0.18%
Manufacturing clusters
Building Materials 0.04% 0.00% -0.07% -0.04% -0.10%
Chemical and Pharmaceutical 0.15% 0.07% 0.01% 0.04% -0.02%
Foodstuff 0.07% -0.01% -0.10% -0.06% -0.14%
Machinery and Engineering 0.05% 0.00% -0.06% -0.03% -0.10%
Textiles, Wood and Furniture 0.07% 0.00% -0.09% -0.05% -0.12%
Non-cluster sectors*
Transport and Logistics 0.19% 0.04% -0.11% -0.05% -0.19%
Local Production 0.04% 0.00% -0.07% -0.04% -0.11%
Natural Resource Based 0.01% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Note: *National public sector fixed and regional public goods are non-traded.
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Table C.9: Changes in Regional Exports
Scenario τk = 10%, τm = 10%, σk = 9.0 and σm = 9.0
From region
Co
pe
nh
ag
en
Ze
ala
nd
So
uth
ern
De
nm
ark
M
id-
Ju
tla
nd
No
rth
ern
Ju
tla
nd
Knowledge intensive clusters
Business Services 0.17% 0.03% -0.09% -0.04% -0.16%
Entertainment 0.16% 0.03% -0.07% -0.03% -0.08%
Financial Services 0.19% 0.04% -0.06% -0.03% -0.14%
IT and Telecommunication 0.16% 0.05% -0.05% -0.01% -0.10%
Tourism 0.23% 0.04% -0.12% -0.06% -0.18%
Manufacturing clusters
Building Materials 0.04% 0.00% -0.07% -0.04% -0.10%
Chemical and Pharmaceutical 0.13% 0.05% -0.01% 0.02% -0.03%
Foodstuff 0.07% -0.01% -0.10% -0.06% -0.14%
Machinery and Engineering 0.04% 0.00% -0.06% -0.03% -0.10%
Textiles, Wood and Furniture 0.07% 0.00% -0.09% -0.05% -0.12%
Non-cluster sectors*
Transport and Logistics 0.19% 0.04% -0.11% -0.05% -0.19%
Local Production 0.04% 0.00% -0.07% -0.04% -0.11%
Natural Resource Based 0.01% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Note: *National public sector fixed and regional public goods are non-traded.
Table C.10: Changes in Regional Exports
Scenario τk = 10%, τm = 20%, σk = 2.3 and σm = 2.3
From region
Co
pe
nh
ag
en
Ze
ala
nd
So
uth
ern
De
nm
ark
M
id-
Ju
tla
nd
No
rth
ern
Ju
tla
nd
Knowledge intensive clusters
Business Services 0.16% 0.03% -0.10% -0.04% -0.16%
Entertainment 0.14% 0.02% -0.08% -0.04% -0.08%
Financial Services 0.18% 0.05% -0.06% -0.02% -0.14%
IT and Telecommunication 0.15% 0.04% -0.06% -0.02% -0.11%
Tourism 0.21% 0.04% -0.12% -0.06% -0.18%
Manufacturing clusters
Building Materials 0.03% 0.00% -0.06% -0.03% -0.09%
Chemical and Pharmaceutical 0.10% 0.03% -0.02% 0.00% -0.04%
Foodstuff 0.05% -0.02% -0.10% -0.07% -0.14%
Machinery and Engineering 0.05% 0.01% -0.04% -0.02% -0.08%
Textiles, Wood and Furniture 0.06% 0.00% -0.08% -0.05% -0.11%
Non-cluster sectors*
Transport and Logistics 0.18% 0.04% -0.12% -0.05% -0.19%
Local Production 0.03% -0.01% -0.09% -0.05% -0.12%
Natural Resource Based 0.01% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Note: *National public sector fixed and regional public goods are non-traded.
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Table C.11: Changes in Regional Exports
Scenario τk = 10%, τm = 20%, σk = 2.3 and σm = 4.0
From region
Co
pe
nh
ag
en
Ze
ala
nd
So
uth
ern
De
nm
ark
M
id-
Ju
tla
nd
No
rth
ern
Ju
tla
nd
Knowledge intensive clusters
Business Services 0.16% 0.03% -0.10% -0.04% -0.16%
Entertainment 0.14% 0.02% -0.08% -0.04% -0.08%
Financial Services 0.18% 0.05% -0.06% -0.02% -0.14%
IT and Telecommunication 0.15% 0.04% -0.06% -0.02% -0.11%
Tourism 0.21% 0.04% -0.12% -0.06% -0.18%
Manufacturing clusters
Building Materials 0.03% 0.00% -0.06% -0.03% -0.09%
Chemical and Pharmaceutical 0.10% 0.03% -0.02% 0.00% -0.04%
Foodstuff 0.05% -0.02% -0.10% -0.07% -0.14%
Machinery and Engineering 0.05% 0.01% -0.04% -0.02% -0.08%
Textiles, Wood and Furniture 0.06% 0.00% -0.08% -0.05% -0.11%
Non-cluster sectors*
Transport and Logistics 0.18% 0.04% -0.12% -0.05% -0.19%
Local Production 0.03% -0.01% -0.09% -0.05% -0.12%
Natural Resource Based 0.01% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Note: *National public sector fixed and regional public goods are non-traded.
Table C.12: Changes in Regional Exports
Scenario τk = 10%, τm = 20%, σk = 2.3 and σm = 9.0
From region
Co
pe
nh
ag
en
Ze
ala
nd
So
uth
ern
De
nm
ark
M
id-
Ju
tla
nd
No
rth
ern
Ju
tla
nd
Knowledge intensive clusters
Business Services 0.16% 0.03% -0.10% -0.04% -0.16%
Entertainment 0.14% 0.02% -0.08% -0.04% -0.08%
Financial Services 0.18% 0.05% -0.06% -0.02% -0.14%
IT and Telecommunication 0.15% 0.04% -0.06% -0.02% -0.11%
Tourism 0.21% 0.04% -0.12% -0.06% -0.18%
Manufacturing clusters
Building Materials 0.03% 0.00% -0.06% -0.03% -0.09%
Chemical and Pharmaceutical 0.10% 0.03% -0.02% 0.00% -0.04%
Foodstuff 0.05% -0.02% -0.10% -0.07% -0.14%
Machinery and Engineering 0.05% 0.01% -0.04% -0.02% -0.08%
Textiles, Wood and Furniture 0.06% 0.00% -0.08% -0.05% -0.11%
Non-cluster sectors*
Transport and Logistics 0.18% 0.04% -0.12% -0.05% -0.19%
Local Production 0.03% -0.01% -0.09% -0.05% -0.12%
Natural Resource Based 0.01% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Note: *National public sector fixed and regional public goods are non-traded.
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Table C.13: Changes in Regional Exports
Scenario τk = 10%, τm = 20%, σk = 4.0 and σm = 2.3
From region
Co
pe
nh
ag
en
Ze
ala
nd
So
uth
ern
De
nm
ark
M
id-
Ju
tla
nd
No
rth
ern
Ju
tla
nd
Knowledge intensive clusters
Business Services 0.16% 0.03% -0.10% -0.04% -0.16%
Entertainment 0.14% 0.02% -0.08% -0.04% -0.08%
Financial Services 0.18% 0.05% -0.06% -0.02% -0.14%
IT and Telecommunication 0.15% 0.04% -0.06% -0.02% -0.11%
Tourism 0.21% 0.04% -0.12% -0.06% -0.18%
Manufacturing clusters
Building Materials 0.03% 0.00% -0.06% -0.03% -0.09%
Chemical and Pharmaceutical 0.10% 0.03% -0.02% 0.00% -0.04%
Foodstuff 0.05% -0.02% -0.10% -0.07% -0.14%
Machinery and Engineering 0.05% 0.01% -0.04% -0.02% -0.08%
Textiles, Wood and Furniture 0.06% 0.00% -0.08% -0.05% -0.11%
Non-cluster sectors*
Transport and Logistics 0.18% 0.04% -0.12% -0.05% -0.19%
Local Production 0.03% -0.01% -0.09% -0.05% -0.12%
Natural Resource Based 0.01% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Note: *National public sector fixed and regional public goods are non-traded.
Table C.14: Changes in Regional Exports
Scenario τk = 10%, τm = 20%, σk = 4.0 and σm = 4.0
From region
Co
pe
nh
ag
en
Ze
ala
nd
So
uth
ern
De
nm
ark
M
id-
Ju
tla
nd
No
rth
ern
Ju
tla
nd
Knowledge intensive clusters
Business Services 0.16% 0.03% -0.10% -0.04% -0.16%
Entertainment 0.14% 0.02% -0.08% -0.04% -0.08%
Financial Services 0.18% 0.05% -0.06% -0.02% -0.14%
IT and Telecommunication 0.15% 0.04% -0.06% -0.02% -0.11%
Tourism 0.21% 0.04% -0.12% -0.06% -0.18%
Manufacturing clusters
Building Materials 0.03% 0.00% -0.06% -0.03% -0.09%
Chemical and Pharmaceutical 0.10% 0.03% -0.02% 0.00% -0.04%
Foodstuff 0.05% -0.02% -0.10% -0.07% -0.14%
Machinery and Engineering 0.05% 0.01% -0.04% -0.02% -0.08%
Textiles, Wood and Furniture 0.06% 0.00% -0.08% -0.05% -0.11%
Non-cluster sectors*
Transport and Logistics 0.18% 0.04% -0.12% -0.05% -0.19%
Local Production 0.03% -0.01% -0.09% -0.05% -0.12%
Natural Resource Based 0.01% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Note: *National public sector fixed and regional public goods are non-traded.
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Table C.15: Changes in Regional Exports
Scenario τk = 10%, τm = 20%, σk = 4.0 and σm = 9.0
From region
Co
pe
nh
ag
en
Ze
ala
nd
So
uth
ern
De
nm
ark
M
id-
Ju
tla
nd
No
rth
ern
Ju
tla
nd
Knowledge intensive clusters
Business Services 0.18% 0.04% -0.09% -0.04% -0.15%
Entertainment 0.16% 0.04% -0.07% -0.03% -0.08%
Financial Services 0.21% 0.07% -0.05% -0.01% -0.13%
IT and Telecommunication 0.17% 0.05% -0.05% -0.01% -0.10%
Tourism 0.24% 0.05% -0.12% -0.05% -0.18%
Manufacturing clusters
Building Materials 0.04% 0.00% -0.06% -0.03% -0.09%
Chemical and Pharmaceutical 0.11% 0.04% -0.02% 0.01% -0.04%
Foodstuff 0.05% -0.02% -0.10% -0.07% -0.14%
Machinery and Engineering 0.05% 0.02% -0.04% -0.02% -0.08%
Textiles, Wood and Furniture 0.06% 0.00% -0.08% -0.05% -0.11%
Non-cluster sectors*
Transport and Logistics 0.19% 0.04% -0.12% -0.05% -0.19%
Local Production 0.03% -0.01% -0.09% -0.06% -0.12%
Natural Resource Based 0.01% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Note: *National public sector fixed and regional public goods are non-traded.
Table C.16: Changes in Regional Exports
Scenario τk = 10%, τm = 20%, σk = 9.0 and σm = 2.3
From region
Co
pe
nh
ag
en
Ze
ala
nd
So
uth
ern
De
nm
ark
M
id-
Ju
tla
nd
No
rth
ern
Ju
tla
nd
Knowledge intensive clusters
Business Services 0.16% 0.03% -0.10% -0.04% -0.16%
Entertainment 0.14% 0.02% -0.08% -0.04% -0.08%
Financial Services 0.18% 0.05% -0.06% -0.02% -0.14%
IT and Telecommunication 0.15% 0.04% -0.06% -0.02% -0.11%
Tourism 0.21% 0.04% -0.12% -0.06% -0.18%
Manufacturing clusters
Building Materials 0.03% 0.00% -0.06% -0.03% -0.09%
Chemical and Pharmaceutical 0.10% 0.03% -0.02% 0.00% -0.04%
Foodstuff 0.05% -0.02% -0.10% -0.07% -0.14%
Machinery and Engineering 0.05% 0.01% -0.04% -0.02% -0.08%
Textiles, Wood and Furniture 0.06% 0.00% -0.08% -0.05% -0.11%
Non-cluster sectors*
Transport and Logistics 0.18% 0.04% -0.12% -0.05% -0.19%
Local Production 0.03% -0.01% -0.09% -0.05% -0.12%
Natural Resource Based 0.01% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Note: *National public sector fixed and regional public goods are non-traded.
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Table C.17: Changes in Regional Exports
Scenario τk = 10%, τm = 20%, σk = 9.0 and σm = 4.0
From region
Co
pe
nh
ag
en
Ze
ala
nd
So
uth
ern
De
nm
ark
M
id-
Ju
tla
nd
No
rth
ern
Ju
tla
nd
Knowledge intensive clusters
Business Services 0.17% 0.04% -0.09% -0.04% -0.16%
Entertainment 0.15% 0.03% -0.07% -0.03% -0.08%
Financial Services 0.20% 0.06% -0.05% -0.02% -0.13%
IT and Telecommunication 0.16% 0.04% -0.06% -0.02% -0.10%
Tourism 0.23% 0.05% -0.12% -0.06% -0.18%
Manufacturing clusters
Building Materials 0.04% 0.01% -0.06% -0.03% -0.09%
Chemical and Pharmaceutical 0.12% 0.05% -0.01% 0.02% -0.03%
Foodstuff 0.05% -0.02% -0.10% -0.07% -0.14%
Machinery and Engineering 0.05% 0.02% -0.04% -0.02% -0.08%
Textiles, Wood and Furniture 0.06% 0.00% -0.08% -0.05% -0.11%
Non-cluster sectors*
Transport and Logistics 0.18% 0.04% -0.12% -0.05% -0.19%
Local Production 0.03% -0.01% -0.09% -0.06% -0.12%
Natural Resource Based 0.01% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Note: *National public sector fixed and regional public goods are non-traded.
Table C.18: Changes in Regional Exports
Scenario τk = 10%, τm = 20%, σk = 9.0 and σm = 9.0
From region
Co
pe
nh
ag
en
Ze
ala
nd
So
uth
ern
De
nm
ark
M
id-
Ju
tla
nd
No
rth
ern
Ju
tla
nd
Knowledge intensive clusters
Business Services 0.17% 0.04% -0.09% -0.04% -0.16%
Entertainment 0.15% 0.03% -0.08% -0.03% -0.08%
Financial Services 0.20% 0.06% -0.05% -0.02% -0.13%
IT and Telecommunication 0.16% 0.04% -0.06% -0.02% -0.10%
Tourism 0.23% 0.05% -0.12% -0.06% -0.18%
Manufacturing clusters
Building Materials 0.04% 0.00% -0.06% -0.03% -0.09%
Chemical and Pharmaceutical 0.11% 0.04% -0.02% 0.01% -0.04%
Foodstuff 0.05% -0.02% -0.10% -0.07% -0.14%
Machinery and Engineering 0.05% 0.01% -0.04% -0.02% -0.08%
Textiles, Wood and Furniture 0.06% 0.00% -0.08% -0.05% -0.11%
Non-cluster sectors*
Transport and Logistics 0.18% 0.04% -0.12% -0.05% -0.19%
Local Production 0.03% -0.01% -0.09% -0.05% -0.12%
Natural Resource Based 0.01% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Note: *National public sector fixed and regional public goods are non-traded.
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Table C.19: Changes in Regional Exports
Scenario τk = 20%, τm = 10%, σk = 2.3 and σm = 2.3
From region
Co
pe
nh
ag
en
Ze
ala
nd
So
uth
ern
De
nm
ark
M
id-
Ju
tla
nd
No
rth
ern
Ju
tla
nd
Knowledge intensive clusters
Business Services 0.22% 0.06% -0.08% -0.02% -0.13%
Entertainment 0.19% 0.06% -0.05% -0.01% -0.06%
Financial Services 0.24% 0.08% -0.04% 0.00% -0.11%
IT and Telecommunication 0.17% 0.04% -0.06% -0.02% -0.10%
Tourism 0.28% 0.09% -0.09% -0.03% -0.14%
Manufacturing clusters
Building Materials 0.03% -0.02% -0.09% -0.05% -0.12%
Chemical and Pharmaceutical 0.20% 0.12% 0.05% 0.08% 0.02%
Foodstuff 0.40% 0.30% 0.18% 0.23% 0.12%
Machinery and Engineering 0.05% 0.00% -0.06% -0.03% -0.10%
Textiles, Wood and Furniture 0.05% -0.02% -0.11% -0.07% -0.14%
Non-cluster sectors*
Transport and Logistics 0.20% 0.05% -0.11% -0.04% -0.19%
Local Production 0.15% 0.09% 0.01% 0.05% -0.02%
Natural Resource Based 0.01% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Note: *National public sector fixed and regional public goods are non-traded.
Table C.20: Changes in Regional Exports
Scenario τk = 20%, τm = 10%, σk = 2.3 and σm = 4.0
From region
Co
pe
nh
ag
en
Ze
ala
nd
So
uth
ern
De
nm
ark
M
id-
Ju
tla
nd
No
rth
ern
Ju
tla
nd
Knowledge intensive clusters
Business Services 0.20% 0.05% -0.08% -0.03% -0.14%
Entertainment 0.18% 0.05% -0.06% -0.02% -0.06%
Financial Services 0.21% 0.06% -0.05% -0.02% -0.12%
IT and Telecommunication 0.19% 0.08% -0.03% 0.01% -0.08%
Tourism 0.26% 0.06% -0.10% -0.05% -0.16%
Manufacturing clusters
Building Materials 0.05% 0.01% -0.07% -0.03% -0.10%
Chemical and Pharmaceutical 0.16% 0.08% 0.02% 0.05% -0.01%
Foodstuff 0.07% -0.01% -0.10% -0.06% -0.14%
Machinery and Engineering 0.05% 0.01% -0.05% -0.03% -0.09%
Textiles, Wood and Furniture 0.08% 0.00% -0.08% -0.05% -0.11%
Non-cluster sectors*
Transport and Logistics 0.19% 0.05% -0.11% -0.04% -0.18%
Local Production 0.04% 0.00% -0.07% -0.04% -0.11%
Natural Resource Based 0.01% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Note: *National public sector fixed and regional public goods are non-traded.
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Table C.21: Changes in Regional Exports
Scenario τk = 20%, τm = 10%, σk = 2.3 and σm = 9.0
From region
Co
pe
nh
ag
en
Ze
ala
nd
So
uth
ern
De
nm
ark
M
id-
Ju
tla
nd
No
rth
ern
Ju
tla
nd
Knowledge intensive clusters
Business Services 0.20% 0.05% -0.08% -0.03% -0.14%
Entertainment 0.18% 0.05% -0.06% -0.02% -0.06%
Financial Services 0.21% 0.06% -0.05% -0.02% -0.13%
IT and Telecommunication 0.19% 0.08% -0.03% 0.01% -0.08%
Tourism 0.26% 0.06% -0.11% -0.05% -0.16%
Manufacturing clusters
Building Materials 0.04% 0.00% -0.07% -0.03% -0.10%
Chemical and Pharmaceutical 0.13% 0.06% -0.01% 0.02% -0.03%
Foodstuff 0.07% -0.01% -0.10% -0.06% -0.14%
Machinery and Engineering 0.05% 0.01% -0.05% -0.03% -0.09%
Textiles, Wood and Furniture 0.07% 0.00% -0.08% -0.05% -0.11%
Non-cluster sectors*
Transport and Logistics 0.19% 0.05% -0.11% -0.04% -0.19%
Local Production 0.04% 0.00% -0.07% -0.04% -0.11%
Natural Resource Based 0.01% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Note: *National public sector fixed and regional public goods are non-traded.
Table C.22: Changes in Regional Exports
Scenario τk = 20%, τm = 10%, σk = 4.0 and σm = 2.3
From region
Co
pe
nh
ag
en
Ze
ala
nd
So
uth
ern
De
nm
ark
M
id-
Ju
tla
nd
No
rth
ern
Ju
tla
nd
Knowledge intensive clusters
Business Services 0.19% 0.04% -0.08% -0.03% -0.14%
Entertainment 0.17% 0.04% -0.06% -0.02% -0.06%
Financial Services 0.20% 0.06% -0.05% -0.02% -0.12%
IT and Telecommunication 0.14% 0.02% -0.07% -0.03% -0.11%
Tourism 0.24% 0.07% -0.09% -0.03% -0.15%
Manufacturing clusters
Building Materials 0.02% -0.02% -0.09% -0.06% -0.12%
Chemical and Pharmaceutical 0.19% 0.10% 0.03% 0.07% 0.01%
Foodstuff 0.40% 0.30% 0.18% 0.23% 0.12%
Machinery and Engineering 0.04% 0.00% -0.06% -0.03% -0.10%
Textiles, Wood and Furniture 0.04% -0.02% -0.11% -0.07% -0.14%
Non-cluster sectors*
Transport and Logistics 0.19% 0.04% -0.12% -0.04% -0.19%
Local Production 0.15% 0.09% 0.02% 0.05% -0.02%
Natural Resource Based 0.01% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Note: *National public sector fixed and regional public goods are non-traded.
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Table C.23: Changes in Regional Exports
Scenario τk = 20%, τm = 10%, σk = 4.0 and σm = 4.0
From region
Co
pe
nh
ag
en
Ze
ala
nd
So
uth
ern
De
nm
ark
M
id-
Ju
tla
nd
No
rth
ern
Ju
tla
nd
Knowledge intensive clusters
Business Services 0.17% 0.03% -0.09% -0.03% -0.14%
Entertainment 0.16% 0.04% -0.06% -0.02% -0.07%
Financial Services 0.18% 0.04% -0.06% -0.03% -0.14%
IT and Telecommunication 0.16% 0.05% -0.05% -0.01% -0.09%
Tourism 0.23% 0.04% -0.11% -0.05% -0.17%
Manufacturing clusters
Building Materials 0.05% 0.00% -0.07% -0.04% -0.10%
Chemical and Pharmaceutical 0.16% 0.08% 0.01% 0.04% -0.01%
Foodstuff 0.07% -0.01% -0.10% -0.06% -0.14%
Machinery and Engineering 0.05% 0.01% -0.06% -0.03% -0.10%
Textiles, Wood and Furniture 0.07% 0.00% -0.09% -0.05% -0.12%
Non-cluster sectors*
Transport and Logistics 0.19% 0.04% -0.11% -0.05% -0.19%
Local Production 0.05% 0.01% -0.07% -0.04% -0.11%
Natural Resource Based 0.01% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Note: *National public sector fixed and regional public goods are non-traded.
Table C.24: Changes in Regional Exports
Scenario τk = 20%, τm = 10%, σk = 4.0 and σm = 9.0
From region
Co
pe
nh
ag
en
Ze
ala
nd
So
uth
ern
De
nm
ark
M
id-
Ju
tla
nd
No
rth
ern
Ju
tla
nd
Knowledge intensive clusters
Business Services 0.17% 0.03% -0.09% -0.04% -0.15%
Entertainment 0.16% 0.04% -0.06% -0.02% -0.07%
Financial Services 0.18% 0.04% -0.06% -0.03% -0.14%
IT and Telecommunication 0.16% 0.05% -0.05% -0.01% -0.09%
Tourism 0.22% 0.04% -0.11% -0.05% -0.17%
Manufacturing clusters
Building Materials 0.04% 0.00% -0.07% -0.04% -0.10%
Chemical and Pharmaceutical 0.13% 0.05% -0.01% 0.02% -0.03%
Foodstuff 0.07% -0.01% -0.10% -0.06% -0.14%
Machinery and Engineering 0.04% 0.00% -0.06% -0.03% -0.10%
Textiles, Wood and Furniture 0.07% 0.00% -0.09% -0.05% -0.12%
Non-cluster sectors*
Transport and Logistics 0.19% 0.04% -0.11% -0.05% -0.19%
Local Production 0.05% 0.01% -0.07% -0.03% -0.11%
Natural Resource Based 0.01% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Note: *National public sector fixed and regional public goods are non-traded.
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Table C.25: Changes in Regional Exports
Scenario τk = 20%, τm = 10%, σk = 9.0 and σm = 2.3
From region
Co
pe
nh
ag
en
Ze
ala
nd
So
uth
ern
De
nm
ark
M
id-
Ju
tla
nd
No
rth
ern
Ju
tla
nd
Knowledge intensive clusters
Business Services 0.17% 0.03% -0.08% -0.03% -0.14%
Entertainment 0.15% 0.03% -0.06% -0.02% -0.07%
Financial Services 0.19% 0.05% -0.05% -0.02% -0.13%
IT and Telecommunication 0.13% 0.02% -0.07% -0.04% -0.12%
Tourism 0.23% 0.06% -0.10% -0.04% -0.15%
Manufacturing clusters
Building Materials 0.02% -0.02% -0.09% -0.06% -0.12%
Chemical and Pharmaceutical 0.18% 0.10% 0.03% 0.06% 0.00%
Foodstuff 0.40% 0.30% 0.18% 0.23% 0.12%
Machinery and Engineering 0.04% 0.00% -0.06% -0.04% -0.11%
Textiles, Wood and Furniture 0.04% -0.03% -0.11% -0.07% -0.14%
Non-cluster sectors*
Transport and Logistics 0.19% 0.04% -0.12% -0.05% -0.19%
Local Production 0.15% 0.09% 0.02% 0.05% -0.02%
Natural Resource Based 0.01% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Note: *National public sector fixed and regional public goods are non-traded.
Table C.26: Changes in Regional Exports
Scenario τk = 20%, τm = 10%, σk = 9.0 and σm = 4.0
From region
Co
pe
nh
ag
en
Ze
ala
nd
So
uth
ern
De
nm
ark
M
id-
Ju
tla
nd
No
rth
ern
Ju
tla
nd
Knowledge intensive clusters
Business Services 0.16% 0.03% -0.09% -0.04% -0.15%
Entertainment 0.15% 0.03% -0.07% -0.03% -0.07%
Financial Services 0.17% 0.03% -0.07% -0.03% -0.14%
IT and Telecommunication 0.14% 0.04% -0.05% -0.02% -0.10%
Tourism 0.21% 0.04% -0.11% -0.05% -0.17%
Manufacturing clusters
Building Materials 0.04% 0.00% -0.07% -0.04% -0.10%
Chemical and Pharmaceutical 0.15% 0.08% 0.01% 0.04% -0.01%
Foodstuff 0.07% -0.01% -0.10% -0.06% -0.14%
Machinery and Engineering 0.05% 0.00% -0.06% -0.03% -0.10%
Textiles, Wood and Furniture 0.07% 0.00% -0.09% -0.05% -0.12%
Non-cluster sectors*
Transport and Logistics 0.19% 0.04% -0.11% -0.05% -0.19%
Local Production 0.05% 0.01% -0.07% -0.03% -0.10%
Natural Resource Based 0.01% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Note: *National public sector fixed and regional public goods are non-traded.
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Table C.27: Changes in Regional Exports
Scenario τk = 20%, τm = 10%, σk = 9.0 and σm = 9.0
From region
Co
pe
nh
ag
en
Ze
ala
nd
So
uth
ern
De
nm
ark
M
id-
Ju
tla
nd
No
rth
ern
Ju
tla
nd
Knowledge intensive clusters
Business Services 0.16% 0.03% -0.09% -0.04% -0.15%
Entertainment 0.15% 0.03% -0.07% -0.03% -0.07%
Financial Services 0.17% 0.03% -0.07% -0.04% -0.14%
IT and Telecommunication 0.14% 0.04% -0.05% -0.02% -0.10%
Tourism 0.21% 0.04% -0.11% -0.06% -0.17%
Manufacturing clusters
Building Materials 0.04% 0.00% -0.07% -0.04% -0.10%
Chemical and Pharmaceutical 0.13% 0.05% -0.01% 0.02% -0.03%
Foodstuff 0.07% -0.01% -0.10% -0.06% -0.14%
Machinery and Engineering 0.04% 0.00% -0.06% -0.03% -0.10%
Textiles, Wood and Furniture 0.07% 0.00% -0.09% -0.05% -0.12%
Non-cluster sectors*
Transport and Logistics 0.19% 0.04% -0.12% -0.05% -0.19%
Local Production 0.05% 0.01% -0.07% -0.03% -0.10%
Natural Resource Based 0.01% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Note: *National public sector fixed and regional public goods are non-traded.
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Table D.1: Equivalent Variations – across Scenarios
Transport costs Elasticities of substitution
Knowledge Manufacturing Knowledge Manufacturing Co
pe
nh
ag
en
Ze
ala
nd
So
uth
ern
De
nm
ark
M
id-
Ju
tla
nd
No
rth
ern
Ju
tla
nd
De
nm
ark
τk = 10% τm = 10% σk = 9.0 σm = 9.0 -0.88% -0.12% 0.61% 0.32% 1.37% 0.02%
τk = 10% τm = 10% σk = 9.0 σm = 4.0 -0.88% -0.12% 0.62% 0.32% 1.37% 0.02%
τk = 10% τm = 10% σk = 9.0 σm = 2.3 -0.84% -0.09% 0.65% 0.35% 1.41% 0.05%
τk = 10% τm = 10% σk = 4.0 σm = 9.0 -0.87% -0.12% 0.62% 0.32% 1.38% 0.02%
τk = 10% τm = 10% σk = 4.0 σm = 4.0 -0.87% -0.12% 0.62% 0.33% 1.38% 0.03%
τk = 10% τm = 10% σk = 4.0 σm = 2.3 -0.84% -0.08% 0.66% 0.36% 1.41% 0.06%
τk = 10% τm = 10% σk = 2.3 σm = 9.0 -0.86% -0.11% 0.63% 0.34% 1.39% 0.04%
τk = 10% τm = 10% σk = 2.3 σm = 4.0 -0.85% -0.11% 0.63% 0.34% 1.39% 0.04%
τk = 10% τm = 10% σk = 2.3 σm = 2.3 -0.82% -0.08% 0.67% 0.38% 1.43% 0.07%
τk = 10% τm = 20% σk = 9.0 σm = 9.0 -0.88% -0.13% 0.62% 0.32% 1.37% 0.02%
τk = 10% τm = 20% σk = 9.0 σm = 4.0 -0.88% -0.13% 0.62% 0.32% 1.37% 0.02%
τk = 10% τm = 20% σk = 9.0 σm = 2.3 -0.88% -0.13% 0.61% 0.32% 1.36% 0.01%
τk = 10% τm = 20% σk = 4.0 σm = 9.0 -0.87% -0.13% 0.62% 0.33% 1.37% 0.02%
τk = 10% τm = 20% σk = 4.0 σm = 4.0 -0.88% -0.13% 0.61% 0.32% 1.36% 0.01%
τk = 10% τm = 20% σk = 4.0 σm = 2.3 -0.88% -0.13% 0.61% 0.32% 1.36% 0.01%
τk = 10% τm = 20% σk = 2.3 σm = 9.0 -0.88% -0.13% 0.61% 0.32% 1.36% 0.01%
τk = 10% τm = 20% σk = 2.3 σm = 4.0 -0.88% -0.13% 0.61% 0.32% 1.36% 0.01%
τk = 10% τm = 20% σk = 2.3 σm = 2.3 -0.88% -0.13% 0.61% 0.32% 1.36% 0.01%
τk = 20% τm = 10% σk = 9.0 σm = 9.0 -0.88% -0.12% 0.62% 0.32% 1.37% 0.02%
τk = 20% τm = 10% σk = 9.0 σm = 4.0 -0.88% -0.12% 0.62% 0.32% 1.38% 0.02%
τk = 20% τm = 10% σk = 9.0 σm = 2.3 -0.84% -0.09% 0.65% 0.36% 1.41% 0.06%
τk = 20% τm = 10% σk = 4.0 σm = 9.0 -0.88% -0.12% 0.62% 0.32% 1.38% 0.02%
τk = 20% τm = 10% σk = 4.0 σm = 4.0 -0.88% -0.12% 0.62% 0.33% 1.38% 0.02%
τk = 20% τm = 10% σk = 4.0 σm = 2.3 -0.84% -0.08% 0.66% 0.36% 1.42% 0.06%
τk = 20% τm = 10% σk = 2.3 σm = 9.0 -0.87% -0.11% 0.63% 0.34% 1.39% 0.03%
τk = 20% τm = 10% σk = 2.3 σm = 4.0 -0.86% -0.11% 0.63% 0.34% 1.39% 0.04%
τk = 20% τm = 10% σk = 2.3 σm = 2.3 -0.82% -0.08% 0.67% 0.38% 1.43% 0.07%
τk = 20% τm = 20% σk = 9.0 σm = 9.0 -0.88% -0.13% 0.62% 0.32% 1.37% 0.02%
τk = 20% τm = 20% σk = 9.0 σm = 4.0 -0.88% -0.13% 0.62% 0.33% 1.37% 0.02%
τk = 20% τm = 20% σk = 9.0 σm = 2.3 -0.88% -0.13% 0.61% 0.32% 1.36% 0.01%
τk = 20% τm = 20% σk = 4.0 σm = 9.0 -0.88% -0.13% 0.61% 0.32% 1.36% 0.02%
τk = 20% τm = 20% σk = 4.0 σm = 4.0 -0.88% -0.13% 0.61% 0.32% 1.36% 0.01%
τk = 20% τm = 20% σk = 4.0 σm = 2.3 -0.88% -0.13% 0.61% 0.32% 1.36% 0.01%
τk = 20% τm = 20% σk = 2.3 σm = 9.0 -0.88% -0.13% 0.61% 0.32% 1.36% 0.01%
τk = 20% τm = 20% σk = 2.3 σm = 4.0 -0.88% -0.13% 0.61% 0.32% 1.36% 0.01%
τk = 20% τm = 20% σk = 2.3 σm = 2.3 -0.88% -0.13% 0.61% 0.32% 1.36% 0.01%
Note: Interregional trade imputed with No Home Bias seed.
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Table D.2: Equivalent Variations – across Scenarios
Transport costs Elasticities of substitution
Knowledge Manufacturing Knowledge Manufacturing Co
pe
nh
ag
en
Ze
ala
nd
So
uth
ern
De
nm
ark
M
id-
Ju
tla
nd
No
rth
ern
Ju
tla
nd
De
nm
ark
τk = 10% τm = 10% σk = 9.0 σm = 9.0 -0.94% -0.15% 0.63% 0.39% 1.44% 0.02%
τk = 10% τm = 10% σk = 9.0 σm = 4.0 -0.94% -0.15% 0.64% 0.39% 1.45% 0.02%
τk = 10% τm = 10% σk = 9.0 σm = 2.3 -0.89% -0.10% 0.69% 0.44% 1.51% 0.08%
τk = 10% τm = 10% σk = 4.0 σm = 9.0 -0.93% -0.15% 0.64% 0.39% 1.45% 0.02%
τk = 10% τm = 10% σk = 4.0 σm = 4.0 -0.93% -0.14% 0.64% 0.40% 1.45% 0.03%
τk = 10% τm = 10% σk = 4.0 σm = 2.3 -0.88% -0.09% 0.70% 0.45% 1.51% 0.08%
τk = 10% τm = 10% σk = 2.3 σm = 9.0 -0.90% -0.14% 0.65% 0.41% 1.46% 0.04%
τk = 10% τm = 10% σk = 2.3 σm = 4.0 -0.90% -0.13% 0.66% 0.41% 1.46% 0.05%
τk = 10% τm = 10% σk = 2.3 σm = 2.3 -0.85% -0.08% 0.71% 0.47% 1.52% 0.10%
τk = 10% τm = 20% σk = 9.0 σm = 9.0 -0.94% -0.16% 0.63% 0.39% 1.44% 0.02%
τk = 10% τm = 20% σk = 9.0 σm = 4.0 -0.94% -0.16% 0.63% 0.38% 1.42% 0.01%
τk = 10% τm = 20% σk = 9.0 σm = 2.3 -0.68% 0.08% 0.93% 0.68% 1.77% 0.30%
τk = 10% τm = 20% σk = 4.0 σm = 9.0 -0.94% -0.16% 0.63% 0.38% 1.42% 0.01%
τk = 10% τm = 20% σk = 4.0 σm = 4.0 -0.94% -0.16% 0.63% 0.38% 1.42% 0.01%
τk = 10% τm = 20% σk = 4.0 σm = 2.3 -0.68% 0.07% 0.93% 0.68% 1.77% 0.29%
τk = 10% τm = 20% σk = 2.3 σm = 9.0 -0.94% -0.16% 0.63% 0.38% 1.42% 0.01%
τk = 10% τm = 20% σk = 2.3 σm = 4.0 -0.94% -0.16% 0.63% 0.38% 1.42% 0.01%
τk = 10% τm = 20% σk = 2.3 σm = 2.3 -0.68% 0.07% 0.92% 0.68% 1.76% 0.29%
τk = 20% τm = 10% σk = 9.0 σm = 9.0 -0.95% -0.15% 0.63% 0.38% 1.44% 0.02%
τk = 20% τm = 10% σk = 9.0 σm = 4.0 -0.94% -0.15% 0.64% 0.39% 1.45% 0.02%
τk = 20% τm = 10% σk = 9.0 σm = 2.3 -0.88% -0.10% 0.69% 0.44% 1.51% 0.08%
τk = 20% τm = 10% σk = 4.0 σm = 9.0 -0.94% -0.15% 0.64% 0.39% 1.45% 0.02%
τk = 20% τm = 10% σk = 4.0 σm = 4.0 -0.93% -0.14% 0.64% 0.39% 1.45% 0.03%
τk = 20% τm = 10% σk = 4.0 σm = 2.3 -0.87% -0.09% 0.70% 0.45% 1.51% 0.08%
τk = 20% τm = 10% σk = 2.3 σm = 9.0 -0.92% -0.14% 0.65% 0.40% 1.46% 0.04%
τk = 20% τm = 10% σk = 2.3 σm = 4.0 -0.91% -0.13% 0.65% 0.41% 1.46% 0.04%
τk = 20% τm = 10% σk = 2.3 σm = 2.3 -0.85% -0.08% 0.71% 0.47% 1.52% 0.10%
τk = 20% τm = 20% σk = 9.0 σm = 9.0 -0.94% -0.16% 0.64% 0.39% 1.44% 0.02%
τk = 20% τm = 20% σk = 9.0 σm = 4.0 -0.94% -0.16% 0.63% 0.38% 1.42% 0.01%
τk = 20% τm = 20% σk = 9.0 σm = 2.3 -0.94% -0.16% 0.63% 0.38% 1.42% 0.01%
τk = 20% τm = 20% σk = 4.0 σm = 9.0 -0.94% -0.16% 0.63% 0.38% 1.42% 0.01%
τk = 20% τm = 20% σk = 4.0 σm = 4.0 -0.94% -0.16% 0.63% 0.38% 1.42% 0.01%
τk = 20% τm = 20% σk = 4.0 σm = 2.3 -0.94% -0.16% 0.63% 0.38% 1.42% 0.01%
τk = 20% τm = 20% σk = 2.3 σm = 9.0 -0.94% -0.16% 0.63% 0.38% 1.42% 0.01%
τk = 20% τm = 20% σk = 2.3 σm = 4.0 -0.94% -0.16% 0.63% 0.38% 1.42% 0.01%
τk = 20% τm = 20% σk = 2.3 σm = 2.3 -0.94% -0.16% 0.63% 0.38% 1.42% 0.01%
Note: Interregional trade imputed with Home Bias seed.
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Regional Computable General 
Equilibrium Models for Denmark 
 
Lars Brømsøe Termansen 
 
Resumé 
 
Hvert år, når den danske regering fremlægger finanslovsforslaget, er forslaget vedlagt en 
økonomisk effektberegning og en fremskrivning af økonomien. Disse beregninger er ba-
seret på økonomiske modeller, som ADAM og DREAM. Modellernes bidrag er deres 
evne til at holde styr på dynamiske sammenhænge, der er til stede i økonomien. 
 
Danmarks erhvervsliv har en regional dimension, hvor næsten halvdelen af produktionen 
sker i Hovedstadsregionen, mens resten er nogenlunde jævnt fordelt på de resterende 
regioner. Vi kan desuden observere, at mange erhverv har en tendens til at klumpe sig 
sammen i erhvervsklynger. Men netop det regionale perspektiv og klyngeeffekter er ikke 
indarbejdet i de nationale modeller som ADAM og DREAM. De er ikke bygget med 
formålet at analysere regionale effekter, og kan derfor ikke give informationer på det de-
taljeringsniveau, som er nødvendigt for at evaluere politiske initiativer med regionale im-
plikationer. 
 
For at give et sådant værktøj til regionale effektmålinger, præsenterer nærværende af-
handling tre papirer om regionale anvendte generelle ligevægtsmodeller. Modellerne tager 
højde for klyngeeffekter med agglomerationsegenskaber og er baseret på litteraturen om 
økonomisk geografi. 
 
Ved at introducere finansiel udligning mellem regioner, afslører det første papir          
(kapitel 2), at en sådan udligning vil ændre koncentrationsmønstret i modellen. Analysen 
viser, at et økonomisk center, til en hvis grad, kan beskattes og en del af skatteprovenuet 
overføres til et udkantsområde. Omkostningen er dog, at det økonomiske center er van-
skeligere at opretholde. 
 
Det andet papir (kapitel 3) fører analysen videre og introducerer lokale offentlige ydelser 
og trængselsomkostninger. Nu har modellen endnu færre løsninger med centre og ud-
kantsområder, idet koncentrationseffekterne modvirkes yderligere af effekterne af de nye 
udvidelser. Transfereringer mellem regioner trækker således ressourcer ud af økonomiske 
centre til gavn for borgerne i fattigere udkantsområder. Offentlige serviceydelser hæver, 
ydermere, nytten for borgerne, dog lægger det beslag på ressourcer der kunne være brugt 
i den private sektor. 
 
Resultaterne fra de stiliserede analyser tages videre i det sidste papir (kapitel 4), som præ-
senterer en regional anvendt generel ligevægtsmodel kalibreret til den danske økonomi. 
Modellen bruges til at analysere effekterne af udligningsreformen, der blev implementeret 
i 2007. Reformen betød at der blev flyttet penge fra det østlige til det vestlige Danmark. 
Simulationer viser at østdanmark reducerer den offentlige sektor, hvilket frigør ressourcer 
så den private sektor kan ekspandere. Modsat i vestdanmark, hvor det går ud over den 
private sektor, at den offentlige sektor udvider. Udligningsreformen betyder, at koncen-
trationen af videnstunge klynger i Hovedstadsregionen styrkes, mens klynger af fremstil-
lingsvirksomheder svækkes i det vestlige Danmark. Overordnet betyder den stærkere 
koncentration, at der kommer en velfærdsgevinst nationalt set, dog vil borgere i østdan-
mark tabe sammenlignet med borgere i vestdanmark. 
 
Arbejdet, der er præsenteret her i afhandlingen, er et første skridt på vejen til at konstrue-
re anvendte regionale generelle ligevægtsmodeller. Disse modeller vil kunne medregne 
klyngeeffekter, og vil kunne bruges til at analysere regionalpolitiske initiativer, specielt 
med fokus på erhvervslivets lokalisering og regionale velfærdseffekter. Papirerne i af-
handlingen lægger derfor et efterspurgt fundament til at udvikle nye værktøjer til analyse-
re regionalpolitik. Værktøjer, der vil bidrage til at øge informationsgrundlaget for beslut-
ningstagere, både generelt og mere specifikt i regionalpolitiske sammenhænge. 
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